What factors explain Latino support for conspiracy theories? Contemporary scholarship offers valuable insights on how psychological, social, and political factors shape support for conspiracy theories. At the same time, scholarly understanding of the dynamics that foster conspiracy beliefs among racial and ethnic minorities is much more limited. Utilizing survey responses from more than 1,000 Latinos, we theorize explicitly about the factors that explain their support for conspiracies. Consistent with the scholarship highlighting in-group diversity among Latinos, we reveal significant differences among Latinos in their propensity to harbor conspiracy beliefs. Some of the factors that influence their support for conspiratorial statements align with the broader literature, other results appear unique to Latino Americans. Religiosity, lack of trust in institutions, and conservative political ideology are associated with higher levels of conspiracy beliefs among Latinos. We also find that Latinos from later generations, those who consume Spanish media, and who disagree that Latinos face discrimination and White privilege exists are more likely to believe in certain conspiracy theories.

This article investigates how Black voters choose candidates in majority-Black congressional districts. Partisanship often drives Black vote choice, but the lack of competition in general elections reduces its relevance and highlights the importance of primary elections. Racial cues are also referenced in literature, but the electoral setting reduces the relevance of race. Majority-Black congressional districts are racially homogeneous, and all emerging candidates are Black. Race cannot be used to distinguish between candidates. Congressional primary elections are also considered low-information environments, and voters have limited knowledge about the emerging candidates. In these settings, Black voters turn to cues to choose candidates. Since partisan and racial cues are not viable options, I argue that Black voters seek cues that signal group consensus. I highlight the role of endorsements and public opinion data. I utilize a mixed methodological approach incorporating a randomized survey experiment and focus group discussions with Black primary voters. Results from both methods suggest consensus cues are essential. Experimental results found no significant difference between racial and partisan endorsements, but they found a positive and significant effect for high polling. Focus group respondents had sincere preferences but were willing to abandon them if they differed from the group consensus. They also pointed to the importance of the media. I conducted an exploratory analysis of my experimental results, and I found that those with higher levels of media attention are more likely to rely on consensus cues. These results provide important insight into Black vote choice in majority-Black congressional districts.

Why is solidarity between people of color (PoC) so difficult to achieve? New evidence suggests solidarity can be activated through a sense of shared discrimination between PoC. Yet other research highlights many real-world obstacles to this solidarity, including recurring inter-minority conflicts. We consider system justification as one possible mechanism that undercuts PoC solidarity. System justification is a human motive to bolster the status quo. System justifiers who are PoC condone racial inequalities as stable, predictable, and just—which alleviates mental stressors associated with their own racially stigmatized status. We investigate system justification’s impacts on Asian Americans: a key party to many coalitions and conflicts with Black and Latino people. Using national survey data, we find that system justification is significantly associated with Asian opposition to solidarity with Black Lives Matter, net of racial resentment, and other key covariates. We then refine this result experimentally by exposing Asian adults to the model minority myth—a system-legitimizing ideology. Exposure to this myth triggers system justification, which then increases Asian opposition to pro-Black and pro-Latino policies, among other solidarity-based outcomes. Both results are primarily driven by conservative Asian Americans, highlighting a need to better appreciate Asian Americans’ ideological diversity in U.S. racial politics.

Different participatory mechanisms for the representation of Indigenous peoples have been proposed across states. Since their creation in 1867, the Māori electorates in the national Parliament have led to dedicated representation for Māori (Indigenous peoples of New Zealand). However, only half of Māori choose to vote on the Māori roll, the remainder choosing to vote on the General roll, illustrating that roll choice is not based simply on group representation. This survey aimed to ask Māori (N = 1,958) in their own words why they made their roll choice. Through a deductive codebook thematic analysis, a range of codes were constructed around the reasoning behind roll choice. Māori on the Māori roll made their choice because they valued Māori representation; as an expression of their identity; to support the electorates; as a strategic choice; or they had been influenced by others or through education. Those on the General roll felt their roll was the default or a more familiar option; the Māori roll had less of an impact; it was a strategic choice, or they appreciated greater candidate variety; or they valued the smaller geographic electorate size. Some felt Māori no longer needed separate representation or felt less connected to their identity as Māori. The results have implications for both Māori and Indigenous representation through dedicated representational mechanisms.

