This article considers Bentham's response to the criticism of utilitarianism that it allows for and may even require the sacrifice of some members of society in order to increase overall happiness. It begins with the contrast between the principle of utility and the contrasting principle of sympathy and antipathy to show that Bentham regarded the main achievement of his principle as overcoming the subjectivity he found in all other philosophical theories. This subjectivism, especially prevalent in theories of rights, might well lead to the sacrifice of the individual. The principle of utility was presented as an ‘objective’ theory that avoided the difficulties of other moral and political theories. The article also considers the importance of universally applicable ends, such as security and equality, as part of the principle of utility, and especially Bentham's view of maximizing pleasure as being a distributive rather than an aggregative idea. The article concludes by criticizing H. L. A. Hart's interpretation of the role of equality and rights in Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and argues that Mill's doctrine of moral rights builds on foundations originally established by Bentham, foundations which would preclude the sacrifice of individuals.

This paper attempts to do two things. One concerns Mill's attitude to public indecency. In On Liberty Mill expresses the conventional view that certain actions, if conducted in public, are an affront to good manners, and can properly be prohibited. This paper aims to come to an understanding of Mill's position so that it allows him to defend this part of conventional morality, but does not disrupt certain of his liberal convictions: principally the conviction that what consenting adults do in private is no-one's concern but their own. The difficulty is to find an argument that Mill could have used to defend the position that some things which, though acceptable in private, can rightly be stopped if attempted in public. The other thing the paper attempts is to consider the impact of Mill's view of indecency on the interpretation of the Liberty Principle. There remain difficulties here which have not been adequately explored. So the paper will examine a range of interpretative alternatives.

The first part of the paper will raise and explore the issue of the interpretative problems. The second part will look at some ways of trying to justify Mill's view of indecency on characteristically Millian grounds. The final part will explore the somewhat surprising consequences of the discussion of the second part for the interpretative questions raised in the first.

David Ross made the first sustained attack on Moore's agathistic utilitarianism or ethical neutralism – the first attack, that is, on a consequentialism purified of ethical naturalism. Ross started out with an important idea about the difference (in the sphere of action) between the right and the good, and a good appreciation of the dialectical situation about consequentialism. His attack, based on the personal character of duty, is greatly hampered by his imperfect account of the duty of beneficence and the supposed general prima facie duty to promote the good. In due course, duties of other kinds come to appear as exceptions to this duty – a damaging concession to consequentialism.

Rosen argues that Bentham's utilitarian doctrine was sensitive to distributive concerns and would not countenance sacrifice of fundamental individual interests for aggregate gains in happiness in society. This essay seeks to extend and deepen Rosen's argument. It is argued that Bentham's equality-sensitive principle of utility is an expression of an individualist conception of human happiness which contrasts sharply with the orthodox utilitarian abstract conception. Evidence for this interpretation of the basic motivation of Bentham's doctrine is drawn from his view of the relationship between happiness and expectations, from various expressions of his ‘each to count for one’ formula, and from his reformulations of the principle of utility itself late in his career.

The note claims that Rosen's arguments about distribution and aggregation do not support his central claim, either in their own terms or as a reading of Bentham; and suggests a different account of the relation of the objective to the subjective in Bentham.

Ross's attempt to undermine the consequentialist understanding of the relation between duties and outcomes might give him greater defence against the danger that outcome-related duties will come to constitute a norm, to the disadvantage of all others.

The article examines J. S. Mill's views on the significance of the racial factor in the formation of what he called ‘national character’. Mill's views are placed in the context of his time and are assessed in the light of the theories concerning these issues that were predominant in the nineteenth century. It is shown that Mill – although he did indulge himself in the discourse based on race, geography or climate to a minor extent – made strenuous efforts to discredit the deterministic implications of racial theories and to promote the idea that human effort and education could alter beyond recognition what were supposed to be the racially inherited characteristics of various human groups. Finally, Mill's attitude towards race is used as a case-study through which a contribution can be made to broader debates on how to categorize him.

This paper examines Rosen's claim that Bentham's principle of utility was a distributive rather than an aggregative principle.

Mill was receptive to all sorts of ideas, both plausible and implausible, which did not fit well with utilitarianism. He was, for example, inclined to think of equality, not just pleasure, as ‘good in itself’. He was able to think of himself as a utilitarian only by grossly expanding that notion to cover any doctrine which did not entirely rely, without the possibility of further explanation, on ‘intuition’ or God's commands. It is even doubtful whether he was a consequentialist in any sense. Mill's account of moral obligation is not a maximizing, nor even a satisficing, one. And the account emphasizes the place of supererogation. There is no suggestion in Mill that one is obliged to do something merely because a teaching to that effect would be felicific. Far from there being an obligation to maximize, it would sometimes be wrong merely to make Pareto-improvements. Sympathetically understood, the account of obligation in Mill is more or less the same as one finds in Hobbes, with his theorems ‘for the preservation of men in multitudes’.

