Modern colonialism from the eighteenth century onward encompassed most of the world’s surface. Today, the world is different. In theory at least, nation-states rather than empires and colonies are the global norm. The sorts of colonial conquests that mark earlier centuries appear to have ended. But does this mean colonialism in the past is not relevant for the present? Scholarly and popular discussions allude to the idea that past colonialism impacts the present, using a variety of terms like “legacies,” “imprints,” “vestiges,” “ruins,” or “afterlives.” Yet existing scholarship has yet to fully clarify and catalog the specific processes and mechanisms that connect colonial history with its putative legacies. This essay, based upon the 2022 Presidential Address to the Social Science History Association, identifies and discusses four such processes and mechanisms or “modes of reverberation”: (1) continued colonialism through simple reproduction, (2) the persistence of power through formal and informal institutionalization, (3) path dependent historical trajectories (or “colonial institutionalism”), and (4) colonialism’s archive of meaning.

This article analyzes and demonstrates the declining social selectivity of migration distance in Europe’s long nineteenth century and argues that this drove a radically new process of democratization of long-distance migration. It uses innovative spatial and quantitative analysis of nominal data on more than 5,000 international migrants who moved to the booming port city of Antwerp in present-day Belgium between 1850 and 1910. Examining the changes in migrants’ origins and trajectories on the one hand, and in their profiles in terms of gender and occupations on the other hand, it argues that the main evolutions observed represent an overall loosening of the ancien régime link between migration distance on the one hand and social selectivity on the other hand. By focusing on gender and social class as markers of social selectivity and by mapping the impressive expansion of the trajectories of Antwerp’s growing number of long-distance migrants, it lays bare the spatial, gender, and social dimensions that contributed to a general process of democratization of long-distance migration. As such, it sheds new light on the dynamics of Europe’s so-called “mobility transition” in the long nineteenth century.

In the early 1900s, Washington, D.C. contained many alleys in the interior of blocks inhabited by impoverished Black residents. Elite reformers engaged in an aggressive campaign to eliminate alleys, on the grounds of their purported unsanitary environment and high disease prevalence. In this paper, I combine quantitative, qualitative, and spatial sources to explore new perspectives on segregation, public health, and the racialized efforts of housing reformers during this period. I find that reformers overstated the horrors of conditions in alleys and their effects on residents’ health: poorer health among alley residents was in large part due to Black residents’ marginalization wherever they might live. Alleys’ status as racialized space, coupled with progressive paternalistic racism, facilitated the discursive construction of alleys as pathological “breeding grounds of disease.” Further, my findings shed new light on micro-configurations of segregation within racially mixed neighborhoods, as well as the social experience and meaning of such configurations. Far from indicating harmonious coexistence, the proximity of such alleys to white homes and institutions spurred elite Washingtonians’ self-interested fear of disease spreading beyond the alleys. Thus, this pattern of segregation helps explain the zeal of the campaign to eradicate alleys: as a means of achieving separation from undesired Black neighbors whom white reformers associated with contagion.

Historical research on urban epidemics has focused on the interaction of diseases with social and spatial gradients, such as class, ethnicity, or neighborhood. Even sophisticated historical studies usually lack data on health-related behavior or health-related perceptions, which modern analysts tend to emphasize. With detailed source material from the Finnish city of Tampere during a typhoid epidemic in 1916, we are able to combine both dimensions and look at how material and social constraints interacted with behavior and knowledge to produce unequal outcomes. We use data on socioeconomic status, location, and physical habitat as well as the self-reported behavior and expressed understandings of transmission mechanisms of the infected people to identify the determinants of some falling ill earlier or later than others. Applying survival analysis to approximately 2,500 cases, we show that disease avoidance behavior was deficient and constrained by physical habitat, regardless of considerable public health campaigning. Behavioral guidelines issued by authorities were sub-optimally communicated, unrealistic, and inadequately followed. Boiling water was hampered by shared kitchens, and access to laundry houses for additional hygiene was uneven. Centralized chemical water purification finally leveled the playing field by socializing the cost of prevention and eliminating key sources of unequal risk.

