This article serves as an introduction to the special issue on ‘Populism and Right-Wing Legal Mobilization in Europe’. We point to the dependence of populists in power on non-state actors: populist governments have ideological and political reasons to need the support of civil society’s right-wing representatives and have the financial and institutional means to strengthen those organizations. We then map right-wing legal mobilization in Europe based on the analyses in the special issue. By right-wing legal mobilization, we understand the organized efforts, resources, and strategies employed by individuals, groups, or organizations with conservative or right-leaning ideologies to embody their values in positive law and its interpretation. The text concludes with a dynamic normative framework to assess this type of mobilization. Drawing on recent contributions from comparative constitutional law, human rights, and socio-legal studies, we argue that the analysis and evaluation of right-wing legal mobilization could be based on a comprehensive analysis of three bundles of issues: (1) the relationship between mobilizing actors and the courts, as well as the local standard of judicial independence, (2) the relation of right-wing argumentation to systemic linkages and historical trajectories of human rights, (3) the redistributive effect (economic and symbolic) and the potential success of such mobilization on the legal capacities of other actors who may have opposing interests. From this perspective, the problematic part of right-wing legal mobilization in the context of populism is, therefore, not its ideological, conservative character but its influence on the rule of law to gain strategic advantage. In the process, the very idea of the rule of law and the related issue of civic agency may be compromised.

This introduction develops a theoretical framework for understanding authoritarian backsliding against the backdrop of existing historical and European socio-legal scholarship. It introduces a number of key distinctions to better understand socio-legal variance among autocratisation. Specifically, it highlights the distinction between authoritarian backsliding and complete breakdown of judicial independence and human rights

Authoritarian backsliding is an aggravated form of rule of law decay, where functioning of key rule of law institutions comes under direct threat and it is mostly observable in the contemporary Central and Eastern European context. This differs from historical instances of authoritarian turn referring to the complete breakdown of judicial independence and human rights, characterised by the politicisation of courts as a mainly historical phenomenon. The differentiation and their socio-legal implications is crucial for developing a roadmap to identify different forms of autocratisation and their different contexts (actors, institutional and political context) that need to be considered when addressing rule of law decay in Europe, both at the national and supranational levels. Ultimately, this general overview also offers the possibility to identify and address latent discontinuities in rule of law development at both the supranational and national levels. Identification of such latent discontinuities is of importance when assessing the risks involved in the introduction of emergency measures to combat perceived threats to the state and the society.

Some recent work on populist conservative forces engaged in legal mobilization in Europe highlights the involvement of US-based conservative legal advocacy organizations and their European affiliates. These groups are linked to efforts to resist the integration of Europe and the power of the European courts to implement the projects of liberal, left-leaning pro-EU social forces. Little attention thus far has focused on the lawyers active in these advocacy groups, their ties to the American conservative legal movement and the transnational lawyer networks of which they are a part. This essay sketches an agenda for future research on the composition, operations, strategies and discourse of this complex constellation of conservative lawyers and their organizations.

It is now over ten years since the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) first established that asylum seekers are inherently and particularly vulnerable on account of their very situation as asylum seekers. This occurred in its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. This article critically examines the Court’s subsequent asylum jurisprudence through the lens of vulnerability. The analysis reveals that the Court has engaged in ‘vulnerability backsliding’. Specifically, it traces the ways in which the Court has surreptitiously reversed the very principle of asylum vulnerability it itself established in M.S.S. The consequence of this backsliding is not only that the judicially recognised concept of asylum vulnerability is undermined, but that some of the most vulnerable applicants that come before the Court suffer renewed marginalisation, and, in some circumstances, exclusion from the ‘special protection’ to which they were previously afforded courtesy of M.S.S.

This article critically examines the significance of the relationship between past and present for understanding liberal democratic values in the European context. The article starts by reflecting on the terms used to evaluate the apparent decline in the rule of law in Europe, including ‘backsliding’. It argues that these terms are indicative of a conceptual framework of analysis that includes a temporal dimension but is only partly historical, demonstrating a presentist focus and a perception of the past as a separate period. The article links this perception with the conceptual construction of the rule of law itself, as well as national and transnational narratives about it, which evoke Europe’s non-democratic past as a definitional point of reference that is distinct from the present. Using examples of the legacies of Europe’s dark legal past, the article highlights the artificial nature of this distinction for a range of systems with differing historical experiences. The article argues that interpreting the past in terms of segmented and sequential temporal periods is conceptually contestable and it draws on the philosophy of history to show how the past can instead be understood to have ‘sedimentary’ layers and to endure over time. Ultimately, the article argues that the relationship between law’s past and law’s present needs to be reconceptualised in terms of metaphorical ‘fault lines’ in the rule of law, to acknowledge the potentially disruptive effects of history and to facilitate a critical reimagining of the rule of law’s theoretical and factual foundations.

