“The philosophic attitude is a resolute attempt to enlarge the understanding of the scope of application of every notion which enters into our current thought” (Whitehead, 1938:233-34). There is probably no parallel in the history of thought either to Aristotle's breadth of scholarly attainment or to the historical reach of his intellectual influence. Sociobiologists, therefore, can only be enthusiastic about any attempt, such as Arnhart's, to bring such resources to bear on their still young endeavors.

Mark Walker has put forth a proposal which he calls the Genetic Virtue Program or GVP, whose kernel is that it is both possible and desirable to improve virtue by preimplantation selection or in utero engineering. Walker lists caveats to his thesis, although he consistently implies that their validity is doubtful by stating at each instance that he is including them “merely for the sake of completeness.”

Researchers have sought to understand the effects of like-minded versus contrary news exposure on attitude polarization, which can be a threat to democracy. The online news environment offers opportunities for exposure to both types of news, albeit unequally. This study tests the effects of exposure to heterogeneous partisan news bundles (both like-minded and contrary news) on attitude polarization. Because media exposure can lead to bias, attitude polarization is tested as a direct and indirect effect via hostile media perceptions. Data in this study are from a between-subjects experimental design about the issue of assisted suicide. Results indicate that even though the effect of the partisan news bundle on hostile media perceptions is significant, both direct and indirect effects on attitude polarization are null.

Evolutionary ethics is a subject that has been debated ever since Darwin's day. The basic issue, in a nutshell, is whether or not human ethical systems can be explained — and justified — in terms of evolutionary principles. In recent years there has been an upsurge of publications devoted to this issue, including many new books (as well as a number of books on Darwinism and religion) and countless journal articles. Indeed, an Internet search using the term “evolutionary ethics” yielded 65,400 citations of various kinds. As this outpouring of publications suggests, there has been a great diversity of views on the subject over the years.

Although there may be some disagreement about the exact date, I think it safe to say that the biopolitics movement was launched in the 1960s. Now, a half century later, it may be appropriate to pose the rather obvious, if somewhat delicate, question: What has biopolitics contributed to political science? Here, I will try to persuade you that a biopolitical approach may have yielded answers to a couple of the most debated issues in political philosophy—one, the granddady of them all, is “What is the nature of political man?” The other, much more recent, but steadily increasing in importance, is “Why are democracies so rare and so fragile?”

This article reviews the regulation of the new agricultural-environmental biotechnology and recent changes in the regulatory framework in the United States. Regulations put in place in the mid-1980s were established due to concern over potential risks posed by products not yet released into the environment. Now that over a thousand small-scale field trials have been carried out and various new agricultural-environmental biotechnology products have been in farmers' fields for the past several years, questions are being raised about the current regulatory system by both proponents, who want greater deregulation due to the relative absence of ecological harm, and opponents, who warn against potential environmental catastrophe due to greater variety and amount of new agricultural-environmental products being released. Therefore, we focus on triggers for regulation, which appear to hinge on the “naturalness” of a product, and trends in field release of these products.

The literature on stress and political leadership typically views such potential stressors as time-pressure, severe consequences for bad decisions, inadequate information, and conflicting demands as negative influences on political performance. We know, however, that many politicians thrive on or even require such circumstances. Drawing on medical, historical, psychiatric, psychological, and political science literature, this essay proposes that there are at least three major types of leaders in regard to potential stressors: sturdy warriors (who cope with or who even enjoy and are helped by events commonly reacted to by others as stressors), battle-hungry warriors (who are psychologically drawn to potential stressors and “cannot function,” well or badly, without them), and frail warriors (who are unable to cope with stressors). Subcategories, including psychological and political dynamics, are provided.

This essay reflects on the past, present, and future of biopolitics, starting with the academic interest in the link between biology and politics. Examples of primitive adumbrations of this approach appear throughout academic history; however, the modern roots of biology and politics began in the 1960s. This reflection traces biopolitics from its modern birth through the 1990s, and considers future research endeavors related to biology and politics.

The sequencing of the human genome and advances in gene therapy and genomic editing, coupled with embryo selection techniques and a potential gerontological intervention, are some examples of the rapid technological advances of the “genetic revolution.” This article addresses the methodological issue of how we should theorize about justice in the genomic era. Invoking the methodology of non-ideal theory, I argue that theorizing about justice in the genomic era entails theorizing about (1) the new inequalities that the genetic revolution could exacerbate (e.g., genetic discrimination, disability-related injustices, and gender inequality), and (2) those inequalities that the genetic revolution could help us mitigate (e.g., the risks of disease in early and late life). By doing so, normative theorists can ensure that we develop an account of justice that takes seriously not only individual rights, equality of opportunity, the cultural and sociopolitical aspects of disability, and equality between the sexes, but also the potential health benefits (to both individuals and populations) of attending to the evolutionary causes of morbidity and disability.

Probably the most enduring question throughout the history of the social sciences pertains to how much human social behavior is a product of evolutionary, genetic, nonsocial, “natural” sorts of variables as opposed to learned sociocultural, environmental, “nurturing” variables (Hammond, 1983). Regardless of where individual social scientists themselves happen to have settled on this issue, many have offered an opinion about the prevailing position of social scientists generally on this question at various points in social science history. The present study compares these opinions, especially as they pertain to the twentieth century.