Recalling the abrupt changes in American national security policy in 1953 and 1961, we may well ask: What New Look should we expect now? What should we want? Changes will probably emerge more temperately and slowly than they did in those years. To our friends abroad, over-sensitized as they have become to policy modifications, this prospect should be reassuring. Much as they tend to sympathize with dissent within the United States over Vietnam, they realize that our domestic furor over this tragic war threatens to induce a generalized neo-isolationism. Arguments for neo-isolationism have a powerful appeal, but tend to cloud debate about the real issues for long-term security policy choice: what doctrine, military force structure, budgets, and plans?

In the field of comparative Communist studies theory seems to have lagged behind reality. Until a few years ago we tended to think of Communist polities in terms of uniformities oriented around the concept of a totalitarian model that permeated all Communist systems more or less the same way and to the same degree. Although it was recognized that there were cultural differences and variations in the levels of development, these factors were not assigned great weight in modifying and transforming Communist polities. On the contrary, the very possibility of a transformation was assigned a low probability.

The charge to examine old problems with new eyes, and so obtain a firmer understanding of the structure of the modernization process, came from Karl Deutsch in 1953. And now, sixteen years later, other social and behavioral scientists urge us to focus upon the process, the very dynamics of modernization, noting that with this more powerful view of change the sequential structures themselves will be clarified. But in examining the modernization process in Africa, we feel almost helpless in trying to reply to such a call—a call that essentially requires us to link Space and Time and Man in such a way that a general system is created to postdict the course of a modernizing society.

In a recent issue of this journal, Oran Young argued forcefully against the ‘collection of empirical materials as an end in itself and without sufficient theoretical analysis to determine appropriate criteria of selection.” The present paper issues a complementary critique of the opposite failing. Its target is the tendency toward compulsive and mindless theorizing—a disease at least as prevalent and debilitating, so it seems to me, as the one described by Oran Young.

The role of interest groups in the policy process has long engaged the attention of students of democratic politics. Only recently, however, have Soviet interest groups been studied systematically. This lag can be explained by two facts: the employment of the totalitarian model, emphasizing hierarchical controls and ignoring or denying significant political conflict; and the considerable difficulties of applying group theory to nondemocratic societies.

Until very recently social interpretations of revolution have enjoyed a position of virtual orthodoxy among both historians and social scientists. Sociologists and political scientists concerned with the problem of revolution have been mainly of the structural-functional school. They describe a revolutionary situation as one of “multiple dysfunction” in the relations between the political system and the society it serves. Revolution thus interpreted is a violent redress of imbalance among functionally interrelated and historically synchronous social and political parts of one total system. It is commonly assumed that it is the social process, including economic change, that is the dynamic element in any revolutionary event, and that political institutions play a causative role only in so far as they fail to provide mechanisms for resolving the state of disequilibrium. Historians of revolution, many of them strongly if not consciously influenced by Marxist traditions of interpretation, have taken much the same position. If they tend to think more in terms of trends than of equilibrium systems, nevertheless they agree with the social scientists that revolution is primarily the result of accumulating social and economic pressures, with politics playing only a secondary role in shaping the course of events.

In a broadcast from Havana on October 15, 1967, Cuba's líder máximo told his audience, “Who could deny the significance to the revolutionary movement of the blow of Che's death? It is a fierce blow, a very hard one.” One week earlier the near-legendary ideologue of the Cuban Revolution had been captured and shot by Bolivian authorities in a tiny Andean village named Higueras. Troops had also taken into custody the French Marxist Régis Debray, who had gained attention with his interpretation of the Cuban revolution before joining the Guevara-led band of rebels in Bolivia.

There is a sizeable number of separatist movements in contemporary political life. Some of them have attracted widespread support, others have not; some are surrounded by violence, others are not. It is the combination of the size and tactics of separatist movements that we wish to examine. Our purpose is to inquire into the conditions that enable regional separatism to attract widespread support without also eliciting violence. Our conclusions will be based on one separatist movement that managed to accomplish this feat, the Scottish National Party.

In the already vast, and rapidly expanding, literature of political modernization, it is rather surprising that little use has been made of the concept of growth, while development, with all its ambiguities, has become a fixture. This perhaps reflects the selective methodological influence of economics, where development is a fairly well-defined research field concerned with problems of countries with low per capita income. What needs to be underscored, however, is that in economic usage development is intimately related to growth. In this paper I propose to discuss the distinction between growth and development in economics and then attempt to draw a similar distinction for politics, emphasizing throughout the implications of the historical sequence and timing of these processes for modernization.

