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Switching: Cultural fluency sustains and cultural disfluency disrupts thinking fast
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2023
Abstract
Culture-as-situated cognition theory provides insight into the system 1 monitoring algorithm. Culture provides people with an organizing framework, facilitating predictions, focusing attention, and providing experiential signals of certainty and uncertainty as system 1 inputs. When culture-based signals convey that something is amiss, system 2 reasoning is triggered and engaged when resources allow; otherwise, system 1 reasoning dominates.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
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Author response
Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing