* The authors are writing in their private capacities; the views expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors, and not of their respective organizations.

¹ Bureaucracy, , Politics and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown 1969), viiGoogle Scholar.

² See Jacobson, Harold K., “The Changing United Nations,” in Hilsman, Roger and Good, Robert C., eds., Foreign Policies in the Sixties: The Issues and the Instruments (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1965), 67–89Google Scholar.

³ For exemplary recent discussions of international functionalism, see Haas, Ernst, “The Study of Regional Integration,” International Organization, XXIV (Autumn 1970), 607–48Google Scholar; and Nye, J. S., Peace in Parts (Boston: Little, Brown 1971)Google Scholar. An attempt to test functionalist hypotheses from the point of view of the theory of collective goods is Ruggie, J. G., “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 874–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ This fact has long been considered obvious with regard to bureaucratic behavior at the national and subnational levels. As Michel Crozier has written: “[Modern society] evokes the slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, the complication of procedures, and the maladapted responses of ‘bureaucratic’ organization to the needs which they should satisfy, and the frustration which their members, clients or subjects consequently endure.” The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), 3Google Scholar; (author's trans.). The phenomenon of incrementalism, inertia, and the need for survival have been summarized by as, Charles Lindblom “The Science of Muddling-Through,” Public Administration Review, XIX (Spring 1959), 79–88Google Scholar. See also the Unitar paper prepared by Robert S. Jordan and John P. Renninger, “What Has Happened To Our International Civil Service?” for an overview of the current situation in what is an important yet generally little known segment of international life.

⁵ We do not maintain that the administrative or bureaucratic perspective is wholly lacking in the literature, but that scholars have paid insufficient attention to it and probably underestimate the importance of the subject. Recent discussions of administrative reform of the UN system constitute one class of exceptions. See, for example, Robert G. A. Jackson, A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System (Geneva, UN document DP/5, 1969); Hill, Martin, Towards Greater Order, Coherence and Co-ordination in the United Nations System (New York, Unitar Research Report No. 20, originally E/5491 1974)Google Scholar; and Goldschmidt, Arthur, “The Re-invention of ECOSOC,” International Development Review, XVI (1974), 23–29Google Scholar. The theme of dispersed administrative authority had been investigated much earlier by Sharp, Walter in Field Administration in the United Nations System (London: Stevens 1961)Google Scholar and The Economic and Social Council (New York: Columbia University Press 1969)Google Scholar. On problems of staffing, see Bertrand, Maurice, Personnel Questions: Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations, 5 10 1971Google Scholar, A. 8454, Parts I and II; and Report on Medium-Term Planning in the United Nations System, JIU/REP/74/1. UNITAR participated in the Group of Experts to Study the Structure of the United Nations, as part of the preparations for the seventh special session of the General Assembly, held in September 1975. Questions of bureaucratic politics are at least implied in many studies of leadership in international organizations. The theoretical implications of leadership have been stated by Cox, Robert W., “An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations,” International Organization, XXII (Spring 1969), 205–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Biographical and analytical discussions of the two most widely recognized international officials—the ILO's first Director-General, Albert Thomas, and former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjoldare: Phelan, E. J., Yes and Albert Thomas (New York: Columbia University Press 1949)Google Scholar, and Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of the Peace (New York: Columbia University Press 1967)Google Scholar. For more general discussions of leadership in international organizations, see: Coombes, David, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (London: Allen and Unwin 1970)Google Scholar; Etzioni, Amatai, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1965)Google Scholar; Fischer, G., La competence du secretaire general (Paris: AFDI 1965)Google Scholar; Jordan, Robert S., The NATO International Staff Secretariat, 1952–1957: A Study in International Administration (London: Oxford University Press 1967)Google Scholar; Schwebel, Stephen M., The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lang-enhove, F. Van, Le role preeminent du secretaire general dans (operation des Nations-Unies au Congo) (The Hague: Nijhoff 1964)Google Scholar. Finally, the bureaucratic politics approach has been combined with research on transnational politics to yield useful hypotheses regarding interaction between national and international bureaucracies; see Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, XXVII (10 1974), 39–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ For a discussion of the theoretical implications of such an evolution, see Rosencrance, Richard N. and Stein, Arthur A., “Interdependence: Myth or Reality?” World Politics, XXVI (10 1973), 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Puchala, Donald J. and Fagan, Stuart I., “International Politics in the 1970's: The Search for a Perspective,” International Organization, XXVII (Spring 1974), 247–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The implications for U.S. policy making can be found in Brown, Seyom, New Forces in World Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brook-ings Institution Press 1974)Google Scholar.

