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A pointer's hypothesis of general intelligence evolved from domain-specific demands

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 August 2017

X. T. (Xiao-Tian) Wang
X. T. (Xiao-Tian) Wang*
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD [email protected]://usd-apps.usd.edu/xtwanglab/
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Abstract

A higher-order function may evolve phylogenetically if it is demanded by multiple domain-specific modules. Task-specificity to solve a unique adaptive problem (e.g., foraging or mating) should be distinguished from function-specificity to deal with a common computational demand (e.g., numeracy, verbal communication) required by many tasks. A localized brain function is likely a result of such common computational demand.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e221
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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