¹ Kuznets, Simon, “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, v (October 1956), 1–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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³ Keynes, John Maynard, “Some Economic Consequences of a Declining Population,” Eugenics Review, xxix (April 1937), 13–17Google Scholar; Hansen, Alvin H., “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth,” American Economic Review, xxix (March 1939), 1–15Google Scholar) reprinted in Spengler, Joseph J. & Duncan, Otis D., Population Theory and Policy (Glencoe 1956), 256–69Google Scholar. For recent elaboration of the consequences of demographic change on aggregate demand and hence growth in advanced economies see National Bureau of Economic Research, Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries (Princeton 1960), 324–40Google Scholar and 352–71.

⁴ Clark, Colin, Population Growth and Land Use (New York 1967), 237Google Scholar.

⁵ As summarized in Clark, 256–57.

⁶ Hirschman, Albert O., The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven 1958), 176–82Google Scholar.

⁷ Cf. Higgins, Benjamin, “An Economist's View,” in Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America (Paris 1963), 11Google Scholar, 226; Levine, A. L., “Economic Science and Population Theory,” Population Studies, xix (November 1964), 139–54Google Scholar.

⁸ For tables listing such estimates, see Buck, John L., Land Utilization in China (Chicago 1937), 363Google Scholar; Pelzer, Karl J., Population and Land Utilization (New York 1941), 33Google Scholar.

⁹ Chen, Ta, Population in Modern China (Chicago 1946), 28–30Google Scholar; Taeuber, Irene and Taeuber, Karl E., “The Fertility of the Chinese in Northeast China,” Proceedings of the International Population Conference (Vienna 1959), 348–54Google Scholar; Thompson, W. and Chiao, C. M., An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics (Oxford 1938), 70Google Scholar.

¹⁰ “Directive on National Census and Registration,” Jen-min Jih-pao (April 3, 1953).

¹¹ For a detailed description of the progress of the census-taking, see China News Analysis, Hong Kong, No. 61.

¹² “Communique on the Results of the National Population Enumeration and Registration,” Jen-min Jih-pao (November I, 1954).

¹³ Pai Chien-Hua, “600 Million—A Great Strength for Our Country's Socialist Construction,” Jen-min Jih-pao (November 1, 1954).

¹⁴ John S. Aird argues that the 1953 census represented a genuine effort on the part of the Communist regime to count the population of China and that the census results probably understate the true population size by 5 to 15 percent. See Aird, , “Present and Prospective Population of Mainland China,” in Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R. and Mainland China (New York 1960), 94–116Google Scholar; Aird, , “Population Growth,” in Eckstein, Alexander and others, eds., Economic Trends in Communist China (Chicago 1968), 183–328Google Scholar. Dwight H. Perkins, though agreeing with Aird oh the nature of the 1953 census-taking, doubts that the margin of error could be as high as 15 percent. “Such an error would imply that the census takers missed two persons in every three families investigated, or perhaps failed to register as many as 1 in 7 families. … It is difficult to see how such an enormous number of mistakes could be made.” Perkins, See, Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968 (Chicago 1969), 201Google Scholar. John Durand, though willing to accept the official figure, questions the Communist claim of the accuracy of the enumeration by pointing out the methodological and operational deficiencies. See Durand, , “The Population Statistics of China, A.D. 2–1953,” Population Studies, xiii (March 1960), 246Google Scholar. Ping-ti Ho, also pointing out the procedural defects of the census, accepts its results as being “closer to the truth than any previous population figures” without hazarding a guess at the margin of error. See Ho, Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953 (Cambridge, Mass. 1959), 93–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar. John L. Buck believes that “the Communist 1953 census figure … is undoubtedly more nearly correct than that of any previous census, and there is no reason to suspect the 1953 Communist census figure as being too high.” Buck, and others, Food and Agriculture in Communist China (New York 1966), 40Google Scholar. Of all the demographers who have studied the 1953 census returns, Irene Taeuber and Nai-chi Wang are most critical of all. They point out the “strikingly consistent patterns of similarities and differences” between the 1953 provincial registration figures and those of the 1850's and the 1928's, which were “defective and unreliable,” and suggest that there had probably never been “either field enumeration or a controlled registration of the population of all China.” See Taeuber, and Wang, , “Questions on Population Growth in China,” in Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R. and Mainland China (New York 1960), 263–302Google Scholar. Some Western-trained Chinese social scientists have also politely questioned the “scientific” quality of the 1953 census. At a symposium sponsored by the State Statistical Bureau on May 27, 1957, in connection with the Hundred Flowers campaign, Chen Ta criticized the processing of data by tallies at successive levels and recommended that a second census be taken in 1960 and that a pilot project be first set up at a hsien with a population of less than 300,000 that was not too far away from Peking in order to field-train cadres of the State Statistical Bureau. See “Chen Ta's remarks, T'ung-chi Kung-tso, No. 12 (1957), 1–2. Ma Yin-ch'u also suggested that the actual vital rates were probably higher than those reported by the State Statistical Bureau and recommended that a second nationwide census be taken in the near future. See Ma Yin-ch'u, “A New Theory of Population,” Jen-min Jih-pao (July 5, 1957).