This article discusses the thin socio-legal conceptualisation of the rule of law in Hungary. Employing a culturalist perspective, it first shows how the rule of law had a thin foundation prior to the Second World War in this country. Then, the contribution demonstrates how, contrary to previous understandings, even in the most advanced stages of rule of law building in Hungary, in the early 1990s, the resulting concept had been thin mainly focusing on institutional guarantees and legal certainty. The remaining part of the contribution then critically discusses whether and to what extent it is possible to use backsliding to frame the ongoing legal changes in Hungary.

Though the Polish rule of law crisis has been on the scholarly agenda since the Law and Justice Party (PiS) took power in 2015, the individual agents of legal disruption within the judiciary have been largely off the radar. This intervention aims to fill this gap. This article analyses the legal mobilisation practices of the Supreme Court (SC) judges appointed by the PiS party in a court-packing manner after 2017. It is argued that this is a specific type of legal mobilisation; because it is conducted from within the legal system by judges, it aims to challenge doctrinal views strategically and to legitimise the status of unlawfully elected judges, which consequently destabilises the legal system. Because the legal tools to solve the conflict appear to have been exhausted, new judges engage in public discourse to convince citizens that they have a right to sit on the bench. In the first part of this paper, I critically analyse this public discourse in order to explain the framing of the rule of law crisis. The analysis of this discourse is drawn from 106 texts produced by new SC judges between 2017 and 2023. It is argued that although the ‘populist’ group of SC judges is internally differentiated and does not exhibit clear ideological linkage with the PiS party, it strategically produces certain legal narratives in which their appointments and judicial practices at the SC conform to the Constitution and to relevant statutes and, as such, are legitimate in legal terms. The new judges’ narratives are based on four populist dichotomies that distinguish them from old judges (legitimacy–lack of legitimacy, autonomy–political dependence, formal rule of law–legal anarchy and accountability–corporatism). In the second part, the article proceeds to analyse selected case law of the Supreme Court to explore whether and how court-packing makes it more responsive to the legal mobilisation of the conservative Christian organisation Ordo Iuris (OI) and helps the governing party maintain its power. It is argued that the judicial mobilisation inside the packed Supreme Court is mostly of a discursive nature, as there is limited evidence that newly appointed judges side ideologically with the government and right-wing organisations in recent case law.

States’ bordering practices force individuals to undertake dangerous migratory journeys and put them at risk of severe human rights violations. Yet, irregular arrivals who are found not to be at risk of serious harm in their countries of origin are perceived as voluntary migrants and are therefore assumed not to be in need of protection. This article employs the concept of vulnerability to challenge the idea that both the initial and subsequent dangerous migratory journeys are undertaken voluntarily. Based on an analysis of trafficking-based asylum claims from the UK and Germany, the article shows that both re-trafficking and irregular re-migration result from vulnerabilities which converge to preclude reintegration in the country of origin and access to livelihood options. While some of these vulnerabilities are likely to be present at the time of the initial dangerous journey already, the article pays particular attention to ‘consequential vulnerabilities’ brought about by previous migration experiences. It then introduces the concept of ‘route causes’ of irregular re-migration to describe factors which heighten the risk of re-migrating irregularly and therefore establish a risk on return related to harm experienced during irregular migration, rather than in the country of origin. Thus, the article shows that the vulnerability concept informs the future risk analysis in refugee law and argues that, just like a risk of re-trafficking, a risk of irregular re-migration could form the basis of an asylum claim.

Both Hungary and Poland have been in the spotlight regarding their democratic backsliding, with Executives exerting control over supposedly independent pillars of democracy, such as courts or the media. While the concerns about these countries also voiced by leaders of European institutions were similar, the resistance against the systematic erosion of judicial independence comes in different forms. Using comparative longitudinal case study methodology, this article shows that a defining characteristic in the potential, visibility and feasibility of what judges did or could do under the current threats depends on the role judicial associations, understood as representative collegial judicial bodies. More precisely, the format, organisation and operative tools of judicial associations contribute to their influence on prior judicial reforms and their capacity to withstand ongoing efforts in curtailing their independence from political actors. Empirically, the article reviews multiple judicial changes in the 1992–2015 period in both countries and assesses how judicial associations then shaped the divergent responses to recent attempts at limiting judicial independence. The differences in the legal framework, organisation and network reliance explains variance in resistance. Overall, the article broadens the theoretical and empirical framework for studying the role of courts and judges with considerations regarding professional association organisation and co-ordination, as a potential layer of studying judicial resistance.