⁷ A discussion of this system and its present inadequacies is the basis for Falk, Richard A., A Study of Future Worlds (New York: Free Press 1975), chap. 2Google Scholar. For the contrast between international relations as viewed from conventional and newly evolving perspectives, contrast Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf 1973)Google Scholar and Sterling, Richard W., Macropolitics (New York: Knopf 1974)Google Scholar.

⁸ For an expanded discussion of the issues and the administration of this conference, see Weiss, and Jordan, , The World Food Conference and Global Problem Solving (New York: Praeger 1976)Google Scholar, in the series Special Studies in International Economics and Development. Our study of the Food Conference is based largely on our observations of several preparatory meetings and of the Conference itself, on follow-up interviews with participants, and on the large volume of documentation—both official and critical—generated by the Conference.

⁹ Decision-making analysis is usefully divided into two general categories the impact of which modifies the idealized behavior of any staff: individual and group dynamics. For an analysis of individuals’ shortcomings within an organization, see Snyder, Richard G., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, Burton M., Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1954)Google Scholar, later expanded as Foreign-Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press 1962)Google Scholar. On the other hand, Graham Allison stresses primarily organizational processes in “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (09 1969), 689–718CrossRefGoogle Scholar,later expanded as Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 1971)Google Scholar. For a discussion of contributions of both approaches in summary form, see Tanter, Raymond, “The International System and Foreign Policy Approaches,” in Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard H., eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 7–39Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Easton, David, The Political System (New York: Knopf 1959), 129–31Google Scholar. See also Lasswell, Harold, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (New York: Whittlesey 1936), passimGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ “Interview,” Pan, 7 November 1974, p. 5.

¹² Calder, Richie, “Introduction,” to Lord Boyd Orr, As I Recall (London: Mac-Gibbon and Kee 1966), 22Google Scholar.

¹³ As one commentator has noted: “The ground rules for international economic cooperation that were drawn up in the 1940s under the leadership of the United States were aimed primarily at preventing actions found harmful by the major Powers during the 1930s, not at promoting practices helpful to the emerging nations. Since about 1950, however, the international community has devoted an enormous amount of attention to the manifold problems of the low-income countries, gradually modifying the original ground rules and introducing many innovations, including various forms of development assistance. The spokesmen for the less developed countries nevertheless continue to think they are condemned to live in a world they never made under arrangements designed to perpetuate their underdog status.” Asher, Robert E., “International Agencies and Economic Development,” International Organization, XXII (Winter 1968), 43Google Scholar.

¹⁴ National perceptions about organizational performance rarely consider budgetary constraints. It must be remembered that if one compares the FAO's budget with its mandate, then—in the words of one official—“somebody must be joking.” For a more positive assessment of the FAO's performance, see Bard, Robert, Food Aid and International Agricultural Trade (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1972)Google Scholar. See Gosivic, Branislov, Unctad: Compromise and Conflict (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff 1972), passimGoogle Scholar;Cordovez, Diego, Unctad and Development Diplomacy: From Confrontation to Strategy (London: Journal of World Trade Law 1970), esp. chap. 3Google Scholar, “The Unctad-Gatt Relationship,” 57–72; and Hagras, Kamal, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: A Case Study in UN Diplomacy (New York: Praeger 1965), passimGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Report of the Conference of FAO, 17th Session, 10–29 November 1973 (Rome: FAO 1973), document C73/REP, paras. 280–291, pp. 54–57Google Scholar.

¹⁷ “The World Food Authority,” The world food problem, proposals for national and international action, E/CONF.65/4, chap. 20, 225–31.

¹⁸ One commentator wrote, “FAO had failed to get the message. The politicians didn't reject the idea of a World Food Authority because they wanted to avoid creating another international bureaucracy. They did it because they positively prefer political committees of Ministers when it comes to making policy. They know something that FAO seems to be unaware of: that is the way things tend to get done.” Harris, Anthony, “Decision? Forget the FAO,” Pan, 13 November 1974, p. 7Google Scholar.

¹⁹ “yj Follow-up Action, Resolution XXII, Arrangements for Follow-up Action, Including Appropriate Operational Machinery On Recommendations or Resolutions of the Conference,” World Food Conference, Note by the Secretary-General, 22 November 1974, E/5587, pp. 99–102. The World Food Council was the central focus in General Assembly Resolution 3348 (XXIX), 17 12 1974Google Scholar.

²⁰ Rourke(fn. 1), 36.

²¹ Assessment of the world food situation, present and future, E/CONF.65/3, and The world food problem, proposals for national and international action, E/CONF.-65/4, were the backbone of the Preparatory Committee's work.

