The structure of international trade, identified by the degree of openness for the movement of goods, can best be explained by a state-power theory of international political economy. This theory begins with the assumption that the nature of international economic movements is determined by states acting to maximize national goals. Four goals—aggregate national income, political power, social stability, and economic growth—can be systematically related to the degree of openness in the international trading system for states of different relative sizes and levels of development. This analysis leads to the conclusion that openness is most likely to exist when there is a hegemonic distribution of potential economic power. Time-series data on tariff levels, trade proportions, regional concentration, per capita income, national income, share of world trade, and share of world investment are then presented. The first three are used to describe the degree of openness in the trading system; the last four, the distribution of state power. The data suggest that the state-power theory should be amended to take into consideration domestic political constraints on state action.

No single model adequately explains the American foreign policy-making process. At least six models are required, singly or in some combination, to understand recent American foreign policy formation under the Nixon Administration. The six models are: democratic politics, organizational process/bureaucratic politics, the royal-court model, multiple advocacy, groupthink, and shared images or mind-sets. After a review of the rules of the foreign policy game in Washington and the main elements of the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council system, the article seeks to apply the models to a number of cases in recent American policy making toward Europe. U.S.-Soviet relations, the “Year of Europe,” and Nixon's New Economic Policy of August 1971 are examined as cases of royal-court decision making. A second category of cases exhibits mixed patterns of decision making: SALT, the Berlin negotiations, U.S. troops in Europe, MBFR, and U.S. trade policy. Bureaucratic variables alone explained policy outcomes in international economic policy making in the autumn of 1971, and an organizational process model was found to be dominant generally in the formation of recent international monetary policy, led by the Treasury Department. The conclusion considers the relationships between the models and certain kinds of policies.

Inflation has long been a fact of economic and political life in Argentina. The Peronist government which assumed office in mid-1973 attempted to control inflation through the so-called Social Pact, a wage-price agreement of two years’ duration involving the leading labor union organization, a leading businessmen's organization, and the Argentine state. An awareness of the principal issues of the economic situation is essential to an understanding of the crisis of contemporary Argentina, and a description of the evolution of the Social Pact reveals some of the essential contours of the economic debate. But the importance of the Social Pact extends beyond mere economic considerations. The study of the latest Argentine experience with anti-inflationary policy suggests some generalizations about the nature of populist political movements, the symbolic functions of economic policy initiatives, and the functions of such policies in co-opting private economic actors and legitimating governmental interference with free market forces. It also reveals some important characteristics of Argentine politics, especially concerning relations between the state and private economic groups. With economic and political implications of comparative significance, the Argentine Social Pact is an important case study in political economy.

This essay examines the Concert of Europe as an international system and offers some general reflections and tentative conclusions about the meaning, the nature, and the operation of concert diplomacy between 1815 and 1854. It focuses upon the assumptions and procedures engendered by the Concert which restrained and moderated the policies of the European great powers by peaceful means. It concludes that the European Concert was a conscious and reasonably successful attempt to devise a stable and peaceful system of interstate relations.

The accelerating mobilization of Chile's working class from 1965 onward appears to support Huntington's cautious evaluation of the effects of that process rather than Deutsch's more optimistic one. Instead of resulting in more massive support for Dr. Allende's minority-based UP government (which, needing support, stimulated even further a process that had been noticeable from at least 1965), increased mobilization resulted in (a) heightened but unattainable economic demands; (b) increased support for the extreme left (a severe threat to the regime's policies and even existence, as Allende recognized); (c) increased support for the opposition Christian Democrats; (d) a general de-authorization of all institutions, including those tailored specifically to working-class needs. In some situations, mobilization may sweep away the remnants of an old regime. But where that is not possible or not the real issue, it may overwhelm rather than aid an already weak government, even if it is change-oriented.

Three types of thought approach the question of future world order: the naturalrational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. The normative criterion in the natural-rational approach has, in recent times, most commonly been bound up with the view that liberal pluralism in polities is the condition for a just world order. This view has, however, succumbed both under the critique of positivist-evolutionary political science which argues that authoritarianism is characteristic of early stages of political development, and to the manipulation of “pluralism” in poor countries by powerful external forces (investment, trade union, and intelligence). The positivist-evolutionary approach has two main currents. One is functionalism, of which the transnational and transgovernmental relations versions are currently fashionable. The other is the notion of a global ecological system. Both versions take existing structures of power and social relations as implicit givens from which future trends are extrapolated; they provide no basis for considering the possibility of changes in these structures. The historicist-dialectical approach offers the possibility of understanding change in these basic structures of power and social relations by searching out points of emerging conflict and the alternative conceptions of order which the forces in conflict express.