The traditional drafting and subsequent implementation of international refugee law have been criticised for relying on a male-centric understanding of persecution. Whilst this framework has recently shifted to include a more gender-sensitive interpretation, I argue that this introduction of gender within refugee status determination has traditionally relied on narratives infused with gendered and racialised stereotypes. In particular, it relies on a ‘white saviour’ colonial narrative that perceives refugee women as vulnerable victims in need of saving. Drawing on a decolonial and critical epistemological analysis that includes both a race and gender dimension, I unpack the epistemic violence and hidden colonial legacies in the representation of refugee women in case-law. Ultimately, this article concludes with a call for reframing the legal narrative around refugee women by approaching them as political actors rather than oppressed and vulnerable subjects.

What are the legal and political criteria that distinguish between ‘correct’ and ‘unacceptable’ legal mobilisation? How does populism facilitate legal mobilisation? The questions of the workshop organizers led us back in Hungary to the democratic transition from socialism to liberal democracy in 1989, when legal mobilisation for the rule of law, democracy and human rights was led first and primarily by non-state actors (National Round Table). Participants of the democratic transition prepared the complete revision of the 1949 Constitution, which was an emblematic element in addition to the many legislative drafts of the transitory nature of the creation of the new system. In 2010, after the successful political mobilisation, the populist party coalition (lead by Viktor Orban) gained a two-thirds constitution-making majority in Parliament (in the absence of two opposition parties), and the Parliament adopted the new Fundamental Law (new constitution). This was also an emblematic element of the new legal mobilisation conducted by the two-thirds populist Government majority. This article will describe how populism – through the instrumentalisation of the law (disregarding the inherent values in/of law based on value choice) and the destruction of institutional checks and balances – facilitated new legal mobilisation. Based on this experience of the outcome of the equally strong and effective legal mobilisation in Hungary of the liberal and the illiberal (democratic and autocratic, respectively) transitions, in this article we aim to make valid theoretical propositions on how to assess ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ legal mobilisation and what influences the relevance of non-state actors in populism.

In recent years, Western governments have invoked the values of universal human rights to justify large-scale military operations. Critical theorists have often responded that these campaigns serve not to promote peace, stability, or prosperity, but to entrench Western economic and political power, often in ways that have been devastating for local populations. However, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine casts doubt on whether assumptions about Western dominance will continue to furnish adequate accounts of global armed conflict. Critical theorists base many of their views on what is sometimes called ‘memory politics’, meaning that they cite histories of Western militarism, colonialism, racism and economic exploitation as backdrops to current policies. In this article it is argued that they will only be able to explain a conflict like the Ukraine war with credibility by incorporating into their memory politics the left’s own histories of supporting autocratic regimes.

This paper analyses the growing litigation before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by conservative European Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) who exploit legal opportunities and other advocacy tactics. These actors oppose the liberal insistence on permissive individual freedom, minority rights and mandatory vaccination. Instead, they promote the sanctity of life, traditional values and harsh terrorism penalties. In this study we show that conservative legal mobilisation is not only related to litigation but also covers the execution of certain ECtHR judgments and the nomination of some European judges. We analyse their tactics using legal and sociolegal methodology (interviews, analysis of legal documents and jurisprudence and network analysis) to characterise their influence on the European human rights system and the reactions of the Council of Europe. We reflect on the moral values claimed by conservative NGOs and their liberal counterparts by analysing how powerful private actors, driven by material and moral interests, take creative initiatives that shape or reshape case law and its politicisation through alliances with so-called ‘illiberal’ and ‘populist’ states.

This article aims to reflect on ‘ecological vulnerability’ – which makes evident the relationship, flows and interactions between the human being/body and the environment/non-human world – as applied in the context of environmentally induced migration. In particular, the dual role of the law vis-à-vis environmentally displaced migrants as a generator and exacerbator of their vulnerability as well as potential antidote, valuable for attaining protection, will be highlighted. Namely, on one hand, the analysis will show how a lack of conceptualisation of the notion to understand the spatial and temporal patterns of climate change-related migration, as well as its consequences for societal well-being, contributes to generate and exacerbate the vulnerability of that category of migrants. On the other hand, the critical understanding of vulnerability, as developed in some recent legal reasoning of international and national jurisdictions, will be proposed as a key element for ensuring the resilience of both environmental migrants and the law itself, for both virtuously expanding traditional asylum norms and flexibilising access to international protection for those migrants.

