Mental health textbooks sometimes provide inaccurate information, typically supporting common beliefs in the field. Psychiatry and psychology textbooks' discussion of the schizophrenia adoption studies is examined. Particular attention is paid to the earlier studies, which helped pave the way for the current widespread acceptance of the importance of genetic factors influencing psychological trait differences. This article compares the accounts of 30 textbooks to the original studies they reviewed. Generally, problems with these textbooks' accounts include (1) the failure to critically assess the original researchers' methods and conclusions, (2) some textbooks' reliance on secondary sources, (3) the failure to discuss published critiques of the schizophrenia adoption studies, (4) inaccuracy in reporting the original findings, (5) the claim that studies finding nonsignificant results support the genetic position, and (6) a failure to discuss the potentially invalidating environmental confounds in the schizophrenia adoption studies (through the selective placement of adoptees). It is concluded that, in general, these textbooks have served to rubber-stamp mainstream psychiatry's questionable claims about the schizophrenia adoption studies at the expense of a thorough critical analysis.

Proliferation of biological—as well as chemical and nuclear—weapons is a threat to the security of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. The number of states with biological weapons (BW) programs or with a strong interest in having a BW program has increased significantly since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed in 1972 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). BW programs present difficult intelligence targets. Thus, the Soviet Union was a signatory to the BWC at the time of the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, yet we knew little of the scope of its BW program until 1991 (Meselson et al., 1994). The spread of biotechnology throughout the world in recent years has made even more governments potentially BW capable.

During his first term as President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered several serious illnesses. Particularly important was the massive heart attack he experienced in the fall of 1955. Drawing on primary sources as well as prior scholarship, this article analyzes varying interpretations of Eisenhower's 1955 medical treatment in light of his previous illnesses and their management. It explores the handling of public disclosure by the White House, by Eisenhower himself, and by his medical team. And it reconsiders Republican strategists' efforts to allay public concerns about the President's health. Current understanding is called into question in several respects. Although it sharpened speculation about his fitness and willingness to run in the 1956 presidential campaign, the 1955 heart attack made Eisenhower more likely, rather than less likely, to run. Although often sick, and in several instances critically so, Eisenhower was clearly the dominant player — intentionally “behind the scenes” — both in the management of his illnesses and in the health-perceptual aspects of his drive toward a second term. These findings should lead us to a better reading of Eisenhower as a president and to a better appreciation of health's linkage to legacy in presidential politics.

This article approaches the current global environmental crisis from an evolutionary perspective. It identifies two features in contemporary states' behavior: impotence and intransigence in the face of global crisis. These traits stem from humanity's evolutionary past, in which groups had to maintain their integrity while surviving intergroup competition. Contemporary sovereign states are groups that have survived this process, and they guard their sovereignty vigilantly. They do so by instituting coercive measures on the one hand and cultivating members' loyalty on the other. A belief of common descent must be articulated successfully in order for members to feel group solidarity. Hence, states are intransigent in maintaining that they truly represent the welfare of their members. To the extent that states are successful in inculcating a belief of common descent and identity, they are also constrained in acting altruistically—hence, their impotence in the face of deepening global crisis. To find a way out of this dilemma, strategic alternatives are explored. The emerging role of nongovernment organizations, with certain caveats, is seen as promising.

Health status has been held to affect people's political orientations and behavior. Using the 1987 National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey, this paper tests for the existence of that relationship. Results suggest that healthier people are more likely to be conservative and status quo oriented, somewhat more politicized, less alienated, and more active in politics. Results, although modest, support the thesis that health status has an effect on political orientations and behavior.

Research shows that individuals with liberal and conservative ideological orientations display different value positions concerning the acceptance of social change and inequality. Research also links the expression of different values to a number of biological factors, including heredity. In light of these biological influences, I investigate whether differences in social values associated with liberal and conservative ideologies reflect alternative strategies to maximize returns from social interactions. Using an American sample of Democrats and Republicans, I test whether information about shared and unshared social values in the form of implicit social attitudes have a disproportionate effect on the willingness of Democrats and Republicans to trust an anonymous social partner. I find evidence that knowledge of shared values significantly increases levels of trust among Democrats but not Republicans. I further find that knowledge of unshared values significantly decreases trust among Republicans but not Democrats. These findings are consistent with studies indicating that differences in ideological orientation are linked to differences in cognition and decision-making.

The COVID-19 pandemic has spotlighted the importance of high-quality data for empirical health research and evidence-based political decision-making. To leverage the full potential of these data, a better understanding of the determinants and conditions under which people are willing to share their health data is critical. Building on the privacy theory of contextual integrity, the privacy calculus, and previous findings regarding different data types and recipients, we argue that established social norms shape the acceptance of novel practices of data collection and use. To investigate the willingness to share health data, we conducted a preregistered vignette experiment. The scenarios experimentally varied the vignette dimensions by data type, recipient, and research purpose. While some findings contradict our hypotheses, the results indicate that all three dimensions affected respondents’ data sharing decisions. Additional analyses suggest that institutional and social trust, privacy concerns, technical affinity, altruism, age, and device ownership influence the willingness to share health data.

In recent years, significant efforts have been made toward elucidating the potential of the human brain. Spanning fields as disparate as psychology, biomedicine, computer science, mathematics, electrical engineering, and chemistry, research venturing into the growing domains of cognitive neuroscience and brain research has become fundamentally interdisciplinary. Among the most interesting and consequential applications to international security are the military and defense community’s interests in the potential of cognitive neuroscience findings and technologies. In the United States, multiple governmental agencies are actively pursuing such endeavors, including the Department of Defense, which has invested over $3 billion in the last decade to conduct research on defense-related innovations. This study explores governance and security issues surrounding cognitive neuroscience research with regard to potential security-related applications and reports scientists’ views on the role of researchers in these areas through a survey of over 200 active cognitive neuroscientists.

Building on a growing body of research suggesting that political attitudes are part of broader individual and biological orientations, we test whether the detection of the hormone androstenone is predictive of political attitudes. The particular social chemical analyzed in this study is androstenone, a nonandrogenic steroid found in the sweat and saliva of many mammals, including humans. A primary reason for scholarly interest in odor detection is that it varies so dramatically from person to person. Using participants’ self-reported perceptions of androstenone intensity, together with a battery of survey items testing social and political preferences and orientations, this research supports the idea that perceptions of androstenone intensity relate to political orientations—most notably, preferences for social order—lending further support to theories positing the influence of underlying biological traits on sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors.

Since 1998, and especially since the “Amerithrax” emergency of 2001, the United States has ambitiously funded biodefense projects, intending not only to enhance detection and management of any biological-weapons attack but also to establish a robust domestic biodefense industry. I asked if the United States had fulfilled this latter intention. Using the RAND Corporation's RaDiUS database, I examined federal biodefense grants and contracts awarded from 1995 through most of 2005, noting recipient type, awarding unit, funding level, and the disease focus of research-and-development support. Patterns in these data as well as other sources suggest that the biodefense industry as late as 2005 remained in a nascent stage, with most firms small, precariously financed, and more responsive to funders' announcements and solicitations than to opportunities for self-directed innovation. A biodefense industry with investor-capital funding and retained earnings, with its own leading companies, with its own stock analysts, and with its own legitimacy in commercial and financial markets did not emerge over the period studied, nor does its emergence appear imminent.