The principal question which this article seeks to answer is: Why was the intention of the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War misperceived despite the fact that Israeli Intelligence had ample and accurate information on enemy moves and dispositions? In this anatomy of the Israeli intelligence failure, extensive use is made of the report of the official commission of inquiry that investigated the events leading up to the war. The article is equally concerned with the phenomenon of strategic surprise in general, and this case study is used to explore the psychological and organizational roots of intelligence failures. Some safeguards and institutional reforms for reducing the frequency of failure are examined. However, there is no suggestion that surprise can ever be eliminated altogether. In conclusion a case is made for developing a theory of intelligence through case studies and systematic research.

According to Soviet military theorists, the war aims of a government determine not only the scale of military action and diplomatic alliances, but the “moral-political factor,” the extent to which soldiers and civilians regard a war as “just” and support the policy of their government. Soviet theorists caution that if both soldiers and civilians regard a war as “unjust,” the government runs a greater risk of military setbacks. If such setbacks occur, domestic opposition to the war may develop and domestic tensions that existed prior to the war may become exacerbated. In pursuing “unjust” war aims, a government risks “moral-political” threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its home front, and the legitimacy of the regime.

Political development in Leninist regimes can be understood in terms of the relationships among elite-designated tasks, corresponding political uncertainties, and regime structures. The post-Stalin period has seen a crucial change in relations between polity and society. Whereas under Stalin the relationship between political-organizational status and socio-occupational status was hierarchical and mutually exclusive, after Stalin ruling Communist parties have allowed social elites to complement socio-occupational and political-organizational roles. The major political problem in contemporary Leninist regimes arises from the potential conflict between innovative attempts in this direction and the party's continued pre-emption of any potential political arena or role not coterminous with party organization and membership.

In the struggle to find a successor to the totalitarian model for study of Soviet politics, the interest-group approach has won significant support. Yet this concept fails to meet all three of Huntington's criteria for a “useful” model. First, the group concept emphasizes the peripheral at the expense of what is of critical importance. Second, as a comparative concept it introduces errors in logic as well as a myriad of ambiguities in definition and taxonomy. Third, it is more likely to obscure than to clarify the dynamic character of the Soviet system. The group approach does not promise, as some assert, to bring the study of Soviet politics into the mainstream of comparative political theory.

In contrast, the totalitarian model still goes far toward meeting Huntington's criteria. When supplemented by the notion of political culture and by middle-range concepts of organization theory and bureaucracy, the totalitarian model retains great heuristic value as an ideal construct from which Soviet realities diverge in various ways.

As a step toward further conceptualization and differentiation of the problem of surprise attacks, this article suggests a new framework for analyzing the assumptions of decision makers. Two main categories are distinguished: (i) strategic assumptions of possibilities—the explicit and implicit assumptions held by an “observing state” about the conditions and circumstances under which the “observed state” would strike; (2) tactical assumptions of actualities—assumptions that have become realities in the eyes of the observing state, or that are on the verge of realization. Five cases of failures in intelligence estimates are discussed: (1) the Barbarossa Operation; (2) the attack on Pearl Harbor; (3) the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; (4) the Sino-Indian Border War of October 1962; (5) the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.

The analysis indicates that in each case, when discrepancies existed between tactical assumptions of actualities and strategic assumptions of possibilities, the latter prevailed without reassessment of the situation.

What leverage does international organization offer on problems of interdependence? At what system level can actors cooperate to what effect? And is their cooperation more the product of the “objective facts” of interdependence or of “subjective” political considerations? Insights into these problems are obtained by examining the operational network of relationships that developed between the UN and selected regional organizations in the field of collective security. The organizations' operational jurisdictions and capabilities are examined in light of 146 cases of interstate security conflicts that were submitted to them. The operational network that developed is found to be in accordance with the prescriptions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, suggesting that short-term bargaining considerations are the primary determinants of the effectiveness of international organization. But although such considerations have made these organizations quite useful, they have also produced a movement away from organizational conflict management during the past decade.

One of the important developments in world politics during the cold-war era was the relationship between the superpowers and small nation-states. In contrast to the period before the cold war, small nation-states had considerable latitude for maneuvering in pursuit of their own interests. This phenomenon was largely rooted in the imperatives of the cold war. The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea during the period of the Korean War is critically analyzed in light of the new reality in international relations. South Korea tried to influence the conduct of the United States in Korea by employing five techniques: (1) a public call for assistance; (2) a public call for mutual cooperation against the common enemy; (3) a calculated policy proposal for bargaining advantage; (4) refusal to cooperate; and (5) moral suasion. These techniques are examined, with the conclusion that of the five, (1) and (2) were effective; (3) and (4) were least effective; and (5) was most effective.

Since 1959 Congress has tried to protect U.S. direct foreign investments from expropriation by quite explicit amendments to various foreign assistance acts. Probably the most important of these legislative efforts, the Hickenlooper amendment, the Gonzales amendments, and the effective repeal of the Hickenlooper amendment, are contradictory and have been applied only sporadically. By developing testable hypotheses that can accurately and parsimoniously predict these varied legislative and diplomatic policies, this article attempts to demonstrate the value of a radical analysis of American foreign policy. After those hypotheses are evaluated, they are compared with propositions derived from pluralist and bureaucratic analysis. Finally, the policy history is reconsidered to show that changes in the external environment, particularly the rise of economically powerful nationalist regimes, have let to a significant evolution in the policy preferences of large multinational firms.

