Yehuda Halevi's Kuzari was written in response to the challenge posed to Judaism by a highly spiritual, nondenominational philosophy. Science, especially that embodied in the Hellenistic heritage, was a major component of philosophy; thus, if for no other reason than to make Judaism a serious competitor, Halevi had to show that the Jewish tradition as well possessed a body of scientific knowledge. The superiority of the Jewish teachings was demonstrated chiefly by appeal to the criteria of tradition, consensus, and authority, which, in Halevi's judgement, were in practice the criteria most influential in deciding scientific opinion. Despite the rather unique setting for the book, and the wide range of stances Halevi develops, the Kuzari was rather quickly and smoothly absorbed into the mainstream of Jewish religious thought.

Argument

During the nineteenth century, physicians either discovered or invented a variety of clinical autobiography called “traumatic memory.” Freud produced two versions of this memory, the final version in the 1920s. A revolutionary nosology (DSM-III), adopted in 1980, promised to extirpate Freud and the concept of neurosis from American psychiatry. However, it made a tacit exception for Freud’s concept of traumatic neurosis, renaming it “posttraumatic stress disorder.” The following decades have been a period of intense clinical and scientific interest in this disorder. An influential research program has investigated traumatic neurosis and its brain through variations in cortisol excretion. I describe the history of this program and examine its distinctive knowledge product: its running narrative of its achievements. The narrative’s structure is analyzed and found to resemble a crossword puzzle constructed from heterogeneous kinds of inference, recalling The Interpretation of Dreams. My conclusion is that, far from extirpating Freud’s neurosis, biological research has secured a place for it in today’s post-Freudian psychiatry.

Argument

Norwegian statisticians were pioneers in the development of sampling techniques for social and economic investigations in the late nineteenth century. After a few years of extensive use of sampling surveys in large-scale social and economic investigations, the method fell out of use in the early 1900s. This article supports Alain Desrosières’ argument that the emergence of sampling procedures in social investigations must be seen in relation to a modern “individualistic” view of society. But the importance of the institutional setting is also stressed: The way statistical research was connected to the power and resources of the State within the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) was a central element in the development and implementation of the new technique. A separate argument is presented to explain why the method suddenly lost ground in Norway and the general director of the CBS stopped promoting his method in the meetings of the International Statistical Institute. The explanation is probably to be found in a large and politically important survey in the 1890s that was attacked by a group of actuaries from private insurance firms. The heated and long-lasting debate turned into a question about trust in the new method and the reputation of the head of CBS as a statistical expert. The necessary trust and confidence was lost when the CBS in 1906 had to admit that important estimates from this survey obviously were erroneous.

To highlight speculative trends specific to the mathematical tradition that developed in China, the paper analyzes an excerpt of a third-century commentary on a mathematical classic, which arguably contains a proof. The paper shows that the following three tasks cannot be dissociated one from the other: (1) to discuss how the ancient text should be read; (2) to describe the practice of mathematical proof to which this text bears witness; (3) to bring to light connections between philosophy and mathematics that it demonstrates were established in China. To this end the paper defines its use of the word “proof” and outlines a program for an international history of mathematical proof. It describes the sense in which the text conveys a proof and shows how it simultaneously fulfills algorithmic ends, bringing to light a formal pattern that appears to be fundamental both for mathematics and for other domains of reality. The interest in transformations that mathematical writings demonstrate in China at that time seems to have been influenced by philosophical developments based on The Book of Changes (Yi-jing), which the excerpt quotes. This quotation within a mathematical context makes it possible to suggest an interpretation for a rather difficult philosophical statement.

This paper builds on a neglected philosophical idea, Evidenz. Max Weber used it in his discussion of Verstehen, as the goal of understanding either action or such things as logic. It was formulated differently by Franz Brentano, but with a novel twist: that anyone who understood something would see the thing to be understood as self-evident, not something dependent on inference, argument, or reasoning. The only way one could take something as evident in this sense is by being able to treat other people as having the same responses – by empathy with them, in the weak sense of following their thought. Brentano's philosophical claim is that without some stopping point at what is self-evident, justifications fall into infinite regress. This is radically opposed to much of conventional philosophy. The usual solutions to the regress problem rely on problematic claims about the supposed hidden transcendental structure behind reasoning. In contrast, empathy is a genuine natural phenomenon and a better explanation for the actual phenomenon of making sense of the reasoning of others. What is evident to all who are capable of understanding is an empirically-defined subset of this class.