Feeling rules are norms surrounding emotions, particularly emotional expressions in social contexts, and are a well-known aspect of human societies in both the past and present. As a subdiscipline, the history of emotions has found great profit in tracking changing feeling rules over time to better understand social formations. Emotional norms are culturally, geographically, and socially specific, providing coherence to communities or serving as instruments of distinction within them. Yet some historians have found a sole focus on the normative insufficient for grasping, in their entirety, the historical aspects of emotions and their specific functions. This special issue suggests some new ways to think about escaping the dualism of emotional norms and emotional experiences – or, put more broadly, of structure and subjectivity – without privileging either as the determining factor in shaping social relations. To show the interrelations between rules and experiences, we draw from sociological work on taste and social distinction, arguing that emotions become socially potent and drivers of historical change by being both means and objects of value judgments. This introduction provides an overview of feelings rules and emotional norms in the history of emotions, connects these to work in the sociology of taste, and introduces the case studies in the special issue.

Wheat market integration between the US and the UK before the “first era of globalization” (in the second half of the nineteenth century) was frequently interrupted by policy and “exogenous” events such as wars. This paper adds Canada to this story by looking at trade and price data, as well as contemporary debates. This allows us to triangulate the role of policy and wars, since Canada as a small open economy was part of the British Empire. We find that, despite its privileged access to British markets, Canada faced similar barriers to the US, suggesting that membership of the British Empire provided only a modest benefit to trade. We also describe the limitations she faced accessing the US market, in particular after American independence.

The question of deradicalization looms large in the historiography of western European socialism. But in this contested field, the contributions of the New Left historian, Ralph Miliband, have been curiously neglected. Through his work on the British Labour Party, Miliband developed a distinctive account of deradicalization that foregrounds the fact that when parties enter government, party elites find themselves transplanted into new, alien institutions. Over time, he argued, they then come to internalize the worldviews of those institutions and reshape their parties accordingly. This essay presents the first quantitative and cross-national test of this “experience of governing hypothesis,” using Comparative Manifesto Project data from western European socialist parties between 1945 and 2021 and a novel matching technique for panel data. Miliband’s theory is strongly supported by this analysis, which also demonstrates the value of taking a multi-dimensional approach to deradicalization.

Many early modern Italian nobles were obsessed with duelling. Despite bans from secular authorities and the Council of Trent, the violent honor complex was veiled in part under the title of the scienza cavalleresca, the knightly science, which provided rules for the conduct of conflicts between aristocrats and those with noble aspirations. Such rules were both concerned with emotions and the object of emotions. Using the tools of the history and sociology of emotions, this article contributes to the emotional history of the scienza cavalleresca through examining the rules proposed both as feeling rules in themselves and as objects of emotional judgment. Toward the turn of the eighteenth century, more aristocrats began rejecting such codes with explicit objections to the scienza cavalleresca and its ethical basis. One such noble was Paolo Mattia Doria (1667–1746), a notorious duellist in the closing years of the Spanish regime, who renounced the vendetta and expressed disgust with its practitioners. A zealous convert against the noble vengeance system, he will serve as an example to explore the wider struggle over emotional values in early modern Italy and, more generally, in societies with high levels of violence. The article traces the role of emotions in the scienza cavalleresca, the taste for dispute through one genre (letters of challenge or cartelli di sfida), then explores the case of Doria. From these three stages, the article argues for the significance of adopting approaches from the sociology of emotions to analyze elite cultures of violence.

Throughout the nineteenth century, powerful railway unions in the USA and the UK cultivated an expansive system of voluntary sickness, death, unemployment, and superannuation benefits. By the early twentieth century, the movements had diverged: while the British Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants relinquished its commitment to voluntarism in favor of state healthcare and pensions, the American Railway Brotherhoods persisted along voluntarist lines, resisting social insurance in favor of exclusive schemes for their white male membership. What accounts for these diverging orientations? I highlight the importance of organizational forms as a lens for understanding comparative trade union strategy, emphasizing the role of law in designating legitimate forms of working-class association. I demonstrate that governing elites in both countries promoted voluntarism as a benign form of working-class organization throughout much of the nineteenth century. Consequently, I argue, early American and British trade unions adopted benefits in part because they enabled them to mimic the far more respected and legitimate friendly and fraternal mutual benefit societies. Toward the end of the century, the context had changed: while alternative organizational avenues were opened for trade unions in the UK, benefits presented an ongoing organizational lifeline for American unions. In defining and redefining the boundaries of legitimate forms of workers’ associations, legal decisions in both countries shaped not only trade union organizing strategies in the short run but also their positioning in broader social struggles.

