Research seeking a scientific foundation for the theory of art appreciation has raised controversies at the intersection of the social and cognitive sciences. Though equally relevant to a scientific inquiry into art appreciation, psychological and historical approaches to art developed independently and lack a common core of theoretical principles. Historicists argue that psychological and brain sciences ignore the fact that artworks are artifacts produced and appreciated in the context of unique historical situations and artistic intentions. After revealing flaws in the psychological approach, we introduce a psycho-historical framework for the science of art appreciation. This framework demonstrates that a science of art appreciation must investigate how appreciators process causal and historical information to classify and explain their psychological responses to art. Expanding on research about the cognition of artifacts, we identify three modes of appreciation: basic exposure to an artwork, the artistic design stance, and artistic understanding. The artistic design stance, a requisite for artistic understanding, is an attitude whereby appreciators develop their sensitivity to art-historical contexts by means of inquiries into the making, authorship, and functions of artworks. We defend and illustrate the psycho-historical framework with an analysis of existing studies on art appreciation in empirical aesthetics. Finally, we argue that the fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure can be amended to meet the requirements of the framework. We conclude that scientists can tackle fundamental questions about the nature and appreciation of art within the psycho-historical framework.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) should be commended for highlighting tensions between scientific aesthetics and art history. The question of how each tradition can learn from the other is timely. While I am sympathetic to their views, their diagnosis of the problem appears exaggerated and their solution partial. They underestimate the reach of scientific aesthetics while failing to identify its inherent restrictions.

Artists' intentions are among the primary data retrieved by art appreciators. However, artistic creation is not always deliberate; artists sometimes fail in their intentions; artists' achievements depend on artworld roles, not only intentions; factors external to the artist contribute to artwork meaning; artworks stand apart from their creators; and interpretation need not be exclusively concerned with recovering intended meaning.

The artistic design stance is an important part of art appreciation, but it remains unclear how it can be applied to artworks for which art historical context is no longer available, such as Ice Age art. We propose that some of the designer's intentions can be gathered noninferentially through direct experience with prehistoric artworks.

Accepting Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) criteria for art appreciation would confine the study of aesthetics to those works for which historical information is available, mainly post–eighteenth-century Western “high art.” We reject their contention that “correct” artistic understanding is limited to experts with detailed knowledge or education in art, which implies a narrowly elitist conception of aesthetics. Scientific aesthetics must be broadly inclusive.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) put forth a design stance to fuse psychological and art historical accounts of visual thinking into a single theory. We argue that this aspect of their proposal needs further fine-tuning. Issues of transgression and coherence are necessary to provide stability to the design stance. We advocate looking to Art Education for such fundamentals of picture understanding.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) provide compelling evidence that sensitivity to context, history, and design stance are crucial to theories of art appreciation. We ask how these ideas relate to broader aspects of human cognition. Further open questions concern how psychological essentialism contributes to art appreciation and how essentialism regarding created artifacts (such as art) differs from essentialism in other domains.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) correctly include historical perspectives into the scientific study of art appreciation. But artistic understanding always emerges from embodied simulation processes that incorporate the ongoing dynamics of brains, bodies, and world interactions. There may not be separate modes of artistic understanding, but a continuum of processes that provide imaginative simulations of the artworks we see or hear.

The psycho-historical framework proposes that appreciators' responses to art vary as a function of their sensitivity to its historical dimensions. However, the explanatory power of that framework is limited insofar as it assimilates relevantly different kinds of appreciation and insofar as it eschews a normative account of when a response succeeds in qualifying as an appreciation of art qua art.

The contextualist claim that universalism is irrelevant to the proper study of art can be evaluated by examining an analogous question in neuroscience. Taking the reductionist-holist debate in visual neuroscience as a model, we see that the analog of orthodox contextualism is untenable, whereas integrated approaches have proven highly effective. Given the connection between art and vision, unified approaches are likewise more germane to the scientific study of art.

Although the art-historical context of a work of art is important to our appreciation of it, it is our knowledge of that history that plays causal roles in producing the experience itself. This knowledge is in the form of memories, both semantic memories about the historical circumstances, but also episodic memories concerning our personal connections with an artwork. We also create representations of minds in order to understand the emotions that artworks express.

The target article presents a thought-provoking approach to the relation of neuroscience and art. However, at least two issues pose potential difficulties. The first concerns whether “art appreciation” is a coherent topic for scientific study. The second concerns the degree to which processing fluency can explain aesthetic feeling or may simply be one component of a more complex account.

We discuss how the psycho-historical framework can be profitably applied to artistic production, facilitating a synthesis of perception-based and knowledge-based perspectives on realistic observational drawing. We note that artists' technical knowledge itself constitutes a major component of an artwork's historical context, and that links between artistic practice and psychological theory may yet yield conclusions in line with universalist perspectives.

Art can be experienced in numerous ways, ranging from sensory pleasure to elaborated ways of finding meaning (Leder et al. 2004). However, rather ignored by Bullot & Reber (B&R), in empirical aesthetics several lines of research have studied how knowledge of artistic style, descriptive and elaborate information, expertise, and context all affect aesthetic experiences from art. Limiting aesthetics to rather rare experiences unnecessarily narrows the scope of a science of art.

Attention is drawn to the distinction between the actual (or factual) and the apparent (or ostensible) causal history of a work of art, and how the authors' recommendation “to assume the design stance” in the name of understanding works of art blurs that distinction, thus inadvertently reinforcing the hoary idea, against which the authors otherwise rightly battle, that what one needs to properly appreciate an artwork can be found in even suitably framed observation of the work alone.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) begin asking if the study of the mind's inner life can provide a foundation for a science of art. Clearly there are many epistemological problems involved in the study of the cognitive and affective basis of art appreciation. I argue that context is key. I also propose that as long as the “mind's life” continues to be perceived as an “inner” intracranial phenomenon, little progress can be made. Mind and art are one.

In addition to general criticisms of scientific studies on empirical aesthetics, Bullot & Reber (B&R) particularly criticise two “representative studies” that manipulated paintings by Mondrian, those studies seemingly, “fail[ing] to consider the predictions suggested by a contextualist approach to the appreciation of imbalance” (sect. 4.2, para.2). Those criticisms are unjustified, both within the approaches of empirical aesthetics and the historical context and aims of Mondrian's work.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) make a strong case for the role of causal reasoning in the appreciation of artwork. Although I agree that an artistic design stance is important for art appreciation, I suggest that it is a subset of a more general framework for evaluating artworks as the causal extensions of individuals, which includes inferences about the creator's mind, as well as more physical notions of essence.

We applaud Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) attempt to encompass the function of artworks within their psycho-historical model of art appreciation. However, we suggest that in order to fully realize this aim, they require a clearer distinction between an artist's intentions toward an artwork and its proper functions. We also show how such a distinction improves the internal coherence of their model.

The psycho-historical account implies two ways of construing the relation of basic exposure to the artistic design stance and artistic understanding. One is empirically dubious and the other does not fit well with the account. The assumption that combining psychology with history requires identifying actual intentions is undermined by the artistic design stance.