As David Wiggins points out, although Ross is best known for opposing Moore's consequentialism, Ross comes very close to capitulation to Moore when he accepts, as required by beneficence, a prima facie duty to maximize the good. I argue that what lies behind this is Ross's acceptance of Moore's doctrine of agent-neutral intrinsic value, a notion that is not required by, but is indeed is in tension with, beneficence as doing good to or for others.

Consequentialism has trouble explaining why hypocrisy is a term of moral condem-nation, largely because hypocrites often try to deceive others about their own selfishness through the useof words or deeds which themselves have good consequences. We argue that consequentialist attempts to deal with the problem by separating the evaluation of agent and action, or by the directevaluation of dispositions, or by focusing on long-term consequences such as reliability and erosion of trust, all prove inadequate to the challenge. We go on to argue, however, that a version of consequentialism which values the fulfilment of desires, rather than mental states, is able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong, and indeed can do so better than its Kantian rivals.

Mill's discussion of ‘the internal sanction’ in chapter III of Utilitarianism does not do justice to his understanding of internal sanctions; it omits some important points and obscures others. I offer an account of this portion of his moral psychology of motivation which brings out its subtleties and complexities. I show that he recognizes the importance of internal sanctions as sources of motives to develop and perfect our characters, as well as of motives to do our duty, and I examine in some detail the various ways in which these sanctions give rise to motivating desires and aversions.

In this article, I critically examine Peter Unger's arguments for the claim that there is a duty to cause physical harm to oneself and others in order to save lives. This includes discussion of his view that when the method of cases involves several rather than merely two options our intuitive judgements support his radical thesis. In conclusion, I consider his attempt to reconcile his claims with common sense moral judgements.

I claim that Mill has a theory of poetry which he uses to reconcile nineteenth century associationist psychology, the tendency of the intellect to dissolve associations, and the need for educated members of society to desire utilitarian ends. The heart of the argument is that Mill thinks reading poetry encourages us to feel the feelings of others, and thus to develop pleasurable associations with the pleasurable feelings of others and painful associations with the painful feelings of others. Once the associations are developed, they are supported and maintained by our natural capacity for sympathy and by external elements in society, and provide motivation for the pursuit of utilitarian ends. Further, the additional support causes the associations to be strengthened to the extent that they come to be seen as ‘natural and necessary’, and as such are immune from the dissolving force of the intellect.

Most versions of utilitarianism depend on the plausibility and coherence of some conceptionof maximizing well-being, but these conceptions have been attacked on various grounds. This paper considers two such contentions. First, it addresses the argument that because goods are plural and incommensurable, maximization is incoherent. It is shown that any conception of incommensurability strong enough to show the incoherence of maximization leads to an intolerable paradox. Several misunderstandings of what maximization requires are also addressed. Second, this paper responds to the argument that rationality is not a matter of maximizing, but of expressing proper attitudes. This ‘expressivist’ position is first explicated through the elaboration of several paradoxes. It is then shown how, through an application of economic and strategic thinking, these paradoxes can be dissolved. The paper then concludes with some reflections on the indispensability of calculation for moral and prudential reasoning.

Elsewhere I have defended utilitarianism as a philosophy peculiarly well suited to the conduct of public affairs, on grounds of the peculiar tasks and instruments confronting public officials. Here I add another plank to that defence of ‘utilitarianism as a public philosophy’, focusing on the peculiar role responsibilities of people serving in public capacities. Such ‘public service utilitarianism’ is incumbent not only upon public officials but also upon individuals in their capacities as citizens and voters. I close with reflections on how best to evoke appreciation of these utilitarian role responsibilities from officials and electors alike.

By fundamental equality is meant the idea of the equal worth of human beings understood as a constitutive principle of morality. The paper is concerned with how this principle may be justified. Attempts to justify it in an objectivist way by citing some quality of human beings in virtue of which they are supposed to be of equal worth are rejected. Such approaches in fact justify inequality to the extent that some people possess the quality to a greater degree than others. The endeavour to avoid this trap, by attributing an inherent worth to each individual by virtue of their possession of the quality, succeeds only in generating a deep tension between the absolute principle of inherent worth and the relative principle of equal worth which the absolute principle is supposed to justify. The idea that the relation of equality as such is inherently valuable independently of any other consideration is also rejected. The paper then adopts a subjectivist view of equality grounded in an antirealist perspective on value. The argument for equality follows a Rawlsian contractarian procedure but not the Rawlsians' simple assumption of equality. Equality is shown to offer a stable principle of co-operation and so is more advantageous to the subjectivist contractors than the only alternative – to each according to his relative bargaining power. However, the appeal to advantage is necessary but not sufficient. An existential commitment to co-operate on the basis of mutual respect as equals is also required.