In 1787 an anonymous student of the Perth Academy spent countless hours transforming his rough classroom notes into a beautifully inscribed notebook. Though this was an everyday practice for many Enlightenment students, extant notebooks of this nature are extremely rare and we know very little about how middle class children learned to inscribe and visualize knowledge on paper. This essay addresses this lacuna by using recently located student notebooks, drawings, and marginalia alongside textbooks and instructional literature to identify the graphic tools and skills that were taught to Scottish children in early modern classrooms. I show that, in addition to learning the facts of the curriculum, students participated in educational routines that enabled them to learn how to visually package knowledge into accessible figures and patterns of information, thereby making acts of inscription and visualization meaningful tools that benefitted both the self and society.

When Pasteur and Chamberland hastily set up their small biological industry to meet the agricultural demand for the anthrax vaccine, their methods for preparation and production had not yet been stabilized. The process of learning how to standardize biological products was accelerated in 1882 when vaccination accidents required the revision of production norms as the first hypotheses on fixity, inalterability, and transportability of vaccines were invalidated and replaced by procedures for continuous monitoring of the calibration of vaccines and the renewal of vaccine strains. Initially, the incompleteness and ongoing development of production standards justified Pasteur's monopoly on the production of the anthrax vaccine under his immediate supervision. Later on, the Pasteur Institute maintained control of these standards in the framework of a commercial monopoly that it established on the veterinary vaccines first sent and then cultivated abroad by the Société de Vulgarisation du Vaccin Charbonneux Pasteur, founded in 1886.

In this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus (Science in Context 1:5–51), I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists (a “weak” hermeneutics) from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science (a “strong” hermeneutics), with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.

I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood (positivistically) by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.

What, if anything, uniquely defines the mountain as a “laboratory of nature”? Here, this question is considered from the perspective of meteorology. Mountains played a central role in the early history of modern meteorology. The first permanent year-round high-altitude weather stations were built in the 1880s but largely fell out of use by the turn of the twentieth century, not to be revived until the 1930s. This paper considers the unlikely survival of the Sonnblick observatory (3105 m.) in the Austrian Alps. By examining the arguments of the Sonnblick's critics and defenders, it reveals a seemingly paradoxical definition of the mountain as a space that simultaneously maximized isolation and communication. Drawing on the social and environmental history of the Alps, it shows how the Sonnblick came to appear as the perfect embodiment of this paradox.

This article explores the history of mummy unwrappings in the West, culminating in Margaret Murray's public unrolling of two mummies in Manchester in 1908. Mummy unwrappings as a practice have shifted often between public spectacles which displayed and objectified exotic artifacts, and scientific investigations which sought to reveal medical and historical information about ancient life. Although others have looked at Murray's work in the context of the history of mummy studies, I argue that her work should be viewed culturally as poised between spectacle and science, drawing morbid public interest while also producing ground-breaking scientific work that continues to this day. Murray's main goal was to excite the interest of the public while at the same time educating them in the true history of ancient Egypt, while ascertaining new scientific information and contributing to the scholarly interpretations of ancient Egypt.

Argument

In this paper, I examine the treatment of mathematics in the definitive 1599 Ratio Studiorum of the Jesuit Order and in the preliminary drafts of the Ratio that were done in 1586 and 1591. Drawing on some additional writings of the Jesuit mathematician Christopher Clavius and his view of the importance of mathematics in a university curriculum, I suggest that the inclusion of mathematics as a standard part of the curriculum in Jesuit schools at the beginning of the “scientific revolution” was of significant importance in a climate that often demeaned the work of mathematicians. Jesuit schools were being founded around the time of Galileo and other key figures who influenced the scientific revolution. The introduction of mathematical sciences into universities and the textbooks of Clavius laid the groundwork for generations of students to become better acquainted with mathematics and the sciences that were being developed during that period of history.