¹⁵ Aird, for instance, points out the deficiency of persons aged 5 to 14 and the high sex ratio in this age-group and suggests that there was probably an undercount arising from biases in reporting age and selective omissions by age and sex. See Aird, John S., “Present and Prospective Population of Mainland China,” in Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U. S. S. R. and Mainland China (New York 1960), 109–115Google Scholar.

¹⁶ The articles published in Chi-hua Ching-chi [Planned Economy] in the 1950's all seem to suggest that the authors (i.e., the planners) had used the same set of data.

¹⁷ A recent attempt at reformulating the Malthusian model in a more rigorous way was made by Leibenstein. See Leibenstein, Harvey, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth (New York 1957), 20Google Scholar and 56; Nelson, Richard R., “A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped Economies,” American Economic Review, xlvi (December 1956), 894–908Google Scholar. For a more recent attempt at reversing the causal direction of the Malthusian model as an explanation of historical population, see Boserup, Ester, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure (Chicago 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Coale, Ansley J. & Hoover, Edgar M., Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-income Countries (Princeton 1958)Google Scholar; “Growth Models for Illustrating the Effects of Alternative Employment and Investment Policies,” United Nations, ECAFE, Economic Bulletin for Asia and Far East, ix (New York 1958)Google Scholar; Enke, Stephen, “The Economic Aspects of Slowing Population Growth,” Economic Journal, xxvi (March 1966), 44–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a critique of this approach, especially the Coale-Hoover model, see Myrdal, Gunnar, Asian Drama, iii (New York 1968), 2068–2075Google Scholar. Myrdal's criticisms are directed at (1) certain omissions (i.e., leaving out consideration of a number of important variables because they pose difficult problems of measurement), (2) certain arbitrary assumptions, and (3) the accuracy of the model, especially the narrow ranges of its results. These criticisms, however, supplement rather than invalidate the essential soundness of the Coale-Hoover model. Myrdal himself also concurs with Coale and Hoover regarding the “substantial” and “cumulative” economic benefits of fertility reductions. Myrdal, II, 1467.

¹⁹ Coale, , “The Effects of Changes in Mortality and Fertility on Age Composition,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 1 (January 1956), 79–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stolinitz, G. J., “Mortality Declines and Age Distributions,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 1 (January 1956), 178–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Keyfitz, N., “Changing Vital Rates and Age Distribution,” Population Studies, xxxii (July 1968), 235–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²¹ This and the diversion of savings to “social-overhead” expenditure are what Sauvy calls “demographic investment.” See Alfred Sauvy, Fertility and Survival (New York) 110–123. See also Tinbergen, Jan, The Design of Development (Baltimore 1958), 13–14Google Scholar.

²² Schultz, Theodore W., Economic Growth and Agriculture (New York 1968), 46–54Google Scholar.

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²⁴ Cressey, George B., Land of the 500 Million (New York 1955), 103–104Google Scholar.

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²⁶ Li Fu-ch'un (fn. 23), 6; see also Ou Yu, “On the Problem of Population Resettlement and Land Reclamation,” Kuang-ming Jih-pao (January 15, 1957).

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³¹ Perkins, Dwight H., Agricultural Development in China 1368–1968 (Chicago 1969)Google Scholar.

³² In 1941 the Japanese estimated that about 28.7 million hectares of additional land in Manchuria could be brought under cultivation. See Japan-Manchoukuo Yearbook (Tokyo 1940), 710Google Scholar.

³³ Perkins (fn. 31), 189–91.

³⁴ In 1957 China's per capita grain availability was 256 kilograms. In contrast, in 1928, the Soviet Union's per capita grain availability was 480 kilograms. Thus, during comparable stages of their respective drives toward industrialization, China's per capita grab availability was less than half that of the Soviet Union. This difference accounts for the fact that whereas, in the Soviet Union agriculture permitted industrialization to proceed at a maximum level set by factors endogenous to industry and trade, in China the agricultural bottleneck has set the pace of her industrialization. See Tang, A. M., “Agriculture in the Industrialization of Communist China and the Soviet Union,” Journal of Farm Economics, lix (December 1967), 1118–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Spulber, Nicholas, “Chinese and Soviet Development Strategies,” Soviet Studies, xv (July 1963), 1–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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³⁶ A. M. Tang (fn. 30), 1968, 504–505. Two more students of China's economy, Perkins and Ishikawa, express essentially the same view. See Perkins (fn. 31), 189–91; Shigeru Ishikawa, “Factors Affecting China's Agriculture in the Coming Decades” (unpubl. manuscript), 1967; Ishikawa, Shigeru, “Resource Flow Between Agriculture and Industry,” Developing Economics, rv (December 1966), 3–49Google Scholar.