²² Report of the FAO Council, 64th Session, Rome, 18–29 11 1974, CL 64/REP, 6–9Google Scholar.

²³ Rensberger, Boyce, “Long-Range Plans to Feed World Are Moving Ahead,” New York Times, 16 03 1975, p. 28Google Scholar. This is not necessarily the opinion of the authors.

²⁴ Report of the FAO Council (fn. 22), 8.

²⁵ U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger's proposal suggested three such new structural committees—the highest number mentioned.

²⁶ On October 23, between the final session of the Preparatory Committee and the World Food Conference, Marei was elected to the presidency of the Egyptian Parliament. He had been special adviser to Anwar Sadat, and had previously held several important agricultural posts in the government. For details, see: Peroncel-Hugoz, J.-P., “M. Sayed Marei parait designe pour succeder au president Sadate,” Le Monde, 25 10 1974, p. 2Google Scholar. Marei was unconcerned about a future within the international civil service, and had already removed himself from consideration to head the FAO (Director-General Boerma was scheduled to retire in 1975) or any agency resulting from the World Food Conference. At the June 1975 meeting of the World Food Council he was, however, elected President of the Council.

²⁷ In an interview with the authors before the publication of the action document, Marei made clear that he wanted to mobilize new monies from traditional and new donors, and also wanted to avoid any new bureaucratic unit. He preferred instead a high-powered, ministerial-level, coordinating group. This double motivation for finance and nonbureaucratic perspectives actually had its origins in the recommendation of a Panel of Experts on the Protein Problem Confronting Developing Countries:

There is, however, a clear need for a political body or committee operating at the highest level within the United Nations system with responsibility for mobilizing international opinion and action directed towards the protein problem.… Such a body should be composed of representatives of Governments at the highest possible level, preferably cabinet ministers, so that nations concerned are closely identified with its efforts, and it could be established by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council.

“Strategy Statement on Action to Avert the Protein Crisis in Developing Countries,” 3–7 May 1971, U N Sales No. E.71 II.A17, p. 14.

²⁸ Another observer has noted that “Marei had said, prior to the Rome meeting, that even if the idea of a World Food Authority were to be rejected something similar would emerge to take its place.” Loftas, Tony, “WFC: Cash Could Cripple the Concept,” Now Where Were We? 01 1975, p. 14Google Scholar. It is also interesting to note that Marei's ability to conceptualize and see through the implementation of his ideas closely resembled efforts by Maurice Strong and his staff before and during the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. Strong had advocated the establishment of a small administrative unit to service an intergovernmental, and nonbureaucratic, body in fulfilling its policy review and coordination functions and to attract and to administer new financial resources. Unlike the international institutions it was to coordinate, this secretariat was to have no operational responsibilities. Although the financial resources to be mobilized after the World Food Conference are to be much higher (almost ten times), the anticipated and actual follow-up mechanisms for the two Conferences are strikingly similar. Th e three central parts of new arrangements resulting from Stockholm were: an intergovernmental body within the U N (Governing Council for Environmental Programmes); a small secretariat without operational responsibilities (UNEP); and a voluntarily subscribed financial fund (Environmental Fund). Th e World Food Council, the proposed seven-person secretariat (along with the two new committees in FAO), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development appear to be modeled on the institutions that resulted from the Stockholm Conference.

²⁹ Harris (fn. 18), 7.

³⁰ “Statement by Mr. Sayed Marei, Secretary-General of the World Food Conference at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee,” Rome, 30 September 1974, document WS/F3218.

³¹ “Note by the Chairman of the Working Group,” I October 1974, document WM/F3391.

³² Report of the Preparatory Committee for the World Food Conference on its Third Session, October 1974, document E/CONF.65/6, Annex VII.

³³ The text of the resolutions passed by the World Food Conference is found in World Food Conference, E/5587, pp. 61–102. Subsequently, Dr. Aziz became Deputy Director of the World Food Council. John Hannah of the United States was named Director. At the June 1975 meeting of the Council, some of the developing states attacked Dr. Hannah's appointment on the grounds that, coming from a developed country, he was unqualified to serve the interests and needs of the developing Third World. The episode was more a rhetorical than an actual attempt to dislodge Dr. Hannah.

³⁴ Asher, Robert E., “International Agencies and Economic Development: An Overview,” International Organization, XXII (Winter 1968), 442Google Scholar.

³⁵ Jacobson, , “Technological Developments, Organizational Capabilities, and Values,” International Organization, XXV (Autumn 1971), 780Google Scholar.

³⁶ Allison (fn. 9), 145.