The making of knowledge and information into property, through intellectual property rights (IPRs) has commonly been justified using a set of cosmopolitan norms. These norms of justification have been extensively deployed within the structures of global governance for IPRs. However, the political community that underpins such norms in national jurisdictions is lacking at the global level. Many of the political problems now recognized with the globalized protection of IPRs stem from this tension between cosmopolitan legalism and the contemporary ‘thin’ global community.

The article contests the view that the Blair government has presided over the demise of cabinet government in the UK, and the rise of a kind of British presidentialism. By examining changes made at the very heart of government, chiefly in the Prime Minister's and Cabinet Offices, it argues that change under Labour marks the latest stage in the evolution of Britain's still functioning system of cabinet government. Moreover, recent reforms, like so many before, have been partly prompted by deep-seated administrative factors that have helped to shape the core executive for close to a century. Nevertheless, the article concedes that the Blair reforms do reflect an acceleration of pre-existing trends, with the result that the executive arm of government has been substantially enhanced. This has led to some change in the balance of power both within the core executive and across central government more widely.

The main methodological problem in assessing the impact of political institutions on any kind of performance stems from the possibility that institutions may be endogenous. As a result, institutions cannot be matched for the conditions under which they function. Inferences from such non-experimental observations are subject to several biases and, in the end, our conclusions may not be robust. One should not be confident, therefore, that any institutions would function in the same way under conditions different from those from which they are transplanted.

Critics of the global economic multilaterals (GEMs) – the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization – allege that these organizations fail the test of democratic accountability. Two distinct measures of democratic accountability have been applied to the GEMs. To the degree that these organizations display ‘accountability deficits’, those deficiencies are the result of choices by the most influential national governments. Three techniques have been deployed to enhance the accountability of the GEMs: transparency (more information for those outside the institution), competition (imitation of democratic accountability) and changes in rules of representation (accountability to stakeholders rather than shareholders). Each of these may impose costs, however, and may conflict with other valued aims of the organizations.

Legitimate political opposition constitutes a key component of any form of liberal democracy, which has, however, received surprisingly scant attention in the more recent political science literature. In an attempt to revitalize the debate about the various forms of political opposition, this paper starts with distinguishing five different ways or models of institutionalizing political opposition in liberal democratic systems. It goes on to look at how these different models have worked in the constitutional practice of selected western democracies. In the second part of this article, the focus is on the possible lessons that constitution-makers in democratizing countries could draw from this experience. Whereas there is no best model of opposition in general, some models would seem to be better suited to meet the particular needs of new democracies than others.

Set in the context of the larger literature on regionalist parties and specifically on the Italian Northern League, this paper examines and explains why the party moved from Euro-positivism to Euroscepticism. Drawing on concepts raised in the larger comparative politics literature, five explanations of this U-turn towards Europe are evaluated. It is argued that, despite the strength of explanations that focus on the desires of party supporters, the role of public opinion, the potential influence of economic investors or the role of EU-level institutions in shaping party preferences, a more cogent explanation focuses on domestic-level developments. The conclusions will underscore the general implications of this research for the study of parties, particularly regionalist ones in the EU, highlighting that a party's changing stance towards supranational integrationist polices can be best understood as a consequence of its experience in a political system's electoral system.

Since the 1980s the rise of so-called ‘populist parties’ has given rise to thousands of books, articles, columns and editorials. This article aims to make a threefold contribution to the current debate on populism in liberal democracies. First, a clear and new definition of populism is presented. Second, the normal-pathology thesis is rejected; instead it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies. Indeed, one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist. Third, it is argued that the explanations of and reactions to the current populist Zeitgeist are seriously flawed and might actually strengthen rather than weaken it.

Coalitions with left-of-centre parties have traditionally been regarded as the only viable option for Green parties that have shed their stance of radical opposition. The German Greens are investigated as a case study putting this assumption into doubt. Historical analysis of their relationship with the Social Democratic Party reveals how they slipped into life-threatening dependency on the latter. A survey of consecutive reinterpretations of the positioning formula ‘Neither right, nor left but ahead’ maps the struggle for an independent Green identity. An appraisal of recent debates about Conservative– Green alliances investigates the basis for Green coalition politics beyond the Social Democratic embrace.

‘Good losers’, legislators willing to play by parliamentary rules, even at the cost of defeat, are a microfoundation of democracy. Yet how they are created has not been adequately explained. Theories focusing on institutions, evolving norms, electoral incentives and ideology do not account for the case of post-war Japan, where deliberate disorder was common in the 1950s and 1960s, absent in the 1970s and 1980s, and returned in the 1990s. This paper highlights the importance of the legislative majority's behaviour in encouraging procedural compliance through the provision of informal mechanisms of consultation and compromise. The lack of such mechanisms also explains periods of parliamentary disorder in other countries.

In this article attention is focused on the features of the emerging Romanian banking system, its failures, and their determinants. These failures were either politically driven or simply a result of the weak regulatory capacity of the state (as the owner of the banks) and lax monitoring from the central bank, as the central authority entrusted with the responsibility to maintain a well-functioning banking system. The reluctance of various governments, regardless of their political orientation, to apply sanctions against banks that are in trouble until the last possible moment encourage excessive risk-taking when banks first encounter financial difficultics, and asset-stripping when the insiders realize that a bank's continued viability is in jeopardy. Based on a number of case studies, the article argues that, in post-1989 Romania, insider trading, self-loans and blunt theft appeared more as systemic features rather than isolated incidents.