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³⁹ Hou, ibid., 377; Yeh, K. C., Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies (Santa Monica, May 1965)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Myrdal (fn. 18), n, 1173–74.

⁴¹ Myrdal, ibid., 1199–1200.

⁴² Ping, Sung, “On the Question of Labor Employment,” Hsueh Hsi, No. 12 (June 18. 1957). 25Google Scholar.

⁴³ Wang Kuang-wei, “Some Opinion on the Arrangement of Agricultural Labor Force,” Chi-hua Ching-chi (August 9, 1957), 6–9.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of seasonal fluctuation in labor utilization in the 1930's, see Buck, John L., Land Utilization in China (Chicago 1937), 295–96Google Scholar. Available surveys of the same phenomenon in the Communist period are summarized in Hou (fn. 38), 378–79. See also John P. Emerson, “Manpower Absorption in the Non-Agricultural Branches of the Economy of Communist China,” China Quarterly (July-September 1961); Lee Orleans, “Problems of Manpower Absorption in Rural China,” China Quarterly (July-September 1961).

⁴⁵ Hou (fn. 38), 379–82; Eckstein, A., “The Strategy of Economic Development in Communist China,” American Economic Review, v (May 1961), 508–17Google Scholar; Ishikawa, Shigeru, “Choice of Techniques in Mainland China,” Developing Economics, 11 (September-December 1962), 39–49Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ There are two historical cases illustrating this: the Soviet Union in the period 1928–1937 when Stalin was implementing his forced rapid industrialization scheme and Canada in the decade 1900–1910 when there was a record rate of migration. See Clark (fn. 4), 259.

⁴⁷ Lewis, W. Arthur, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,” Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, xxii (May 1954), 139-91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted in Agarwala, A. N. and Singh, S. P., eds., The Economics of Underdevelopment (London 1960), 400–49Google Scholar.

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⁴⁹ For discussion of the phenomenon of unemployment of the educated in South Asia, see Myrdal (fn. 18), n, 1124–31; Ilchman, Warren F., “People in Plenty: Educated Unemployment In India,” Asian Survey, ix (October 1969), 781–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also A. C. Callaway, “Unemployment Among African School Leavers,” Journal of Modern African Study (September 1963), 531–71, International Labor Office, “Unemployed Youth: An African Symposium,” International Labor Review, lxxxvii (March 1963), 183–205Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Olin, Ulla, “Population Growth and Problems of Equipment in Asia and the Far East,” in United Nations, Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1965, iv (New York 1966), 314–17Google Scholar; Tangri, S., “Urbanization, Political Stability and Economic Growth,” in Finkle, Jason L. and Gable, R. W., eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York 1966), 305–20Google Scholar; Weiner, Myron, Politics of Scarcity (Chicago 1962), 184Google Scholar.

⁵¹ For a discussion of the retrenchment policy adopted in the aftermath of the Great Leap, see Kang, Chao, “Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China,” Asian Survey, iv (May 1964)Google Scholar; Jones, P. P. and Poleman, Thomas T., “Communes and the Agricultural Crises in Communist China,” Food Research Institute Studies, 111 (February 1962), 3–22Google Scholar; Chen, P. C., “Individual Farming After the Great Leap,” Asian Survey, viii (September 1968), 774–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵³ The campaign discussed here should be distinguished from the “hsia-fang” [downward transfer] campaign, although the two have much in common. For studies of the latter, see Rensselaer W. Lee, III, “The Hsia Fang System: Marxism and Modernization,” China Quarterly (October-December 1966), 40–62; Chen, Hermia, “The Ziafang [hsia fang] of Cadres: A Means of Mass Communication,” China Mainland Review, 11 (March 1967), 257–61Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Kung-jen Jih-pao (March 22, 1964).

⁵⁵ Jen-min Jih-pao (February 19, 1965).

⁵⁶ Jen-min Jih-pao (September 25, 1965).

⁵⁷ Chin Yun, “Millions of Educated Youth Go to the Countryside,” Peking Review (July 16, 1965), 10.