The claim that x is a form of eugenics is frequently used as if it were a knockdown argument against x. Genetic counseling has tried to distance itself from eugenics by presenting itself as facilitating choice. Its success in this attempt has been challenged. The argument however is not a knockdown one and there is scope for some mediation between autonomy and public health goals in genetics.

Argument

This paper explores the connection between the epistemic and the “political” dimensions of the metaphor of information during the early days of the study of Molecular Evolution. While preserving some of the meanings already documented in the history of molecular biology, the metaphor acquired a new, powerful use as a substitute for “history.” A rhetorical analysis of Emilé Zuckerkandl's paper, “Molecules as Documents of Evolutionary History,” highlights the ways in which epistemic claims on the validity and superiority of molecular evidence for evolution were intimately connected with authority issues in evolutionary biology. The debate is situated within the framework of the battle for resources between traditional evolutionists and molecular biologists at the beginning of the 1960s. The architects of evolutionary synthesis questioned the idea that molecular characters constitute “cleaner” and “more direct” evidence of evolution. Nevertheless, the information discourse constituted a productive space for the development of a new research program that, paradoxically, has made explicit the limitations of the information metaphor in reconstructing life's history.

This paper investigates the affiliation of Book I of the Latin translation of Euclid's Elements attributed to Hermann of Carinthia with the Arabic transmission of the Greek mathematical work. It argues that it is a translation of a text of the Arabic secondary transmission, that is, of an Arabic edition mixed with comments. Two methodological claims are made in the paper. The first insists that the determination of a text whose transmission was as multifaceted and complex as the Euclidean Elements needs to be based on a systematic investigation of entire books rather than on selected theorems or diagrams of global, mostly structural relevance. The second claim starts from the experience that almost all results regarding the place of a particular document in a chain of transmission are conjectural. It acknowledges that individual results are more or less persuasive, depending upon the qualitative status of the argument. It suggests that the quantitative accumulation of similarities, differences, errors, regularities, or peculiarities allows one to recognize patterns and thus improves the reliability of judgment.

Argument

The argument of this paper is to situate The Interpretation of Dreams within an historical context. It is, therefore, impossible to believe Freud entirely when he staged himself in his letters to Fliess as a mere discoverer. In reality Freud also felt he belonged to a learned community of dream specialists, whom I call “dreaming scientists” and “scientific dreamers.” Instead of speaking, as Ellenberger does, in terms of influence, I will be offering as an example a portrait of Freud as a reader of two French authors, Maury, and indirectly, Hervey de Saint-Denys. I will analyze how Freud staged himself as replacing Maury and dreaming sometimes like Hervey de Saint-Denys. My premise in this work is that we must forget Freud, in order to adventure into a learned dream culture peculiar to the nineteenth century. Only afterwards can we come back to Freud and place him in this context as a creative heir.

The development of autonomous theoretical science is often considered a “Greek miracle.” It is argued in the present paper that another “miracle,” necessary for the creation of modern science, took place for the first time in the Islamic Middle Ages, viz. the integration of (still autonomous) theory and (equally autonomous) practice.

The discussion focuses on the mathematical disciplines. It starts by investigating the plurality of traditions which were integrated into Islamic mathematics during its formation, emphasizing practitioners' “sub-scientific” traditions, and shows how these were synthesized in a way virtually unknown in earlier cultures. A discussion of the sociocultural roots of this specific synthesis concludes that a major role was played in the earlier period by the combination of fundamentalist convictions characteristic of Islam – that the most humble daily activity is directly responsible to the highest ontological level, while conversely this highest level is concerned with the humblest ranks of daily existence – with the absence of an institutionalized “Church” able to monopolize the interpretation of the mutual bond of the divine and the everyday levels.

As the institutions of learning crystallized around the turn of the millennium, the integrative attitude to theory and practice was fixated institutionally; the latter process is discussed, first with the example of the madrasah institution as the carrier of an arithmetical textbook tradition, and second with that of the bond between astronomy and theoretical geometry.