Networks of government officials – police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators – are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century. Yet, these networks present significant accountability and legitimacy concerns. This article identifies and responds to the potential problems of government networks by suggesting means to increase their accountability and proposing norms to govern the relations of members of government networks with one another. Finally, the article develops the concept of disaggregated sovereignty, arguing that government networks have the capacity to enter into international regulatory regimes of various types and thereby are independently bound by the existing corpus of international law.

The case of Israeli identity is a good example of the paradox of national identity and national self-determination. On the one hand Israelis put forwards ‘centripetal’ claims about why they are part of the family of nations. These claims are based on universal arguments and would go hand-in-hand with universal (often liberal) values. On the other hand they maintain ‘centrifugal’ claims, about ‘breaking away’, and about why their nation feels different from other nations. Centrifugal claims emphasize a people's uniqueness and tend to refer to particularistic morality. In the case of Israeli identity, emphasizing the particularistic goes together with chauvinistic attitudes towards other nations.

It is argued that the more vulnerable Israelis feel, the more they define themselves in a centrifugal way, that is, by distinguishing themselves from the rest of humankind. This tendency, I argue, proves a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more a nation defines itself in centrifugal terms, the more paranoid it becomes; this, in turn, serves to fan the flames of suspicion even more, and sustains the nation's self-image as different, unique and detached. The nation enters a vicious circle, which prevents it from becoming a normal member of the family of nations.

The objective of this paper is to reconstruct both the Kursk incident and especially the reaction to it by Russian military and political authorities with the aim of gauging the extent of continuity and change of Soviet-era practices in three key areas of contemporary Russia's public institutional life: (1) the organizational behaviour and institutional culture of the Russian military; (2) the behaviour of Russia's executive political leadership, i.e. President Vladimir Putin; and (3) the media of mass communication. Reaction to such crises, the author argues, can shed much light on the actual behavioural patterns and operating assumptions of relevant institutions and leaders. The method employed is essentially a detailed forensic reconstruction of the incident and its aftermath from three angles: the reactions of the military authorities; the reactions of Putin; and the reactions of the mass media (and of the authorities to the mass media).

The individual is nonsense, the individual is zero.

Vladimir Mayakovsky, 1921

Human life still costs nothing here.

Leonid Radzikhovskii, 2000

This paper outlines the elements of a pluralistic system of accountability with regard to one of the most ambitious institutional innovations in global governance: multisectoral public policy networks. These networks bring together the public sector (governments and international organizations), civil society and business around issues ranging from corruption, climate change and fighting malaria to environmental and labour standards. We argue that multisectoral networks should be embedded in a pluralistic system of accountability making use of a combination of accountability mechanisms on a number of dimensions (actors, process, outcomes). The paper discusses some of the key conceptual, empirical and practical challenges of a ‘learning model’ of accountability in networks.

The aim of this article is to account for the differences in electoral support for social democratic parties in Scandinavia in recent years. The main argument put forward is that the relative success of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) in preserving voter support compared to the major decline for both the Danish and Norwegian social democrats should be understood by focusing on two factors, both related to the phenomenon of issue-voting. We argue that the relative success of the SAP must been seen in light of the way in which traditional political issues, like employment and social welfare, have continued to dominate Swedish political debates, whereas in Norway and Denmark, new political issues, particularly immigration, have sailed up the political agenda and paved the way for new right-wing parties which attract social democratic voters. Secondly, we believe that one issue in particular, that of the future of the welfare state, is important for preserving social democratic support. Therefore, it is also relevant that the Swedish Social Democratic Party appears to have been more successful than social democratic parties in the neighbouring countries in convincing voters that it is the party best suited to preserve the existing welfare system.

This article is one of a series commissioned by Government and Opposition exploring identity politics in several national and international contexts. Though ostensibly a civic republic, Ireland has been shaped by a certain conception of Irish culture. Cultural claims are typically political but have the potential to allow community interests to override concern for individual well-being. The construction of the Irish state focused on the maintenance of an idea of being Irish rather than on the welfare of people throughout Ireland, both North and South. As a result, a conservative formulation of Irish identity was locked into the state's structures.

The paper explores the construction of both Muslim and Islamist identities and the ways in which they interact, converge and diverge. This exploration is set against the background of debates on the nature of Islamism and its positioning vis-à-vis modernity and post-modernity. The paper argues that processes of modernity and post-modernity may be at work in the production of Muslim identities, but highlights the need to examine how different dimensions of identity formation such as socio-economic position, gender, age and lifestyle enter into the formation of Muslim selves. This is made necessary if we accept the premise of the sociality and historicity of religion.

This article explores the ways and extents that civil society associations can bring greater public accountability to global governance. The analysis first reviews the growth of civil society engagement of global governance. Second, the article elaborates four general ways that civil society associations have promoted increased accountability in global governance: by increasing the public transparency of global governance operations; by monitoring and reviewing global policies; by seeking redress for mistakes and harms attributable to global regulatory bodies; and by advancing the creation of formal accountability mechanisms for global governance. Third, the article identifies six broad circumstances that have affected (and often limited) the extent of civil society achievements with respect to accountability in global governance.