Fitouchi et al.'s moral disciplining theory (MDT) provides an intriguing candidate for a (nearly) unifying singular theory of moral cognition centered on a set of “puritanical” values thought to promote cooperation in the long run.

Some core features of the theory are well supported by evidence that the authors did not consider (or at least discuss). First, the notion that self-control is associated with cooperation and collective success (and vice versa) fits nicely with studies showing that prosocial behaviors and delay of gratification share common psychological underpinnings (e.g., that people treat their “future selves” much like other people; Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, Reference Pronin, Olivola and Kennedy2008), that traits associated with self-control (e.g., conscientiousness) negatively predict anticollective behaviors (Kim & Cohen, Reference Kim and Cohen2015), and that wealthier countries are more future-focused and less past-focused (Noguchi, Stewart, Olivola, Moat, & Preis, Reference Noguchi, Stewart, Olivola, Moat and Preis2014).

Second, the notion that people and societies moralize self-control and costly prosocial behavior is rather starkly illustrated by studies showing that people value pain (Olivola, Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011, Reference Olivola2018a; Olivola & Shafir, Reference Olivola and Shafir2013, Reference Olivola and Shafir2018), effort (Inzlicht, Shenhav, & Olivola, Reference Inzlicht, Shenhav and Olivola2018; Olivola, Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011, Reference Olivola2018a; Olivola & Shafir, Reference Olivola and Shafir2013, Reference Olivola and Shafir2018), and other forms of sacrifice (e.g., investments of money and time; Olivola, Reference Olivola2018b) for their own sake, and consider prosocial actions and outcomes to be more meaningful when these are tied to pain and effort (Olivola, Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir, Reference Olivola and Shafir2013, Reference Olivola and Shafir2018). Clearly, sacrificing pleasure, leisure, and resources requires self-control; moreover, doing so constitutes a costly form of cooperation when the intended outcomes are prosocial.

Third, MDT correctly focuses on subjective perceptions regarding the effectiveness of exerting self-control, rather than (necessarily) assuming that moral norms and judgments track objective effectiveness. This distinction is critical because people engage in a wide variety of costly prosocial acts that end up being unproductive or even counterproductive to both individual and collective well-being (Olivola, Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011, Reference Olivola2018a). For example, some of the most popular charity fundraisers (e.g., marathons for charity, the ice-bucket challenge, etc.) involve significant pain and effort, and this leads participants to feel as though they have made more meaningful contributions, even though effortless and painless means of raising money (e.g., a simple donation online) are often more efficient (Olivola, Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011). In fact, some challenging charity fundraising events end up costing more money than they raise (Lee, Williams, & Hadden, Reference Lee, Williams and Hadden1999).

However, other core aspects of MDT are difficult to reconcile with the evidence – including some of the same studies and observations discussed above. First, MDT implies that (more) religious individuals and societies should be more cooperative, yet outside of self-report survey studies (which suffer from major methodological issues; Galen, Reference Galen2012), the evidence linking religion and/or religiosity to cooperative behaviors is somewhere between mixed and absent (Galen, Reference Galen2012; Hoffmann, Reference Hoffmann2013; Olivola et al., Reference Olivola, Kim, Merzel, Kareev, Avrahami and Ritov2020; Sablosky, Reference Sablosky2014). Thus, there is very little, if any, (quality) evidence that religion promotes cooperation, contrary to the predictions of MDT.

Second, Fitouchi et al. argue that the moralization of self-control – and thus the valuation of self-sacrifice – is mainly prevalent in “non-WEIRD” societies and socially conservative groups that also moralize bodily pleasure, entertainment, clothing, and piety. Yet many modern, secular, progressive societies (and subgroups) do value (even needlessly) self-sacrificing, exerting effort, incurring pain, and other forms of self-discipline, albeit in different forms. For example, the popularity of painful–effortful charity fundraising events (Olivola, Reference Olivola, Oppenheimer and Olivola2011; Olivola & Shafir, Reference Olivola and Shafir2013, Reference Olivola and Shafir2018), mentioned above, is not limited to religious and conservative cultural groups. To the contrary, such events tend to be far more popular and prevalent in “WEIRD” societies, and especially among the more progressive and secular parts of those societies, where people value (more) freedoms surrounding bodily pleasures, entertainment, and clothing choices. Thus, although WEIRD societies may have witnessed a reduction in some forms of self-control and sacrifice, they have also created new – some might say “modern” – forms of moralized self-control and sacrifice that would, conversely, be seen as puzzling in many non-WEIRD societies – for example, the rapid rise of charity fundraising events involving pain (e.g., the ice-bucket challenge) and effort (e.g., marathons for charity), which are popular in WEIRD countries but rare in non-WEIRD parts of the world. This suggests that WEIRD societies are not gradually abandoning the moralization of self-control and sacrifice altogether, but rather finding other, newer ways to value self-control and the (even needless) sacrifice of pleasure and leisure.