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What does evolutionary theory add to stereotype theory in the explanation of attractiveness bias?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2017

Kirby Q. Maguire
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5A 1S6, [email protected]@sfu.cahttp://members.psyc.sfu.ca/labs/pfl
Timothy P. Racine
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, V5A 1S6, [email protected]@sfu.cahttp://members.psyc.sfu.ca/labs/pfl

Abstract

Maestripieri et al. seem to put forth an argument in which they become vulnerable to some of the same criticisms that they level against stereotype theory As a result, the explanatory utility of their account of attractiveness bias comes into question, and it is unclear whether it offers anything superior to stereotype theory in conceptual soundness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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