Political self-efficacy, the civic duty to vote, and a homogeneous political atmosphere have been identified as important antecedents of turnout. However, little is known about how they explain voting behavior among minorities, who have an inherent motivation to protect their minority rights. In this article, I examine how belonging to a minority, political self-efficacy, the civic duty to vote, and a shared party identification are connected to intentions to vote. Analyzing nationally representative panel data in a structural equation model, I compare Swedish-speaking minority adolescents and Finnish-speaking majority adolescents—groups that mainly share similar background characteristics in all but language and their minority or majority status. According to the results, the significantly higher voting intentions found among the minority can partly be derived from their higher level of political self-efficacy. The unilingually Swedish-speaking adolescents also seem to benefit from their more pronounced and homogenous political atmosphere.

Who is deemed deathworthy, and how is this status produced? What discourses, affects, and histories enable the industrialization of premature Black death while rendering it largely invisible? Rooted in a decolonial queer feminist epistemological framework, this article examines how discursive and affective strategies in U.K. print media and immigration policies during the European “refugee crisis” (2013–2016) justified routine death-making at sea. Conceptualizing Blackness as a relational political and epistemological tool, the article reveals how media and state actors—drawing on racialized mythologies of young single Black men and appeals to imperial nostalgia—constructed these men as objects of panic, disgust, resentment, and fear. Applying collocation analysis and visualization techniques, the article theorizes “affective-racialized networks”—discursive formations that circulate and accumulate affective meanings across space and time, shaping public perception and legitimizing policies of deterrence, externalization, and active abandonment. These networks sustained the routinized deaths of Black migrant men at sea, reinforcing Europe’s imperial border regimes. By foregrounding the mutual constitution of race, affect, and temporality, this study expands migration scholarship’s engagement with race, demonstrating how racial logics operate beyond geopolitical and temporal boundaries through transnational circuits of meaning, power, and governance. The article argues that centering Blackness and affect is essential to understanding how racialization functions and how Black deaths are rendered normative within global bordering practices.

This paper examines the impact of demographic change on political perceptions, specifically attitudes toward the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol. Utilizing data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey, we explore how changes in county-level nonwhite populations influence whether individuals label the event as a protest or an insurrection. Our findings reveal a curvilinear relationship: respondents in counties with moderate increases in nonwhite populations are more likely to view the event as an insurrection, while those in counties with substantial increases tend to see it as a protest. This pattern holds across racial groups but is primarily driven by respondents who did not vote for President Trump. The study shows the broader implications of demographic shifts on political stability and social cohesion, highlighting how changes in racial and ethnic composition shape interpretations of major political events. These insights are crucial for understanding voter behavior and political messaging in the 2024 presidential election.

Widespread claims of voter fraud following the 2020 election were leveraged in an attempt to overturn the result. While many studies have focused on White Americans’ acceptance of these claims, few have examined the responses of Americans of color. This study explores how racial civic pride influences attitudes toward voter fraud claims among different racial groups. We turn to the 2020 CMPS and find that for Black, Latino, and Asian Americans, increased racial civic pride correlates with reduced belief in voter fraud. In contrast, White Americans with higher racial civic pride are more likely to believe such claims. This divergence is evident across all partisan groups. For non-White Americans, racial civic pride is tied to historical struggles for voting rights and racial justice, with voter fraud allegations threatening these values. Conversely, for White Americans, high racial civic pride is linked to preserving their dominance and status. Finally, we find that voter fraud beliefs are not without consequence: they diminish trust in electoral democracy, result in greater support for restrictive electoral policies, and increase support for future violence. Together, these results highlight the differential influence of race and racial civic pride on Americans’ democratic beliefs.

Since 2021, 18 states in the USA have restricted education on race and structural inequality. Conservative coalitions frame these restrictions as a war on “woke” ideologies. Through interviews with youth and educators in locales (Florida; Georgia; and York, Pennsylvania) that restrict education on race and structural inequality, I investigate the following: What discourses do students and educators use to describe bills that restrict race-related studies? What, if anything, do their discourses suggest about the perceived political implications of these restrictions?

In this study, I argue that gleaning students’ and educators’ views on “anti-woke” legislation sheds light on the perceived political consequences of these bills for American democracy. I find that students and educators perceive restrictions on race-related studies as epistemic injustices that divest society of the knowledge to identify, problematize, and redress the structural conditions that (re)produce racial subordination. For participants, the health of democracy is contingent on addressing racial disempowerment. Hence, they suggest that restrictions on race-related studies encumber democracy precisely because these policies impose epistemologies of racial ignorance that impede racial redress and allow systems of racial inequality to fester.