Throughout the nuclear era, United States strategic defense policy has been conceptualized in terms of the rational theory of decision. Though this has been on balance a happy arrangement for the primary policy of deterrence, there are anomalies in the theory which make its extension to problems of arms control problematic and which lead to well-known doubts about crisis stability. Given the seriousness of the latter issues, it is well to consider the implications of alternative theories of the decision process.

A competitive theory of the decision process can be found; that theory, labeled here the cybernetic theory, leads to distinctly different conclusions concerning major matters of defense policy such as force sizing, force targeting, and arms-negotiation strategy. It is very unlikely that such an unfamiliar and underdeveloped theory could either quickly or completely replace established rational conceptions of defense policy, but some plausible marginal adjustments are suggested.

The paper attempts to examine the impact of East-West trade on the process of economic integration in Eastern Europe, carried out under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The discussion is focused on the proposition that, other things being equal, the continued growth of East-West trade is at the present time incompatible with the increase in the level of economic integration in that part of Europe.

The problem is analyzed in the context of several factors: the process of regional economic integration; the attitude of the Soviet Union and of the East European political and economic elites toward both integration and East-West trade before and after détente; the influence of economic reforms in Eastern Europe; and the impact of the energy crisis and of the developing global shortage of raw materials.

The conclusion emerges that, on balance, the chances of economic cooperation if not integration in the region are today better than in the past, albeit at the expense of closer economic relations between Eastern Europe and the West.

The basis of NATO deterrence strategy is the manipulation of the nuclear "threshold." When NATO's conventional component is strong and the exact nature of its nuclear threshold is uncertain to Warsaw Pact countries, NATO's deterrent will be strong. Attempts to improve the “quality” of the nuclear arsenal by making the outcome of nuclear conflict more predictable weaken NATO's deterrent power. It is the possibility that NATO may use nuclear weapons, as well as the uncertainty of the consequences of such use, that strengthens the deterrent. The number of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal could be reduced with no appreciable damage to the deterrent posture. Qualitative improvements in the conventional component, while increasing deterrent strength, also serve as safeguards in case of deterrence failures. To the extent that political unity within NATO increases the predictability of a NATO response to Warsaw Pact aggression, it is possible that political disunity actually adds to deterrent strength.

Studies on the relationship between internal politics and external behavior present many contradictions. This paper attempts to modify previous research methods by focusing on the relationship between internal mobilization and articulated external hostility in China during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1967-1969.

The findings suggest that during times of authority crisis, domestic mass mobilization tends to be associated with increased antiforeign verbal accusations and mass protests. The Maoists manipulated the expression of external hostility for the purpose of mobilizing internal support for their own domestic programs. Some suggestions concerning the study of China's international behavior and about cross-national research on the linkage of internal politics and external behavior are provided.

It is generally recognized that there are enormous difficulties, bureaucratic as well as political, that attend attempts to ameliorate human problems which arise from the growing interdependence of states. The policy challenge therefore is how to create—or alternatively, how to understand and then to reform—the existing machinery of international administration to enable it to cope with interdependence. The World Food Conference, held in Rome on November 5–16, 1974, was not only an exercise in ad hoc multilateral diplomacy designed to meet the immediate threats of the food crisis; it was also an attempt to rebuild the international food bureaucracy, either by replacing the Food and Agriculture Organization or by reforming it. The Conference largely succeeded in this task; it created a World Food Council, organizationally linked to the FAO in Rome, but separately responsible to the UN General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council. Thus, an examination of the leadership of the Secretariat of the World Food Conference provides a classic case for the study of bureaucratic politics: an international secretariat not merely indirectly influenced the shape of policy; it actually made policy.

On the basis of evidence mainly from West Africa, many scholars in the 1960's made predictions about likely trends in Africa as a whole on such issues as one-party states. On the basis of data from Eastern Africa, can we now risk predictions about likely performance of military regimes in Africa as a whole?

There is evidence from Eastern Africa that African soldiers may be agents of retradi-tionalization. The bulk of the army in most countries is recruited from some of the most rural and least acculturated sectors of society. Contemporary African soldiers may be traditionalists in charge of modern armies with modern technology. What happens when a modern organization is manned mainly by rural recruits?

It may be that both modernization and retraditionalization are taking place under military leadership in Africa. The cultural revivalist role of sub-westernized or non-westernized African soldiers is beginning to manifest itself in places like Uganda under Idi Amin and Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko. The political decline of westernized intellectuals and the rise of soldiers may herald a partial re-Africanization of Africa, but with some painful costs.