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Firestone & Scholl conflate two distinct issues
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2017
Abstract
Firestone & Scholl (F&S) seem to believe that the viability of a distinction between perception and cognition depends on perception being encapsulated from top-down information. We criticize this assumption and argue that top-down effects can leave the distinction between perception and cognition fully intact. Individuating the visual system is one thing; the question of encapsulation is quite another.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016
References
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Target article
Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects
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