Argument

Several recent works in sociology examine the manufacture of public identities through the notion of celebrity. This paper explores the imagery of Charles Darwin as a nineteenth-century scientific celebrity by comparing the public character deliberately manufactured by Darwin and his friends with images constructed by the public as represented here by caricatures in humorous magazines of the era. It is argued that Darwin’s outward persona drew on a subtle tension between public and private. The boundaries between public and private were blurred by the ritual of Darwin “showing” himself in the flesh, either at home to visitors or, more rarely, on public occasions. The reputation for privacy and illness that he built up added materially to this public face. By contrast, caricatures tended to depict him as an ape. These apish representations played a significant role in associating Darwin, rather than any other thinker, with the notion of evolution, and in creating an alternative public persona over which he had no direct control.

Argument

In this article, I compare Sabetai Unguru’s and Wilbur Knorr’s views on the historiography of ancient Greek mathematics. Although they share the same concern for avoiding anachronisms, they take very different stands on the role mathematical readings should have in the interpretation of ancient mathematics. While Unguru refuses any intrusion of mathematical practice into history, Knorr believes this practice to be a key tool for understanding the ancient tradition of geometry. Thus modern historians have to find their way between these opposing views while avoiding an unsatisfactory compromise. One approach to this, I propose, is to take ancient rhetoric into account. I illustrate this proposal by showing how rhetorical categories can help us to analyze mathematical texts. I finally show that such an approach accommodates Knorr’s concern about ancient mathematical practice as well as the standards for modern historical research set by Unguru 25 years ago.

Argument

In this paper I will argue that the scientific investigation of skulls and brains of geniuses went hand in hand with hagiographical celebrations of scientists. My analysis starts with late-eighteenth century anatomists and anthropologists who highlighted quantitative parameters such as the size and weight of the brain in order to explain intellectual differences between women and men and Europeans and non-Europeans, geniuses and ordinary persons. After 1800 these parameters were modified by phrenological inspections of the skull and brain. As the phrenological examination of the skulls of Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Heinse, Arthur Schopenhauer and others shows, the anthropometrical data was interpreted in light of biographical circumstances. The same pattern of interpretation can be found in non-phrenological contexts: Reports about extraordinary brains were part of biographical sketches, mainly delivered in celebratory obituaries. It was only in this context that moral reservations about dissecting the brains of geniuses could be overcome, which led to a more systematic investigation of brains of geniuses after 1860.

Argument

Abstraction is commonly valued as being essential to mathematics or even consubstantial with it. In relation to this belief, mathematical texts from Antiquity – be they from Babylon, Egypt, or China –, which are composed of seemingly concrete problems and algorithms solving them, have been considered to be practice-oriented and deprived of theory. This paper offers an alternative view on both issues. Relying on evidence given by third-century commentaries on The Nine Chapters on Mathematical Procedures, a Chinese treatise composed around the beginning of the Common Era,this paper argues that, in the scholarly mathematical tradition of ancient China, generality was more valued than abstraction. In this respect, problems must be interpreted as paradigms, in the sense grammarians use the term. One of the goals of theoretical endeavor was to exhibit the most general operations possible, and this purpose can be read in quite a few specific features of mathematical practice and concepts. Moreover, it is shown that abstraction is not absent from The Nine Chapters, but that it entertains with generality a relationship that requires analysis and can by no means be taken for granted. These ancient sources hence constitute an invitation to develop a critical approach toward the relation of mathematics to abstraction and generality taken separately, as well as the relation of these two values with each other.

Argument

J. Robert Oppenheimer was a complex person. His work in physics during the 1930s, at Los Alamos during the 1940s, and as governmental advisor in the immediate postwar period, gave him a deep sense of connection with communities that had distinctive purposes. But he found it difficult to conceive an overall creative vision for himself or to devise a compelling objective for the community he belonged to if one had not been formulated at the time he assumed its leadership. I analyze the reasons for his successes: the vision and demands of physics during the 1930s, the make-up of Los Alamos, and the challenges of the postwar atomic world. In each of these enterprises he assumed a distinctive role and came to represent a distinctive persona – but he could not integrate his activities into a coherent whole that might be a model for the intellectual in the new world he had helped to shape.

Argument

Objectivity has been constitutive of the modern scientific persona. Its significance has depended on its excision of standpoint, which has legitimated the scientist epistemically and sociopolitically at once. But if the nineteenth century reinforced those paired effects, the twentieth century brought questioning of both. The figure of Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976) puts the latter process on display. From the Kaiserreich to the Federal Republic of Germany, between quantum mechanics and interest group politics, his evolution shows an increasing openness to perspectival pluralism, together with an attempt to save some form of objectivity as discursive coherence. Heisenberg’s self-understanding and the reactions of his publics display the transmutation of the persona as objectivity was rethought. By the end of the day, speaking “as a scientist” would mean something different from what it had at the start.