In recent years, the number of migrant deaths and disappearances in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coasts has risen steadily. The arrival of small boats with migrants on board on the Spanish and Italian coasts has received a lot of media attention, and European Governments are investing more than in the past to stop unauthorized arrivals on their shores. Certain narratives from governments and officials of international organizations attribute these deaths to “smugglers” and the dangerous routes they take. However, this article provides evidence that the higher mortality rates are the result of changes in border controls following bilateral agreements between the European Union and Morocco after 2018. By analyzing data from official statistics, microdata, and data provided by NGOs up to 2024, it shows how the increase in the mortality rate of migrants in the Western Mediterranean is the result of changes in the management of sea rescues, the militarization and externalization of the border, and the way in which migrants attempting to cross the sea are taking more dangerous routes than in the past.

Are people more inclined to help strangers when they’ve experienced similar hardships? People who have experienced displacement could be tremendous allies to the newly displaced, but they are relatively understudied. This study explores how people who have experienced wartime displacement respond to refugees fleeing new violence. I prime Serbs who experienced wartime displacement with either (1) their experience of displacement or (2) their ethnic identity. I then measure their altruism toward Syrian refugees traveling the Balkan route. Compared to participants who were reminded of their ethnic identity, participants who were reminded of their displacement were no more generous toward displaced Syrians. In fact, participants who experienced displacement, as well as wartime violence, were more generous toward the refugees when they were reminded of their ethnic identity. These results suggest that shared hardship alone may not necessarily enhance refugee inclusion. The results further suggest that interventions may benefit from calling out the differences between hosts and refugees—in this case, on the dimension of ethnicity. These findings caution humanitarians to construct their interventions with care.

Donald Trump has run for president three times with a distinct slogan of “Make America Great Again” (MAGA), endorsing an agenda that advocates for a return to traditional values, renewed support for gender hierarchies, and the exclusion of outsiders. This agenda has received widespread support from Americans mostly along party lines, but partisanship reflects only the tip of the iceberg. Going beyond party, we focus on the existing cross-pressures and intersections between race and gender to demonstrate the importance of attitudes supporting right-wing authoritarianism in explaining how Americans perceive the MAGA agenda. In contrast to the notion that women—characterized as primarily Democrats and supporters of peaceful activism—are less supportive of the MAGA agenda, our analyses demonstrate that white women do not meet this expectation. Utilizing a race-gendered intersectional methodology and data from the 2023 University of Notre Dame Attitudes Toward Democracy Survey (NDATD), we illustrate the nuances of right-wing authoritarianism as a political ideology that works differently across race-gender intersections in driving support for the MAGA agenda. Variation within gender by race, and in complementary fashion within race by gender, reveals crucial insight into the varied reactions within the electorate. Doing so challenges monolithic narratives of women voters and voters of color and highlights the advantages of an intersectional approach to analyzing contemporary politics.

Prior research shows that the pro-Trump, anti-democratic January 6th insurrection (J6) led to a short-term reduction in Republican support for President Trump. However, it remains unclear why the anti-Trump backlash occurred among his electoral base. We theorize that white Republicans concerned about the declining status of Anglo whites in the American ethno-racial hierarchy were the least likely to backlash against Trump after J6. Leveraging an unexpected-event-during-survey design (UESD) and a large survey fielded shortly before and after J6, we find no difference in support for Trump due to J6 among white Republicans who strongly perceived anti-white discrimination (Study 1). We replicate this result with another UESD with a separate survey fielded during J6 (Study 2) and a difference-in-differences approach with additional panel surveys fielded around J6 (Study 3). Moreover, across four cross-sectional surveys, we find the negative relationship between J6 disapproval and Trump support post-J6 between 2021 and 2024 is attenuated among status-threatened white Republicans (Studies 4–7). Our evidence suggests racial status threat undercuts the ability of the white Republican mass public to hold co-partisan anti-democratic elites accountable for norm violations.

While the majority of 2021 Capitol insurrection participants were white men, the media prominently highlighted the involvement of male conservative activists of color. However, we still know little about the perspectives of men in the general public regarding this event in our nation’s history, particularly across racial/ethnic and other identity groups. This project examines the influence of racialized anger and racial efficacy on self-identified male views toward the 2021 Capitol insurrection across racial/ethnic groups. We utilize the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), which was the only national, post-election dataset to yield responses on the Capitol insurrection across a large number of identity groups like men of color. Using the CMPS, we hypothesize that the level of racialized anger and racial efficacy will impact attitudes toward the 2021 Capitol insurrection for men across racial groups comparing men of color and their white male counterparts. We find racial anger has a negative effect on political attitudes about the 2021 Capitol insurrection across all groups of men, while racial efficacy has varied effects on certain men of color groups in comparison to white men. This paper underscores the importance of intersectionality in the study of public opinion formation and the effect of political attitudes like racial efficacy and racialized anger on non-traditional political engagement.

