The historiography emphasizes the importance of the fiscal policy and regional differences as causes of Hispano-American independences. The Consolidación de los Vales Reales (1804-1809), an endorsement of the debt contracted to its colonies by Spain in order to finance its constant wars, caused the collapse of the Mexican Treasury and was a key factor in its independence. This article demonstrates that in Cuba, the Consolidation had a different effect. Thanks to its different institutionalization and fiscal praxis, it was used to alleviate the deficit of situados, with which the Mexican Treasury financed the Cuban, and it may help to understand the reasons for non-independence. However, to prove this requires reconstructing the accounts of the Cuban Consolidation, which also demonstrates that the data used up until now were erroneous.

This paper explores the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in Latin America, using the experience of Colombia (1923-2008) as a case study. Since its creation, in 1923, Colombia’s central bank has undergone several reforms that have changed its objectives and degree of independence. Between 1923 and 1951, it was private and independent, with a legal commitment to price stability. In 1962, monetary responsibilities were divided between a government-dominated monetary board, in charge of monetary policies, and the central bank, which carried them out. In the early 1990s, the bank recovered its independence and its focus on price stability. Inflation varied substantially during these subperiods. Our analysis suggests that the central bank independence, combined with a commitment to price stability, renders the best results in terms of price stability.

The economic history of Uruguay throughout the 20th century, and more especially its second half, is characterized by a long-term economic decline. From the end of the Second World War, economic institutions and the policies adopted were unable to create a favorable climate for growth and development. This article presents evidence to support the idea that institutional factors played a part in the weak GDP growth and the high level of cyclical volatility between 1920 and 2001. Some factors stand out as particularly relevant: the weakening of governments' political power, increasing fragmentation of the political system, an excessively discretional monetary policy and the existence of opportunistic political cycles in macroeconomic policies.