¹ The first major work was Bentley's, ArthurThe Process of Government (Bloomington 1949)Google Scholar. The original edition was published in 1908. The decades from then to the early 1950's saw die publication of many specialized monographs on interest-group activity. In 1951 David Truman attempted to summarize this empirical work in his theoretical book, The Governmental Process (New York 1951)Google Scholar. Other significant contributions on American interest-groups include Latham, Earl, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca 1952)Google Scholar; deGrazia, Alfred, “Interest Group Theory in Political Research,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, cccxix (September 1958), 1104–20Google Scholar. For a review of interest-group literature see Zeigler, H., Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs 1964)Google Scholar. For a stimulating new approach to interest group activity see Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass. 1965)Google Scholar.

² The most important work to date is the forthcoming book by Skilling, H. Gordon and Griffiths, Franklyn, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton 1969)Google Scholar. See also Schwartz, Joel and Keech, William R., “Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union,” The American Political Science Review, LXII (September 1968) 840–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Several studies relevant to group politics but utilizing essentially an elite analysis include Azrael, Jeremy R., Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass. 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Juviler, Peter H. and Morton, Henry W., eds., Soviet Policy-Making (New York 1967)Google Scholar; and Kolkowicz, Roman, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton 1967)Google Scholar. Also note the suggestive contributions by Skilling, H. Gordon, “Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics, xvni (April 1966), 435–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ploss, Sidney I., “Interest Groups,” Kassof, Allen, ed., Prospects for Soviet Society (New York 1968), 76–103Google Scholar.

³ The standard works employing the totalitarian model include Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland 1958)Google Scholar; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York 1962)Google Scholar; Fainsod, Merle, How Russia is Ruled, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Friedrich, Carl and Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. (New York 1965)Google Scholar; and Friedrich, Carl, ed., Totalitarianism (New York 1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Some of the difficulties in applying group theory to both Western and non-Western situations as well as general critiques of the theory are presented in the following: Eckstein, Harry, “Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups,” Eckstein, Harry and Apter, David, eds., Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York 1963), 389–97Google Scholar; Joseph LaPalombara, “The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations,” Ibid., 421–30; Macridis, Roy C., “Groups and Group Theory,” Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 3rd ed. (Homewood 1968), 234–38Google Scholar. See also the comments by Skilling, “Interest Groups,” 435–51.

⁵ See the cogent critique by Darrell Hammer, “Towards a Theoretical Model of Non-Competitive Political Systems: Conflict and Decision-Making in the USSR,” unpublished paper delivered at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

⁶ Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Huntington, Samuel P., Political Power: USA/USSR (New York 1964)Google Scholar chap. 4 but esp. 195–97; Azrael, 9–10.

⁷ Meyer, Alfred G., The Soviet Political System (New York 1965), 233–37Google Scholar.

⁸ Leonhard, Wolfgang, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York 1962)Google Scholar.

⁹ Barghoorn, Frederick, Politics in the USSR (Boston 1966), 216Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Skilling and Griffiths, chaps. 1 and 2.

¹¹ Brzezinski and Huntington, 196; Barghoorn, 214–15; and Azrael, 9–10.

¹² Meyer, 114, 187–93; Aspaturian, Vernon, “The Soviet Union,” Macridis, Roy and Ward, Robert, eds., Modern Political Systems: Europe (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 550–51Google Scholar; Skilling and Griffiths, chaps. 1 and 2.

¹³ Huntington and Brzezinski, 196–97; Azrael, 9, 150; Barghoorn, 213–15, 254.

¹⁴ Meyer, 110–11.

¹⁵ Skilling and Griffiths, chaps. 1 and 2; Boris Meissner, “Totalitarian Rule and Social Change,” Problems of Communism (November-December 1966), 58.

¹⁶ Schwartz and Keech, 847–51.

