In his article ‘Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism’ (Religious Studies, 42 (2006), 177–191) Stephen Maitzen develops a novel version of the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness according to which the lopsided distribution of theistic belief throughout the world's populations is much more to be expected given naturalism than given theism. I try to meet Maitzen's challenge by developing a theistic explanation for this lopsidedness. The explanation I offer appeals to various goods that are intimately connected with the human cognitive constitution, and in particular, with the way in which we depend upon social belief-forming practices for our acquisition of much of our knowledge about the world – features about us that God would value but that also make probable a lopsided distribution of theistic belief, or so I argue.

It is standard within the Christian tradition to characterize God in predominantly masculine terms. Let ‘traditionalism’ refer to the view that this pattern of characterization is theologically mandatory. In this article, I seek to undercut the main motivations for traditionalism by showing that it is not more accurate to characterize God as masculine rather than feminine (or vice versa). The novelty of my argument lies in the fact that it presupposes neither theological anti-realism nor a robust doctrine of divine transcendence, but instead rests heavy theoretical weight on the imago Dei doctrine and the method of perfect-being theology. The article closes by examining the implications of the article's main argument for the moral and liturgical propriety of characterizing God in predominantly masculine terms.

The fall of the devil poses two distinct philosophical problems. Only one of those problems has received sufficient scholarly attention. The hard problem asks how the devil's choice to disobey God can be both suitably free and morally significant. The harder problem asks how it can be subjectively rational. Explaining the former does not suffice for explaining the latter. Drawing on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury, I develop a model of the first sin that uses the framework of consumer preference theory to show how Satan's act of disobedience can be free, morally significant, and subjectively rational.

The article criticizes Gale and Pruss's new cosmological argument (hereafter GP) which purports to prove that the world is created/designed by a powerful intelligent necessarily existing supernatural being (not the full-fledged God of theism). First, the article employs a ‘necessitist’ counterexample to GP's modal premise, S5. Second, it is argued that GP presupposes a restricted range of possible accounts of the generation of the universe. Third, it is argued that GP's argument that the creator is a necessary being is flawed. Fourth, it is argued that GP's argument against Quinn's objection, modelled on the advaita Hindu view of creation by an impersonal being, also fails.

The two most prominent arguments against theism are the problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness. Here I argue that if the evidential problem of evil is truly forceful, it could block the ability of God to reveal His existence in a rationally indubitable way, which would in turn undermine the evidential problem of divine hiddenness.

I set out an argument for religious fictionalism which, unusually, proceeds from realist assumptions to the conclusion that even though some people might know that God exists, others ought to accept only non-doxastically that God exists. The argument relies upon the idea that religious experiences can confer immediate warrant on religious beliefs, whereas the warrant conferred by testimony is defeated by some reasonable beliefs which many people have.

Adams (1993) argues that the traditional view that no one in Hell can leave, poses a problem for the theist. This is because, she argues, such a bad state of affairs should be prevented by God. In response, Buckareff and Plug (2005) argue that everyone in Hell can leave. More recently, Matheson (2014) argues that if everyone in Hell can leave, then everyone in Heaven can also leave. However, Matheson provides reason to think that it is impossible for anyone in Heaven to leave. In which case, he argues, no one in Hell can leave either. In this article, I extend this debate, and offer reason to think Matheson's argument is unsound.

In this article I present two arguments from Brian Hebblethwaite for the conclusion that multiple incarnations are impossible, as well as the analyses of those arguments provided by three other thinkers: Oliver Crisp, Peter Kevern, and Robin Le Poidevin. I argue that both of Hebblethwaite's arguments are unsound.

In her article, ‘Two erotic ideals’, Fiona Ellis offers a sustained critique of my interpretation of Nietzschean eroticism. In the following piece, I respond to her criticism by proposing a shift in emphasis away from ‘erotic ideals’ and towards a greater attentiveness to the physiological states that condition our desire. I argue that such a move allows us to see how questions about eroticism and questions about nihilism are in fact integrally connected.

My aim in this article is to widen the scope of the current debate on peer disagreement by applying it to a kind of case it has hitherto remained silent about – namely, to cases of disagreement in which one of the disagreeing parties bases her opinion on a private religious experience to which the other party has no access. In order to do this, I will introduce a modified version of the notion of peerhood – a version that, in contrast to the one employed in the current debate, can be fruitfully applied to the troublesome kind of case in question. I will then employ this new notion in order to specify the degree of conciliation rationally required from the disagreeing parties in the kind of case in question.

Philosophical pagans in late antiquity charged Christians with believing ‘without evidence’, but were themselves accused of arbitrariness in their initial choice of philosophical school. Stoics and Platonists in particular adopted a form of cosmic religion that Christians criticized on rationalistic as well as sectarian grounds. The other charge levelled against Christians was that they had abandoned ancestral creeds in arrogant disregard of an earlier consensus, and of the world as pagans themselves conceived it. A clearer understanding of the dispute can be gained from a comparison of Heracles and Christ as divinized ‘sons of God’. The hope on both sides was that we might become, or somehow join with, God. Both sought an escape from the image of a pointless, heartless universe – an image that even moderns find difficult to accept and live by. The notion that pagans and Christians had of God, and of the divine life we might hope to share, was almost identical – up to the point, at least, where both philosophical and common pagans conceived God as Pheidias had depicted him (the crowned Master), and Christians rather as the Crucified, ‘risen against the world’.

The classical conception of God is that of a necessary being. On a possible worlds semantics, this entails that God exists at every possible world. According to the modal realist account of David Lewis, possible worlds are understood to be real, concrete worlds – no different in kind from the actual world. But, modal realism is equipped to accommodate the existence of a necessary being in only one of three ways: (1) By way of counterpart theory, or (2) by way of a special case of trans-world identity for causally inert necessary beings (e.g. pure sets), or else (3) causally potent ones which lack accidental intrinsic properties. I argue that each of these three options entails unacceptable consequences – (1) and (2) are incompatible with theism, and (3) is incompatible with modal realism. I conclude that (at least) one of these views is false.