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Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Anne-Marie Slaughter
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Abstract

Networks of government officials – police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators – are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century. Yet, these networks present significant accountability and legitimacy concerns. This article identifies and responds to the potential problems of government networks by suggesting means to increase their accountability and proposing norms to govern the relations of members of government networks with one another. Finally, the article develops the concept of disaggregated sovereignty, arguing that government networks have the capacity to enter into international regulatory regimes of various types and thereby are independently bound by the existing corpus of international law.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , 2004 , pp. 159 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2004

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References

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64 Ibid.

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68 Ibid., p. 26. As noted above, Wolfgang Reinicke similarly emphasizes the extent to which globalization, unlike interdependence, penetrates the deep structure and strategic behaviour of corporations and other actors in the international system.

69 Ibid.

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