¹⁷ For a discussion of the concept of policy arena, or system, as applied to the making of American national education policy see Eidenberg, Eugene and Morey, Roy D., An Act of Congress: The Legislative Process and the Making of Education Policy (New York 1969), 4–9Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Of special value for this study was the persuasive critical evaluation of traditional notions of “interest groups” by Franklyn Griffiths. Especially relevant for this study are the following elements of Griffiths' analysis: (1) the inappropriateness of focusing on “groups” as reified entities; (2) the essential significance of action in the Bentleyian sense as the fundamental datum of the political process; (3) the conceptualization of the group as simply groupings of similar articulations or expectations with respect to a given issue area; and (4) the conceptualization of “group” influence as the communication of expectations (in the form of values, analyses and/or policy recommendations) by individual members of a collective grouping. For detailed argument and analysis, and for a full discussion of the literature from which these notions are derived see Griffiths' chapter in Skilling and Griffiths.

¹⁹ This assumption appears to underlie the conclusions regarding interest group influence of the following: Brzezinski and Huntington, chap. 4 but esp. 196–97; Azrael, 9–10; and Barghoorn, chap. 7, but esp. 213–15 and 254. This assumption is also accepted by Schwartz and Keech, 845.

²⁰ Schwartz and Keech, 840–45.

²¹ This formulation expresses in somewhat different form the idea of veto groups noted by Brzezinski and Huntington, 196–97.

²² Pravda, August 13, 1964.

²³ The original law was adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on December 24, 1958. Pravda, December 25, 1958. For a review of the discussion preceding the adoption of this law see Schwartz and Keech, 840–45, and also Rapacz, Richard V., “Polytechnical Education and the New Soviet School Reforms,” Bereday, George Z. F. and Pennar, Jaan, eds., The Politics of Soviet Education (New York 1960) 28–44Google Scholar.

²⁴ The review of the events leading to the repeal of production education presented here necessarily only summarizes many important events. A complete study of all of the evidence has been prepared and is available from the author upon request.

²⁵ The attack by Shibanov and Vasil'ev was carried in the following issues of Uchitel’skaya Gazeta: November 24, 1962; December 11, 1962; December 20, 1962; January 10, 22, 24, and 31, 1963; and February 5, 9, 12, and 14, 1963. The editor's summary appeared in Ibid., February 26, 1963.

²⁶ Ibid., December 11, 1962.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The most complete report on this research is Mel'nikov, M. A., ed., Svyaz' obucheniia s trudom v srednei shkole i differentsirovannym obucheniem [The ties of education with labor in the secondary school and differentiated education] (Moscow 1962)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Izvestiya, March 2, 1963.

³⁰ P. Rudnev, Narodnoe Obrazovanie, No. 1 (January 1963), 12–22; and Izvestiya, February 7, 1963. See also the replies by N. Goncharov, Sovetskaya Pedagogika, No. 2 (February 1963), 39–50; and Izvestiya, March 2, 1963.

³¹ At no time when references were made to its positions on this issue was an individual or sub-grouping named in the Soviet press. At all times the reference was to “the RSFSR Council of the National Economy,” as a whole. This suggests, as in the case of the actions of the Academy's Presidium, that groupings may, occasionally, form wholly within and act in the name of an official organization. See the text, 17.

³² This and much of the following data on the RSFSR Sovnarkhoz's actions is drawn from an unusually informative source, S. L. Seniavskii, “O perestroike sistemy shkol'nogo obrazovaniia v SSSR (1954–1965 gg.) “[On the reconstruction of the system of school education in the USSR (1954–1965)], SSSR, Akademiya Nauk, Kul'tur-naya revoliutsiya v SSSR 1917–1965 gg. [The cultural revolution in the USSR 1917–1965] (Moscow 1967), 192–93Google Scholar. Seniavskii's data and information are drawn almost entirely from Tekushchii Arkhiv SNKh RSFSR, 1963 [Current Archives of the RSFSR Council of the National Economy, 1963].

³³ As Schwartz and Keech suggest, this may be an important precondition of group influence on policy-making. Schwartz and Keech, 845–51. See also Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe 1959) 51–55Google Scholar.

³⁴ Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, September 28, 1963.