The toolbox for resisting illiberalism is quite diverse. It includes high-level diplomatic negotiations concerning sanctions to enforce democracy and citizens’ mobilisation for local causes. This article focuses on strategic litigation as legal mobilisation, relying on the language of rights and the rule of law and addressing courts as defenders of liberal democracy. Such mobilisation leads to litigation before national and European courts concerning issues such as media freedom, judicial independence, minority rights or the rights of migrants. In order to be authoritative, however, courts need support from political institutions at national and EU levels from the transnational judicial community and from civil society. The embeddedness in structured civil causes and organisations seems particularly relevant in the context of strategic litigation. This article aims to map out particular factors in the EU legal and institutional systems that directly affect the prospects of strategic litigation against illiberal reforms using EU law.

On the one hand, the EU legal system does not provide direct access to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The multilevel system of judicial protection in the EU means that litigation aimed at resisting illiberalism mostly needs to start before national courts, making it vulnerable to political capture of national judiciary. On the other hand, the EU law system is based on the purposive constitutional framework of the Treaties. The tendency to follow a teleological interpretation of the CJEU makes it a promising ground for advocating for new interpretations of the law in light of a changing social context. Finally, EU law is a system with a particular legal culture and a field of experts who are well-versed in applying that culture. This field does not directly overlap with the specialised lawyers who often initiate strategic litigation; who tend to be experts in the fields of migration, transparency or the environment; and who do not have a broader understanding of EU law and its integration logic.

To date the mainstreaming of equality and human rights law into public sector organisations has been underwhelming with the implementation of these norms being ad hoc and inconsistent. Existing research on factors that influence implementation has been either too general or too disjointed. This article has two aims to advance research on the implementation of equality and human rights: (i) to outline factors that influence the implementation of these norms and (ii) provide a more settled foundations for future research on equality and human rights implementation. It does this through interviews, undertaken in 2018–2019, with individuals responsible for leading the implementation of equality and human rights law within public sector organisations (specifically regulators, inspectorates and ombudsmen) in England and Wales. On the basis of this, the article makes suggestions for how the implementation of equality and human rights can be advanced further through changes to the regulatory environment.

The fact that migration cases seldom raise any questions under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is neither inevitable nor justified. This article reaffirms the equality provision as a useful and indeed necessary mechanism for the European Court of Human Rights to deal with such applications. More concretely, we build on our previous work, which identified a legal tool suitable for achieving this reorientation in judicial practice: the principle that we call ‘migratory vulnerability’, once recalibrated away from a group-based approach to a notion of vulnerability as situational and socially induced. In this article, we explain how the principle of migratory vulnerability, even if it does not represent an inherently suspect ground of differentiation, enables us to identify instances of discrimination defined as a measurable disadvantage that is disproportionate or arbitrary and cannot, therefore, be reasonably justified on the basis of the Convention. This presupposes a move away from nationality as a privileged ground in migration-related cases and from the ‘comparator’ test to determine Article 14 ECHR violations, to also encompass situational experiences. We end with two examples that show that this reconceptualization is both workable in practice and of added value, enabling the Court to find violations that presently go undetected.

The role of social movements and civil society actors in rights advancement has been frequently emphasised. The assumption is that legal mobilisation by civil society actors works towards the extension of rights and the emancipation and advancement of justice for distinctive (minority) groups in society. While traditionally, socio-legal attention on social movement and civil society actions around rights promotion was particularly prominent in the US, for some time now the European context has also been approached from such a socio-legal lens. However, a one-sided, liberal–progressive understanding of social mobilisation around rights has, importantly, been put to the test by recent manifestations of societal actors. Conservative actors tend to (1) promote a restrictive interpretation or a radical reinterpretation of existing rights (e.g. abortion, free speech), (2) limit the diffusion of new rights (e.g. the rights to euthanasia or legalizing surrogate maternity) and/or (3) call for the interruption of the further extensions of rights (e.g. with regard to same-sex marriage, LGBTIQ issues). The analysis of legal mobilisation by such conservative right-wing actors indicates that mobilisational repertoires are strikingly similar to those of liberal actors. This article will discuss the notions of civil society and legal mobilisation and call for a rethinking of these concepts, in part because of the increasing manifestation of societal actors that are in contrast to the traditional liberal paradigm. The article will subsequently engage in a detailed study of one such actor – the Polish legal think tank Ordo Iuris (OI) – with regard to its third-party or amicus curiae interventions at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), stressing the difference of orientation of such interventions from those of liberal actors and also indicating dimensions of ambivalence and similarity in their approaches.