Foreign policy has been radically transformed by the revolutionary processes of modernization not only in the societies composing the Atlantic region, but wherever high levels of modernization exist. There is a quality about modernization that dissolves the effects of what have generally been considered the major determinants of foreign policy, whether these determinants are based on ideology and type of political system (democratic versus totalitarian foreign policies, for example), or power and capability (great-power versus smallpower policies). Wherever modernized societies exist, their foreign policies are more similar to each other than they are to the foreign policies of nonmodernized societies, regardless of the scale of the society or its type of government.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of behavioralism upon the study of the United Nations as reflected in journal articles published during the period 1950-1969.

Scope and Method of This Study

In recent years students of politics have become increasingly self-conscious about the spread of behavioral methods and viewpoints within the discipline. A great deal of energy has been expended in explaining what behavioralism is, defending it, attacking it, or trying to reconcile it with more traditional approaches.

The distribution of ethnic groups throughout South Asia constitutes the region's single most significant strategic factor. Other factors, varying in importance according to specific location and time, do, of course, interact with the ethnic factor. Thus, the topographic, political, economic, and transportation maps all contribute essential elements to our knowledge of the region. Nevertheless, the settlement pattern of distinct culture-groups, as defined by the language and dialect maps, is clearly the most critical of all tangible phenomena.

The twentieth anniversary of the assumption of state power by the JL Chinese Communists is a convenient occasion to take stock of the many dramatic events that have taken place since that first day in October of 1949, when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the new People's Republic of China. The anniversary, however, is more than a fortuitous product of the Western calendar. It lies close to one of those convulsive periods that have jolted China from time to time and have caused major changes in the Chinese state and society. The creation of the People's Republic twenty years ago was one such period. The Great Leap Forward of the late fifties was another, and the recent Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution may have been a third. Each of these events has substantially reshaped the state or society or both. From a historical point of view, the next major event that may well come shortly after the twentieth anniversary is the death of Mao Tse-tung and other co-founders of the Communist state. This anniversary, therefore, offers an opportunity to reassess the record of the Chinese Communists since 1949 with a view toward understanding the setting and the problems that the post-Mao leadership will soon inherit.

We have entered a new phase in the apparently endless debate method. Argument once centered on the possibility of quantifying important political variables, and of establishing empirically based generalizations about international behavior. With accumulating evidence that measurement and generalization are possible, the grounds have shifted. Sometimes only specific applications are attacked. Though it is curious how few of the extant applications of scientific method come up to the high standards of some of their critics, the critics’ targets cannot complain too much. After all, the methods and applications are new, most studies do suffer from significant flaws of one sort or another, and constructive criticism is essential to their improvement.

The seizure of the Pueblo, the downing of the American EC-121 reconnaissance plane, the attempted assassination of South Korea's President Chung Hee Park by a North Korean commando unit, and the recent revelation of North Korea's plans for unification of the Korean peninsula in the 1970s, raise numerous questions about the nature of the political system that has emerged from the Soviet occupation of Northern Korea in 1945-1948, during Stalin's last decade of rule.

Most of the nations of Africa and Asia remain predominantly rural and agricultural. However, more than half the people in most Latin American countries are no longer rural, and a fifth to a third live in cities of 100,000 or more. In Asia and North Africa, Lebanon, the U.A.R., and the Philippines are also substantially urbanized, and Morocco, Syria, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan are not far behind. Moreover, virtually everywhere in the developing world, regardless of the extent of urbanization already achieved, cities are growing at rates of 5 to 8 percent annually. That is, they are doubling their populations every ten to fifteen years.

“Whereas in post-war Britain youth has often channelled its energies into violent self-expression, destructive or creative, in France the dominant impression left by all the varying tendencies is of a kind of docile listiessness.” A competent British commentator on French politics and society had the misfortune of appearing in print with this assertion about French youth in June of 1968—that is, at precisely the time when many members of France's younger generation were participating in that violent form of self-expression that has come to be called “the Events.”

The purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary evaluation of the pattern of support of research in international studies in the United States by federal agencies, with a view to identifying critical issues in research policy deserving of more detailed study.

The security and welfare of the people of the United States depend to a significant degree on the quality of the system of knowledge available to their leaders and to the community of scholars on whose advice regarding the international system in all of its aspects their leaders depend.

It is important, in the light of the continuing debate concerning the interpretation of agreements, to clarify the underlying assumptions of contextual methodology and to determine its theory of meaning. The issues have recently been probed in some detail in Gidon Gottlieb's critique1 of the philosophic underpinning of the framework for the interpretation of agreements adopted by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller. It is the thesis of this paper that in significant respects Gottlieb's alternative solution and the framework of McDougal and Lasswell admit a similar need for analyzing extra-textual data to facilitate nonarbitrary decision-making.

The trend toward economic rationality in the USSR has not beenconfined to domestic issues alone. It is also manifest in the search for more advantageous and efficient procedures in foreign economic relations, specifically aid and trade with the third world. In this search for ways to secure tangible gains, Soviet relations with the developing countries are entering a new phase, in which economic considerations of profit are challenging the hitherto dominant political motivations.