Argument

This paper argues that there was a shift in China in the nature, and use, of geometrical figures between around the beginning of the Common Era and the third century. Moreover, I suggest that the emphasis mathematicians in ancient China placed on generality as a guiding theoretical value may account for this shift. To make this point, I first give a new interpretation of a text often discussed, which is part of the opening section of The Gnomon of the Zhou (first century B.C.E. or C.E.). This interpretation suggests that the argument presented in this text for establishing the so-called “Pythagorean theorem” is based upon a certain kind of drawing. Secondly, I contrast this passage with Chinese texts from the third century on the same topic, but relying on a completely different type of drawing. What commands the difference in the kinds of drawing is that the latter drawings are “more general” than the former, in a sense to be made explicit. This paper hence aims at making a contribution to the study of geometrical figures in ancient China.

Commenting on one of the latter figures, one of the authors of the third century, Liu Hui, describes how various algorithms emerge out of the same transformation of one particular figure. His remarks provide grounds for commenting on the link between the general and the particular, in relation to figures and how algorithms rely on them, as the issue was perceived by the practitioners themselves.

The particular figure in question and its transformation are exactly what we find in the Meno, though in relation to a different mathematical issue. The link of that very figure to the one that is perceived as its “generalization” for several algorithms, including the so-called “Pythagorean theorem,” is made not only in Liu Hui, but also by Thabit ibn Qurra (ninth century C.E.), in a letter where he explicitly addresses the purpose of generalizing the reasoning of the Meno. This parallel offers an appropriate basis to highlight differences in terms of conception and use of figures.

Emotion and feeling have only in the last decade become analytic concepts in the humanities, reflected in what some have called an “affective turn” in the academy at large. The study of emotion has also found a place in science studies and the history and philosophy of science, accompanied by the recognition that even the history of objectivity depends in a dialectical fashion on a history of subjectivity (Daston and Galison 2010, esp. chap. 4). This topical issue is a contribution to this larger trend across the humanities and the history of science, and yet is circumscribed by attention to a particular kind of emotion or condition for feeling: one centered not in an individual body, but in the interstices between bodies and things, between selves and others – what we call empathy.

the article deals with the interrelation between galileo and the visual arts. it presents a couple of drawings from the hand of galileo and confronts them with viviani's report that galileo had not only wanted to become an artist in his youth but stayed close to the field of visual arts throughout his lifetime. in the ambiance of these drawings the famous moon watercolors are not in the dark. they represent a very acute and reasonable tool to convince the people who trusted images more than words. the article ends with panofsky's argument that it was galileo's anti-mannerist notion of art that evoked a repulsion of kepler's ellipses. it tries to show that it was again an aesthetical prejudice that hindered einstein from accepting panofsky's theory.

This essay places some therapeutic vaccines, including particularly the diphtheria antitoxin, into their larger historical context of the late nineteenth century. As industrially produced drugs, these vaccines ought to be seen in connection with the structural changes in medicine and pharmacology at the time. Given the spread of industrial culture and technology into the field of medicine and pharmacology, therapeutic vaccines can be understood as boundary objects that required and facilitated communication between industrialists, medical researchers, public health officials, and clinicians. It was in particular in relation to evaluation and testing for efficacy in animal models that these medicines became a model for twentieth-century medicine. In addition, these medicines came into being as a parallel invention in two very distinct local cultures of research: the Institut Pasteur in Paris and the Institut für Infektionskrankheiten in Berlin. While their local cultural origins were plainly visible, the medicines played an important role in the alignment of the methods and objects that took place in bacteriology research in France and Germany in the 1890s. This article assesses the two locally specific regimes for control in France and in Imperial Germany. In France the Institut Pasteur, building on earlier successful vaccines, enjoyed freedom from scrutinizing control. The tight and elaborate system of control that evolved in Imperial Germany is portrayed as being reliant on experiences that were drawn from the dramatic events that surrounded the launching of a first example of so-called “bacteriological medicine,” tuberculin, in 1890.