³⁵ Between the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 and April 9, 1964, Khrushchev made no public statement on the policy of production education. But the latter statement made the more complete fulfillment of the law on the schools. Pravda, April 9, 1964. Indeed, although many meetings involving the Party apparatus did discuss problems of the implementation of this policy, there was never any hint that it might once again become a political issue. In this light, it appears reasonable to conclude that Khrushchev would attempt to take steps to prevent the question of production education from becoming a political issue again if he perceived the activities of various interest groupings as leading to this result.

³⁶ The assumption here is that when either of the two most important Soviet papers, Pravda, the organ of the Party Central Committee, or Izvestiya, the organ of the USSR Council of Ministers, takes an editorial position on questions under discussion it does so ordinarily only in accord with the wishes of some leadership faction. On the other hand, when a less important paper or journal takes such a position this assumption may not hold. Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, for example, may take positions reflecting only the opinion of the Minister of Education, or some grouping within the Ministry. But it may also respond to Central pressures. The point here is that this response does not necessarily always occur.

³⁷ Izvestiya, October 13, 1963. It is significant that the representative of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences was A. Arsenev, long-time supporter of differentiated education. Among the scientists present was Professor A. G. Marsevich, full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Marsevich, it should be noted, served at this time as Vice-President of the Institute of Soviet-American Relations on whose board sat Nina Khrushchev. Other participants in the conference included A. Kolmogorov, mathematician and Dean of Moscow University's Mechanics and Mathematics Faculty; I. K. Kikoin, prominent physicist; V. A. Kargin, Head of Moscow University's Chair of Physical Chemistry; I. M. Gel'fand, Moscow University mathematics professor; and B. Porshnev, Professor of History and Head of the Modern Western European History section of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History. All of the above, except Arsenev, are either full or corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. One other participant, A. Leontev, is a psychologist and full member as well as (at that time) Vice-President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.

³⁸ Izvestiya, October 13, 1963.

³⁹ Ibid., October 20, 1963.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Meyer suggests the possibility of such a strategy when he argues that only a “mighty groundswell of opinion” could force a debate upon the leadership. The actions of the Academy described here appear to be directed toward creating such a groundswell. Meyer, 192.

⁴³ Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, November 28, 1963.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid. See particularly the reports by A. Khumal, Vice-President of the Estonian Academy of Sciences; A. Potberg, Assistant Chief of the Estonian Ministry of Education, Administration for Schools; Kh. Khaberman, Academician and Director of the Institute of Zoology and Botany; F. Klement, Rector of Tartu University; and V. Maamiadi, Director of the Academy's Institute of History.

⁴⁶ Ibid. In fact, a more important act may have been organizing the Estonian meeting itself, but there is no good evidence to suggest that this involved any Presidium faction.

⁴⁷ Interesting evidence on the relationship between Khrushchev and Afanasenko on this issue is provided by the following sequence of events. On March 19, 1964, Afana-senko inserted a strong plea for the retention of Khrushchev's program of production education into a speech on a quite different subject—speeding up the development of the chemical industry. On April 9, die same day that a major speech by Khrushchev urging retention of production education was published, it was announced that Afanasenko had been awarded the Red Banner of Labor. Although it was ostensibly awarded in connection with his 50th birthday, the actual decision to make such an award is nearly always based upon political service. One week later, Afanasenko personally signed a lead editorial in Uchitel'skaya Gazeta supporting production education in the strongest terms, citing Khrushchev by name twelve times and insisting upon die maintenance of production education as the basis of all education. See Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, March 19, 1964; April 9 and 16, 1964.

⁴⁸ Ibid., December 24, 1963, and January 7, 1964.

⁴⁹ Ibid., January 7, 1964.

⁵⁰ Ibid., February 6, 1964.

⁵¹ Ibid., April 9, 1964. It is indicative of the seriousness with which Khrushchev viewed this situation that he devoted an entire speech to the subject while on a tour of Hungary.

⁵² Ibid., March 19, 1964, and April 16, 1964. f

⁵³ Ibid. March 31, 1964.

⁵⁴ Ibid., July 16, 1964.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., August 13, 1964.