⁵⁸ For an eyewitness account describing the tension related to job assignment upon graduation, see Tung, Chi-ping and Evans, Humphrey, The Thought Revolution (New York 1966), 182–85Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ It goes without saying that a strong case can indeed be made for the desirability of adopting such a policy. The Peace Corps and Vista are essentially American counterparts of the Chinese campaign, except that they are run on a voluntary basis.

⁶⁰ Lerner, Daniel, “Toward A Communication Theory of Modernization,” in Pye, L. W., ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton 1963), 330Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Commenting on the Stalinist purges of the 1930's Zbigniew K. Brzezinski observed that the purges served two useful functions for the dictator. First, they provided an escape valve for popular discontent by allowing the tormented population the pleasure of seeing some of its tormentors get their come-uppance. Second, by removing senior Party cadres and functionaries, they provided openings for upward mobility within the Party and thus gave increased opportunity to lowly but ambitious party cadres. See Brzezinski, , The Permanent Purge (Cambridge 1956), 33–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In turning the furious youths against the rank and file of the Party, Mao might originally have entertained the hope of re-instilling revolutionary zeal in the young generation and thereby setting the country again on the path of “uninterrupted revolution,” and of eventually replacing the purged Party “Capitalist roaders” with Red Guards who had tempered and proved themselves in the violent struggle in positions of responsibility. This expectation, however, was to prove to be unrealistic and was largely unfulfilled, since in the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the Red Guard units engaged in endless bloody factional struggles among themselves.

⁶² “Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive,” Peking Review, No. 52 (December 27, 1968), 2Google Scholar.

⁶³ Connected with the revival of the resettlement policy has been educational reform, which Peking introduced in mid-1968. Because of the paucity of information on this new development, it would be unwise to make a definite statement about the shape this reform will take. However, on the basis of scattered information available and at the risk of simplification, we may suggest that the new curriculum decreases the proportion of purely academic subjects, increases that of “thought reform,” and emphasizes transmission of practical, applied technical knowledge. Apart from Mao's apparently genuine conviction of the desirability of such a change, the reform may also be regarded partly as a response to the economic-demographic situation in which China finds herself at the present stage of development. When the urban industrial sector is growing too slowly to absorb many highly trained industrial technocrats, it does not seem very sensible to turn out a large number of engineering graduates. A much more sensible approach to development would be to restructure the educational policy in favor of training a large number of low-level agricultural technocrats in order to raise agricultural production in as short a time as possible. This may partly explain post-1968 emphasis on establishing a new type of agricultural middle school, at the grass-roots level, to be financed by communes or production brigades, and to recruit students from among the children of peasants. The curriculum of this type of agricultural middle school emphasizes indoctrination (i.e., studying the Thought of Mao Tse-tung) and transmission of simple arithmetical and literary skills (i.e., ability to read and do simple calculations and bookkeeping), as well as applied agricultural science (knowledge of how to apply fertilizer, man and service electrical pumps, plant new strains, control weeds and pests, and so forth). This type of school has three advantages. First, since it is financed locally, it not only costs the state nothing but also enables the state to channel its precious revenue previously allocated for the maintenance of “regular” middle schools to other investment purposes. Second, since the students are locally recruited, while in school they can help on the farm during the agricultural peak season, and upon their graduation the state will not face the problem of resettlement, which is both painful and costly. Third, this type of school will enable the state to train a large number of grass-roots agricultural technocrats who are indispensable to nationwide extension of modern farming methods. In short, post-1968 educational reform may be viewed as a step in the right direction in view of China's demographic-economic realities.

⁶⁴ Katherine, & Organski, A.F.K., Population and World Power (New York 1961), 18–35Google Scholar. Also see Aron, Raymond, Peace and War (New York 1966)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ For discussion of the role of agriculture in economic development, sec Johnston, Bruce F., and Mellor, John W., “The Nature of Agriculture's Contribution to Economic Development,” Food Research Institute Studies, 1 (November 1960), 335–56Google Scholar; Johnston, and Mellor, , “The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development,” American Economic Review, li (September 1961), 556–893Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Even the “Green Revolution,” which holds the promise of doubling grain output in a few years, will only postpone the time of reckoning. Besides, the hybrid seeds that have been developed are intended for use in tropical and semitropical areas, which means they can be used only in regions south of the Yangtze river. For a documentation of the “Green Revolution,” see Brown, Lester R., Seeds of Change (New York 1970)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Tachi, Minoru, “Population Trends and Economic Growth in Japan,” in Berrill, Kenneth ed., Economic Development with Special Reference to East Asia (London 1964), 54Google Scholar. See also Tachi, Minoru and Yoichi, Okazaki, “Economic Development and Population Growth,” Developing Economics, iii (December 1965), 498–500Google Scholar.

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