This article focuses on the most relevant far right parties since the restoration of democracy in Spain, namely, Fuerza Nueva and VOX. These two parties show divergent electoral trajectories. While the former had some ephemeral prominence during the democratic process of transition, the latter emerged in 2018 and, for the time being, seems to have become established in several political arenas. Through an in-depth qualitative examination, this research explores the role of the organizational institutionalization process in the divergent electoral sustainability of both parties. The results show that it is possible to identify a temporal link, as well as certain mechanisms, between the way in which the parties develop organizationally and their electoral sustainability. In other words, a solid organizational institutionalization process has a positive effect on electoral sustainability. Overall, these findings suggest the need to further strengthen the so-called “internalist perspective” in the agenda of the far right, which entails a more systematic view of the characteristics of the parties themselves to explain their performance.

The U.S. federal government adopted aggressive policies to control animal diseases decades before it made significant attempts to improve human health. Progressive-era reformers crafted a powerful argument that the male-dominated, rural-oriented political system valued the lives of hogs more than the well-being of babies. The invidious hog-baby comparison became a pervasive theme in debates over the Children’s Bureau, a National Department of Health, and the Sheppard-Towner Act, and it has been reproduced uncritically in recent years. This article investigates the important historical relationships between U.S. animal and human health policies. Human health champions would have been better served by embracing a One Health approach when possible, drawing more on the lessons learned in combating animal diseases.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, leisure was reserved for the few. By the end of the twentieth century, however, most workers had a regulated normal working time of 40 or fewer hours per week, annual paid leave, and overtime compensation. In this paper, I investigate which political parties brought forth these changes – which party constellations supported or opposed working-time reforms and argue that sector and class differences drive party preferences. Lower-class and urban middle-class workers demanded regulation as demand for leisure increased with income. In contrast, employers and farmers opposed such reforms. Accordingly, the study argues that socialist and social-liberal parties were inclined to support leisure-securing working-time reforms, whereas conservative and farmer parties opposed them. Due to their linkages with workers and farmers, liberal parties may be divided into a rural constituency that tends to oppose working-time reforms and an urban constituency that supports them. I test these expectations using parliamentary data: 65 roll-call votes from Norway between 1880 and 1940, combined with analysis of major reforms and legislative appeals. Finally, I undertake a generalization test using country-level reform data from 33 democracies between 1880 and 2010. Results generally fall in line with expectations, and the pattern is stable over time.

Comparative historical analyses have emphasized the role played by conservative parties in the consolidation of democratic regimes in Europe. They have also identified the main factors shaping the political and electoral strength of the right in democratization processes. On the basis of these analyses, the Spanish Second Republic (1931–36) has been characterized as a very inauspicious ground for the development of a strong conservative party. However, the right managed to build a successful electoral force in a short period of time. This paper explores the factors affecting the electoral strength of the Spanish right by conducting ecological statistical analyses in the three republican legislative elections. Empirical results show that the right managed to build strong links with national voters on the basis of sociopolitical cleavages and underlying social and institutional characteristics. In particular, they reveal the key importance of the religious cleavage in the party system of the 1930s and the crucial role played by Catholic lay organizations in the success of the right. Ultimately, this finding shows that, contrary to previous theoretical expectations, initial organizational precariousness was not an unsurmountable obstacle for the electoral success of the Spanish right.

What happens at the point of interchange between scholarly communities? We examine this question by investigating the case of growing ties between historical sociology and ethnography, two social scientific methods that once seemed to have little in common. Drawing on methodological writings by ethnographers and original interviews with practicing historical sociologists, we argue that these ties have been shaped by structural and methodological homologies between the two disciplines. Structurally, ethnography and historical sociology are similarly positioned in sociology more broadly, as enterprises with sometimes-tense relationships with dominant assumptions of the social sciences. Methodologically, both ethnographers and historical sociologists face the challenges of bounding the research process, navigating access to data, analyzing and retaining data while “in the field,” and overcoming cultural distance between themselves and the worlds they are studying. Taken together, these findings extend work in the sociology of science and knowledge and suggest some key conditions for intellectual efflorescence.

