This article explores Heidegger's later philosophy with regard to the problem of a philosophical interpretation of religious language. In what follows, I will draw upon the work of Wittgenstein and refer to the cosmological argument to read Heidegger in terms of a post-theistic understanding of religious language that avoids the shortcomings of both theistic realism and non-cognitivism. At the same time, I am proposing a new interpretation of Heidegger's later philosophy against this background. I will show that, in spite of its hermeticism, Heidegger's later philosophy has a specific relevance to philosophy of religion that still needs to be explored.

Paul Draper has recently developed an account of intrinsic probability according to which a theory's intrinsic probability is determined by its modesty and coherence. He employs this account in an argument that Source Physicalism (SP) and Source Idealism (SI) are equally intrinsically probable. Since SP and SI are not exhaustive, and Theism is one very specific version of SI, it follows that the intrinsic probability of Theism is very low. I argue here that considerations of fundamentality show that more work needs to be done to defend the claim that P(SP) = P(SI).

According to Marilyn Adams, hell poses the principal problem of evil for Christians. In this article, I show that the problem of hell can be eliminated, or solved, but not by any of four favoured theistic solutions (i.e. traditional, escapist, annihilationist and universalist) that have been provided. Rather, I argue that there is another theistic solution to the problem of hell, a morally realistic solution, which, by drawing on ethical theory, can be shown to be morally preferable to these other solutions.

Defending a traditional conception of Hell against the charge of unfairness is difficult for any theorist. It would seem to be even more difficult for the Christian semi-compatibilist who believes we can be responsible when determined. If God determined the wrongdoer's choices, then it seems unfair that he is punished for his actions that were manipulated rather than autonomous. I'll argue that healthy mental functioning can explain how some causally determined actions are manipulative while others are under our control. I'll also argue that God can punish even if He lacks the standing to blame.

That natural evils are plentiful in our world is impossible (plausibly) to deny. Why would a benevolent and all-powerful God allow such an obviously imperfect world to be created? I argue that the problem of evil in this form only seems serious and intractable because our science and technology are currently at comparatively primitive levels. Civilizations whose technological capabilities are significantly more advanced than our own will be able to create artificial worlds of their own in a variety of different ways. Given the very real possibility of world-makers who are non-divine, the problem posed by natural evil is very much diminished.

Despite being emphatically ascribed to God in Scripture, holiness is little examined in the current literature on the divine attributes. This article defends a normative theory of holiness, taking as its point of departure Rudolf Otto's classic account of the phenomenology of the experience of holiness as that of a mysterium tremendum et fascinans. To be holy is to merit this dual response, that is, to merit both the overwhelming attraction and distinctive sort of repulsion that is characteristic of the experience of holiness. It is plausibly an implication of this account that a supremely holy being – one who is holy, holy, holy – must be the most perfect possible being.

This article analyses Aquinas's conception of divine impeccability, and replies to some contemporary objections to this view. The first three sections show that for Aquinas the proposition that expresses God's impeccability is necessary de re, since God's moral goodness is grounded in His ontological goodness. The fourth section presents the connection between God's will and God's power and explains the sense of Aquinas's claim that God cannot sin because He cannot will to sin. The last three sections address the objections based on the apparent incompatibility between omnipotence and impeccability, and between impeccability, free will, and praiseworthiness.

Methodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments on the part of scientific practitioners and it is typically assumed that methodological naturalism does not imply metaphysical naturalism. Against this, it has been argued that the cumulative success of the sciences, conducted in conformity with the principle of methodological naturalism, actually provides compelling evidence for the truth of metaphysical naturalism. In this article I assess the argument for naturalism from the history of science and suggest that it is deficient in a number of ways. There may be reasons for adopting naturalism, but the history of science is not the place to look for them.

This article is a response to Tyler Wunder's ‘The modality of theism and probabilistic natural theology: a tension in Alvin Plantinga's philosophy’ (this journal). In his article, Wunder argues that if the proponent of the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN) holds theism to be non-contingent and frames the argument in terms of objective probability, then the EAAN is either unsound or theism is necessarily false. I argue that a modest revision of the EAAN renders Wunder's objection irrelevant, and that this revision actually widens the scope of the argument.