* I wish to express my deep appreciation to Professor Donald C. Hellmann of the University of Washington Political Science Department for his perceptive suggestions and criticism on an earlier version of this paper.

¹ Clark, Mark W., From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper 1954), 256Google Scholar.

² Keohane, Robert O., “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, No. 2 (Spring 1971), 162–63Google Scholar.

³ Rhee's action was hailed in South Korea as an act of great statesmanship. The release of anti-Communist prisoners was the only option available for the Seoul government in its effort to break up the truce talks, and to unify Korea by defeating the enemy militarily. Rhee's daring action was primarily intended to break up the truce talks rather than to undermine the foundation of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. From the American perspective, however, it seemed to sabotage the efforts for peace, and the American Government openly expressed misgivings with regard to Rhee's inten- tions.

⁴ Eisenhower, Dwight D., Mandate for Change, 1953–56 (New York: Doubleday, 1963) 187Google Scholar.

⁵ Truman, Harry S., Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1956), 336Google Scholar; emphasis added. Cf. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Korean Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1950), 17Google Scholar.

⁶ See Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law (2nd ed.; Allen and Unwin 1971), 269–72, 340–42Google Scholar; Northedge, F. S. and Donelan, M. D., International Disputes: The Political Aspects (New York: St. Martin's Press 1971), 182Google Scholar; The United Nations Charter, Article 35 (2); Brierly, J. L., The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, ed. by SirWaldock, Humphrey (6th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press 1963), 382–84Google Scholar.

⁷ Clark (fn. 1), 76.

⁸ Ibid., When the Korean War broke out, Chiang Kai-shek asked the United States § to permit him to send two of Nationalist China's divisions to Korea. After due con-I sideration, however, the Truman Administration opposed the use of Nationalist troops I in Korea because of their proven inadequacy in the field.

⁹ Ibid.,

¹⁰ Until General Clark's formal recommendation, the Truman Administration considered the increase in additional Korean divisions a waste of money, effort, and time because of the proven inadequacy of South Korean troops in the field. Throughout the Korean War, the Korean troops were undertrained, underequipped, poorly led, and uninspired. This was in large measure due to the lack of time necessary to train, motivate, and lead them; the Republic of Korea had been born on August 15, 1948, and war came on June 25, 1950. Consequently, South Korean soldiers often failed to perform as well as American soldiers in the battlefield. It is quite probable that Eisenhower, too, knew of the inadequacies of Korean troops. Yet he supported Clark's recommendation. President Eisenhower may have seen some advantage in the recommendation: the war in Korea was very unpopular in the United States and some were favorably disposed to Koreanizing the Korean conflict; any measure to turn the major responsibility of the fighting over to the Koreans was a politically very popular one.

¹¹ Caridi, Ronald J., The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1968), 23ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² Clark (fn. 1), 169; emphasis added. Cf. Whitney, Courtney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1956), 338Google Scholar.

¹³ Clark (fn. 1), 263.

¹⁴ Joy, Turner C., How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan 1955), 90fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ North Korea was a fully controlled satellite state of the Soviet Union from 1945 to roughly 1950. See Kim, Joungwon Alexander, “Soviet Policy in North Korea,” World Politics, XXII (01 1970), 239–42Google Scholar; Chung, Wiwon, “The North Korean People's Army and the Party,” in Scalapino, Robert A., ed., North Korea Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1963), 105–16Google Scholar;Koh, Byung Chul, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1969), 42fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Joy (fn. 14), 91.

¹⁷ Ibid., 9if.

¹⁸ Clark (fn. 1), 263. This technique of bargaining is widely used in international negotiations, and is evident, for example, in the disarmament talks, Middle East negotiations, and Vietnam peace talks. But what I am saying here is that the Communists and Rhee skillfully took advantage of the exploitable situations. This does not mean that United States officials were unaware of the Communist bargaining technique. On the contrary, they were well aware of the fact that both the Communists and President Rhee exploited situations wherever possible. The point is that the United States Government was looking beyond the immediate to its global commitments and priorities.

¹⁹ Miller, J. D. B., The Politics of the Third World (London: Oxford University Press 1967), 64Google Scholar.

²⁰ Although Cuba came under the influence of the Soviet Union at the time the structure of the postwar international system was slowly but inexorably being trans- formed from a loose bipolar to a multipolar system, the association of the Soviet Union with Cuba is illustrative of a new phenomenon in relationships between super- powers and small nation-states.

²¹ Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton 1969), 451Google Scholar.

²² ibid.,

²³ Eisenhower (fn. 4), 181f.

²⁴ Ibid., 182.

²⁵ Ibid., 183.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 184.

²⁸ Ibid., 185.

²⁹ Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (3d ed.; New York: Knopf 1960), 337Google Scholar.

³⁰ Ibid., 256.

³¹ Clark (fn. i), 270.

³² When serious debate on the problems of prisoners began in December 1951, the original position of the United Nations Command was to propose an all-for-all exchange of prisoners. (Joy [fn. 14], 150.) That position was subsequently changed to a voluntary repatriation plan under which each prisoner was to be given an appropriate opportunity to choose whether or not to return to the Communist country from which he came or to remain in South Korea. Under this scheme, each prisoner was to be interviewed by the Repatriation Commission for his freely determined choice. The Chinese and North Korean Communists strongly rejected the United Nations proposal and continued to insist that the prisoners should be exchanged on an all-for-all basis.

³³ Speaking at a dinner of the New York State Republican Committee at the Waldorf Astoria on May 7, 1953, President Eisenhower, said: “People that have become our prisoners cannot by any manner of means be denied the right on which this country was founded… the right of political asylum against the kind of political persecution they fear…. Consequently, to force those people to go back to a life of terror and persecution is something that would violate every moral standard by which America lives. Therefore, it would be unacceptable in the American code, and it cannot be done.” Donovan, Robert J., Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper 1956)Google Scholar.