The National Wage Case decision of April 1991 has provided a crisis for the implementation of wages policy in Australia. Since 1983 wages policy has been implemented under a process which requires consistency between the principles under which the Industrial Relations Commission determines National Wage Case adjustments, and the elements of successive Commonwealth Government/ACTU Accords. The 1991 decision represents a rejection by the IRC of the thrust of the Government’s wages policy as presented in Accord V1. It is argued here that it is the shift in the primary goal of wages policy, from control of inflation to the promotion of allocative and operational efficiency, which has provoked the crisis. Unlike the Government, the IRC was not prepared to abandon control over the aggregate wage outcome in the pursuit of the uncertain productivity benefits of enterprise bargaining.

The recent National Wage Decision has the capacity to continue the structural efficiency thrust of recent National Wage Cases. It also has the potential to mark a major discontinuity in wage determination. The paper examines the major post-war discontinuities, the substance of the Accord Mark VI, the National Wage submissions, and the Commission’s attempts to harmonise macro-economic outcomes with enterprise bargaining.

The ACTU convened a Special Unions Conference following the April 1991 National Wage Case Decision. In contrast to its previous responses to National Wage Decisions during the Accord era, the ACTU Wages Committee recommended rejection of the decision. Moreover, it encouraged affiliates to seek direct negotiations with employers over the Accord VI claims turned down by the Commission. This note explores the background to these developments and details the debate at the ACTU Conference.

This paper examines some of the findings from the recently released report on the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, the largest industrial relations survey undertaken in Australia. The data, which is available from the Social Science Data Archive not only provide a picture of workplace industrial relations which are at odds with many popular perceptions of Australian industrial relations, but also provide information that can inform current policy debates. The evidence is examined to assess the preparedness of workplaces for decentralised bargaining arrangements.

There has been little empirical research into enterprise and workplace industrial relations. The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey fills a major void. This paper examines the results of this Survey. It challenges the ‘industrial relations’ perspective adopted as well as some of the major conclusions, particularly those relating to industrial relations constraints upon flexibility. The paper also compares the findings with those of the Business Council’s Industrial Relations Study Commission.

The April national wage decision doubted whether Australia’s industrial relations parties as yet possessed the “maturity” to conduct enterprise bargaining. This view is consistent with the traditional role of the Industrial Relations Commission and with the conclusions of the 1985 Hancock Report, which provided the rationale for a permanent regime of centralised wage-fixing in Australia. It is also supported to some degree by the results of the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, which show that, despite the accumulating pressure for change, most workplaces currently lack the necessary ‘infrastructure’ for bargaining and consultation at enterprise level. In particular, the failure of Australian management to involve workers and unions in change may be seen as a major impediment to further workplace reform. The fundamental question which arises for industrial relations policy is whether to accept the situation as it is and hope for progress through the slow but steady implementation of award restructuring, or whether to provide an external impetus for the development of a workplace infrastructure through the establishment of a new framework for enterprise bargaining combined with legislation to promote information-sharing and consultation at the workplace. The central thrust of this article is that the latter approach will more effectively foster a ‘strategic bargaining’ culture in Australia.

The recent emergence of concern for sustainability, or sustainable development, has lead to a renewed interest in the adequacy of national income accounts for monitoring economic performance. It has been argued that natural resource accounting is needed, and that national income accounting conventions need modifying. The paper reviews this background and argument, and distinguishes several types of natural resource accounting. It is noted that adjustment of measures of national income requires valuation, and that with respect to sustainability objectives market and surrogate market prices are inappropriate. It is argued that the pursuit of sustainability requires modelling rather than historical accounting. Some recent, unofficial, attempts at revising national income data to reflect sustainability concerns are critically reviewed. Finally, data requirements for ecological sustainability are considered.

A number of regulatory controls, aimed at reducing water and air pollution, have been implemented in New South Wales. These controls are examined in the paper. The paper also explores the evolution to market based controls, in particular those linked to the notion of property rights.

Poor economic performance and the Bougainville mine closure have focused attention in PNG on the appropriate stabilization package and micro policies necessary to improve the country’s economic prospects. A package of structural adjustment “reforms”, strongly supported by the IMF and World Bank, have been introduced. This paper examines the applicability and desireability of implementing these “reforms”. Our paper suggests that PNG might profitably explore some alternative development options to the ones currently in vogue.

This article provides information concerning various aspects associated with industrial disputes or strikes in Australia in the years 1980 to 1990. Losses to production and output from other sources are compared to those that result from industrial disputation. Australia’s strike record is compared to that of other OECD countries. An explanation is developed concerning Australia’s propensity for a high proportion of short strikes, and disputes which end with a resumption of work without negotiations. The article also explores reasons for the decline in the level of industrial disputation which occurred in Australia during the decade of the 1980s.