⁵⁷ Truman, David B., The Governmental Process (New York 1955), 23–26Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 160.

⁵⁹ Macridis makes this point with reference to any non-American situation. Macridis, Roy C., “Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Politics, xxiii (March 1961), 31Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ We do not intend here to present a critique of this theory, however. See Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2, and the literature cited therein for the most comprehensive critique of traditional interest group concepts in terms of their suitability for Soviet studies.

⁶¹ Bauer, Pool, and Dexter comment that at least for the making of foreign-trade policy, “The appropriate general model is not one of linear causality, but a transactional one which views all the actors in a situation as exerting continuous influence on each other—with all the actors in to some extent a situation of mutual influence and interdependence.” Bauer, Raymond A., Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Dexter, Lewis A., American Business and Public Policy (New York 1963), 456–60Google Scholar.

⁶² Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2.

⁶³ See Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure (New York 1965), 283–85Google Scholar and Ramsöy, Odd, Social Groups as System and Sub-System (New York 1963), 16–17Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ See Eulau, Heinz, “Rationality in Unanimous Decision-Making,” Friedrich, Carl, ed., Rational Decision (New York 1963), 38Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ This tends to be confirmed by other studies. See, for example, Juviler and Morton. The same appears to hold true for any occupational group.

⁶⁶ Truman, 139–55.

⁶⁷ Although Rudnev wrote the important attacks on differentiated education in the Ministry's journal and in the press, his position is nowhere identified, suggesting this may be a pseudonym for some Ministry official. His major articles on the subject are the following: P. Rudnev, Narodnoe Obrazovanie, No. 1 (January 1963), 12–22; Ibid., No. 7 (July 1963), 22–33; and Izvestiya, February 7, 1963.

⁶⁸ See, for instance, the articles by M. Lavren'tev, Chairman of the Siberian Branch ot the USSR Academy of Sciences, and by Academician S. L. Sobolev, a leading Soviet mathematician. Pravda, October 18, 1960; Literaturnaya Gazeta, June 26, 1962.

⁶⁹ Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2 and the literature cited therein.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Deutsch, Karl, The Nerves of Government (New York 1963), 146Google Scholar and 208.

⁷² Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2.

⁷³ Azrael appears to come close to accepting this image of Soviet interest groups. Azrael, 9.

⁷⁴ Truman, chap. 16.

⁷⁵ Skilling and Griffidis, chap. 1, and Aspaturian, 551, both make this point.

⁷⁶ KPSS v rezoliutsiykh i resheniyakh s”ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK chast’ I 1894–1924 [The CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences, and Central Committee plenums, part I 1894–1924] (Moscow 1954), 527–29Google Scholar. See also Barghoorn, 56–57.

⁷⁷ See Azrael, 9.

⁷⁸ Schwartz and Keech, 846–47.

⁷⁹ Meyer, 188–193.

⁸⁰ See the exhaustive listing of relevant literature cited by Griffiths in Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 2, n. 22.

⁸¹ Meyer, no.

⁸² See the comments by Dahl in Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs 1963) 40–53Google Scholar.

⁸³ Agger, Robert E., Goldrich, Daniel, and Swanson, Bert E., The Rulers and the Bided: Political Power and Impotence in American Communities (New York 1964), 51Google Scholar. The argument in this section is based upon this source.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 51, 56.

⁸⁵ Kornhauser, 59. Kornhauser talks of responsiveness of elite to nonelite. See also Truman, 264–70.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 55.

⁸⁷ Two recent examples are Linden, Carl, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership (Baltimore 1966)Google Scholar, and Tatu, Michel, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York 1969)Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Schwartz and Keech make this same point in their elaboration of the conditions under which the leadership might be responsive to interest-group activity. Schwartz and Keech, 847–51.

⁸⁹ Agger and others, 51, 62.

⁹⁰ Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, August 13, 1964.

⁹¹ Brzezinski and Huntington, 196; Schwartz and Keech, 840–45. Others argue the contrary. Skilling and Griffiths, chap. 1; Barghoorn, 213–14.