During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), an unprecedented number of soldiers wrote “military memoirs,” firsthand accounts of the “first total war.” Next to private forms of recording experiences and keeping contact with those at home, such as letters or diaries, these memoirs were part of a larger shift in the relations between the army and civil society: soldiers wrote, at least partly, to change what non-combatants thought about them. As Britain did not see battles on home soil, war was both omnipresent and far away. Moreover, the reputation of the British armed forces was notorious, with common soldiers famously called “the scum of the earth” by Wellington. In conveying the battlefield experience to a sheltered audience, military memoirs, especially those written during or shortly after the wars, aimed at bridging the emotional divide between military and civil life, between the callous soldier and the compassionate citizen. Soldiers, too, these texts argued, were men of feeling, able to preserve a moral sense of respectability despite all the killing, blood, and trauma. Many memoirs communicated viscerally and in graphic detail about the horrors of war, both to make the traumatizing experience understandable and to show the heights of their emotional self-discipline. Bringing together the history of biography, reading, and emotions, this article argues that, by writing frankly about their horrific experiences, British soldiers fighting during the Napoleonic Wars contributed to changing civil society’s feeling rules about the army, reproaching the civilians’ contempt, and soliciting their compassion.

This paper discusses the implications of organizational control on the race for technological leadership in merchant empires. I provide an illustrative framework in which poor organizations have reduced incentives to invest, which in turn stifle technology improvements making leaders lag new entrants. In the late sixteenth century, Portugal’s large ships carried more merchandise and were more fitting of the monarch’s grandiose preferences, but they also were more prone to disaster. The merchant-controlled Dutch East India Company however, invested in smaller but more seaworthy vessels conducting more voyages at a much lower loss rate. The surviving historical evidence shows Portugal relying on large ships well into the seventeenth century suggesting her technological edge was gone by the time the Dutch dominated the Indian Ocean.

Housing figures prominently during economic crises, a notable example being the Great Depression. Because housing is immobile, its market is very localized. In each city, the main agents are closely interconnected. Lenders depend on mortgaged homeowners and landlords to maintain payments; landlords rely on tenants; municipalities need all property owners to pay taxes. The Depression experiences of tenants, homeowners, and federal housing programs are well-appreciated; those of landlords and private lenders much less so. Considering the role of all agents, this case study of Hamilton, Ontario, focuses on owners and private lenders and asks who lost property, to whom, and how. Drawing on land registry and property tax records, city directories, and newspaper accounts, it documents the pattern and trajectory of defaults experienced by homeowners, landlords, and private lenders. Contemporaries and historians have used foreclosures as a measure of distress, but many borrowers defaulted voluntarily. The experience of Hamilton’s homeowners was similar to those in U.S. cities. Local landlords experienced higher rates of defaults than homeowners; private lenders foreclosed less often than lending institutions. Along with municipalities, both learned to be flexible in demanding payments. The high incidence of private mortgages, the stability of lending institutions, and the marginal role of the federal government were distinctively Canadian, but in general Hamilton’s experience is more broadly indicative.

We combine unsupervised machine learning and econometric methods to study England’s print culture in the pivotal sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Machine learning synthesizes the content of 57,863 texts comprising 83 million words into 110 topics. Topics include the expected, such as Natural Philosophy, and the unexpected, such as Baconian Theology. Timelines suggest that religious and political discourse gradually became less antagonistic and economic topics more prominent. The epistemology associated with Bacon was present in theological debates already before Bacon’s epistemological contributions. Vector autoregression estimates provide insight into the coevolution of ideas on religion, science, and institutions. Innovations in religious ideas stimulated focus on science, especially at times when Puritanism was prominent in religious discourse. Neither science nor institutional thought evidence secularization. The Glorious Revolution and the Civil War did not spur debates on institutions nor did the founding of the Royal Society markedly elevate attention to science.

This article argues that commemoration practices performed in the aftermath of the First World War, on occasion of the British Armistice Day, and during the two minutes’ silence in particular, served as incubators for a change in feeling rules for the British population. It will show how British society engaged with, challenged, and finally shifted what the “emotional regime” of the period – commonly referred to as the “stiff upper lip” – commanded them to feel. A very short lapse of time – two minutes – turned into a moment where a fundamental change in an important subset of feeling rules specifying this emotional regime became manifest: those applied to male weeping. The two minutes encapsulated a challenge to the harsh contempt for expressive mourning through the shedding of tears, a verdict that was inherited from the nineteenth century but increasingly seemed inappropriate, not the least in the wake of the emotional turmoil that Britons had faced during the “Great” War.