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The distinction between long-term knowledge and short-term control processes is valid and useful
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2023
Abstract
The binary distinction De Neys questions has been put forward many times since the beginnings of psychology, in slightly different forms and under different names. It has proved enormously useful and has received detailed empirical support and careful modeling. At heart the distinction is that between knowledge in long-term memory and control processes in short-term memory.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
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Author response
Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing