No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
The dual systems in temporal cognition: A spatial analogy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 December 2019
Abstract
The model presented by the authors can explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. In this commentary I suggest a way in which another paradox of our phenomenal temporality may be addressed along these lines. In the final section, I also discuss some concerns that may arise about the clear-cut distinction between humans and non-human animals.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
References
Camos, V. & Tillmann, B. (2008) Discontinuity in the enumeration of sequentially presented auditory and visual stimuli. Cognition 107:1135–43.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kaufman, E. L., Lord, M. W., Reese, T. W. & Volkmann, J. (1949) The discrimination of visual number. The American Journal of Psychology 62(4):498–525.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Roselli, A. (2018) Temporal subitizing and temporal counting: a proposal between vision and action. RIFAJ, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 9(2). https://doi.org/10.13130/2037-4445/11096.Google Scholar
Savage-Rumbaugh, S. & Lewin, R. (1996) Kanzi: The ape at the brink of the human mind. Turner.Google Scholar
Trick, L. M. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1994) Why are small and large numbers enumerated differently? A limited-capacity preattentive stage in vision. Psychological Review 101(1):80–102.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Target article
Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition
Related commentaries (33)
A dual-systems perspective on temporal cognition: Implications for the role of emotion
A theory stuck in evolutionary and historical time
Animals are not cognitively stuck in time
Are counterfactuals in and about time?
Beings in the moment
Closing the symbolic reference gap to support flexible reasoning about the passage of time
Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition
From temporal updating to temporal reasoning: Developments in young children's temporal representations
Future-oriented objects
Identity-based motivation and the paradox of the future self: Getting going requires thinking about time (later) in time (now)
Let's call a memory a memory, but what kind?
Limitations of Hoerl and McCormack's dual systems model of temporal consciousness
Locating animals with respect to landmarks in space-time
Locating the contradiction in our understanding of time
Neural correlates of temporal updating and reasoning in association with neuropsychiatric disorders
No doing without time
Nonhuman sequence learning findings argue against Hoerl and McCormack's two systems of temporal cognition
On believing that time does not flow, but thinking that it seems to
On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system
Problems with the dual-systems approach to temporal cognition
Temporal representation and reasoning in non-human animals
Temporal updating, behavioral learning, and the phenomenology of time-consciousness
The dual systems in temporal cognition: A spatial analogy
The “now moment” is believed privileged because “now” is when happening is experienced
Thinking about the past as the past for the past's sake: Why did temporal reasoning evolve?
Thinking about thinking about time
Thinking about time and number: An application of the dual-systems approach to numerical cognition
Time, flow, and space
Timers from birth: Early timing abilities exceed limits of the temporal updating system
Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal cognition
Updating and reasoning: Different processes, different models, different functions
Updating the dual systems model of temporal cognition: Reasoning with dynamic systems theory
What time words teach us about children's acquisition of the temporal reasoning system
Author response
Temporal updating, temporal reasoning, and the domain of time