This paper, co-authored by two adult academics and three young researchers aged 11 to 16, investigates the authors’ collective experiences in a participatory research project about growing up multilingual with Chinese heritage and migration background, where race and racism emerged as key themes. Drawing on critical dialectical pluralism and the concept of “reflexivities of discomfort,” we explore how co-constructing research with children and young people can enrich the research process. Despite the intricate and often opaque nature of discussing racism, especially anti-Asian racism, with children from migration backgrounds, this study advocates for participatory research as a critical tool for uncovering these complexities, paving the way for more open and meaningful conversations. In collaboration with young researchers, we reevaluate the role of research and researchers in discussing racism, (de)construct children as experts of their racialized experiences, and imagine the future of researching racism with children through what we call “collective reflexivity”—a practice of open discussions that highlight young people’s positionalities, experiences, and insights. Through practices that protect individuality and value personal experience, our work makes a methodological contribution by offering “collective reflexivity” and co-authorship as a pathway that ensures children are not viewed as “representatives,” but valued for their positionalities, encouraging more engaged and critical conversations on race and racism with them.

The January 6th insurrection at the U.S. capital was an eye-opening moment for many Americans. With the 2024 election cycle in swing, members of the Democratic Party are using January 6th as a rallying call for the need to protect democracy. But were the events of January 6th viewed equally among liberals? We argue that the events of January 6th resonate for a particular demographic well-informed liberal White voters. We argue that liberal minority voters will feel the racial undertones of January 6th more than White liberals. Furthermore, we examine how voters of different races viewed the events of January 6th and how views on race relations impact their perceptions of January 6th. We find that White liberals are less angry about race relations in the aftermath of January 6th, and while they viewed January 6th as an insurrection and blamed Trump and Republicans in Congress for their role, they are less likely to say that racism and White Supremacy motivated the insurrectionists. This paper indicates that race plays a key role in political perceptions, even among those who hold similar political ideologies.

On January 6, 2021, the belief that voter fraud was to blame for Trump’s 2020 loss led thousands of people to storm the Capitol during election certification, aiming to occupy it by force to stop this process. While only thousands participated, millions more voiced their support for the insurrection, and this begs the question: What explains perceptions of voter fraud and support for the January 6 insurrection? Recent studies establish that White conservatives are more likely to believe that voter fraud is a rampant problem, linking these perceptions to state efforts to expand access to voting systems where racial minority groups stand to gain equality. Using a combination of pre-election, post-election, and post-insurrection survey data, we examine the link between White racial attitudes and perceptions of voter fraud and views toward the insurrection. We argue that White racial attitudes are pivotal in explaining the perceptions of voter fraud that led to the January 6 insurrection. We find that White Americans with a bias for their own racial in-group over racial out-groups are likelier to doubt the election results after Donald Trump was declared the loser, though not before. We find these same attitudes are statistically associated with sympathy for the insurrection and insurrectionists.

The January 6th insurrection and its aftermath of obfuscation and denial were ostensibly racialized events. Under the guise of election fraud, white supremacists, white nationalists, and paramilitary groups attempted to overthrow established democratic procedures to retain a president who stoked racial antagonisms and racial divisions. African Americans, like many American citizens, watched in fear, anxiety, and foreboding as the groups most committed to their repression violently attacked and ransacked the Capitol.

We examine the extent to which the January 6th insurrection and its aftermath of denial and obfuscation influence African Americans’ racial resentment. Our results show how the racialized January 6th events were connected to heightened African American racial resentment. The most compelling result confirms that African Americans’ racial resentment stems from beliefs about justice and fairness.

Henry “Enrique” Tarrio—the former Afro-Latino leader of the Proud Boys, a right-wing extremist group—positioned himself as a prominent leader of the January 6 insurrection. Our current understanding of Latine politics, and ethnoracial politics more broadly, would call this a striking paradox. Tarrio’s views highlight that Latines’ view of their place in the ethnoracial hierarchy can vary. We argue that an understudied phenomenon, aspirational status, particularly on ethno-cultural and socioeconomic dimensions, can help us understand variation in Latines’ attitudes and behaviors. While some Latines may adopt a minoritized status and align themselves closer to ethnoracial minorities, others may align themselves closer to whites. We explore how these forms of aspirational status, as well as racial resentment, impact Latines’ political attitudes toward the January 6 insurrection. Using the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS), we find that Latines who aspire to a higher ethno-cultural status that approximates whiteness, as well as those who aspire to a higher socioeconomic status and who distance themselves from Black Americans, are more likely to be supportive of the insurrection. This paper contributes to the overall understanding of the heterogeneity of Latine political attitudes and illustrates the role of status in shaping political attitudes among Latines.