Women's representation in elected and appointed positions is often seen as a matter of justice and equity (Burrell 1997). Beyond symbolic representation, many believe that a greater presence of women in institutions that have traditionally been controlled by men can facilitate the attention to issues that disproportionately affect women (Dahlerup 1988; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Kanter 1977). As the election of women has grown in the past decade, researchers have shown a renewed interest in understanding under what conditions women's descriptive representation can produce more effective substantive representation of women's interests. A number of feminist scholars argue that increasing the descriptive representation of women in legislatures is essential to remedy existing inequalities suffered by women (Mansbridge 1999). But electoral practices aimed at increasing women and minorities in office, such as majority-minority districts or gender quotas throughout European and Latin American countries, have produced varied results concerning the substantive representation of women and minority interests. Understanding the electoral and institutional features that strengthen or attenuate women's representation, therefore, merits further study.

Over the past fifteen years, concerns related to immigration and the integration of immigrants have risen to the forefront of European politics (e.g., Givens and Luedtke 2005; Guild, Groenendijk, and Carrera 2009). As anti-immigrant nationalist parties have gained ground, European governments have closed borders and even deported immigrants en masse. At the same time, countries throughout the European Union (EU) have increasingly stressed the importance of the social, economic, and cultural integration of immigrants. As immigration has become increasingly politicized across Europe, many governments have restructured themselves. Some countries have created new cabinet ministries designed to focus on immigration and immigrant integration. Other countries have assigned new immigration-related tasks to existing political bodies. In the face of new or radically transformed governance structures, one important question emerges: To what extent do women serve in immigration ministry leadership?

Worldwide, politicians devote increasing attention to the sociodemographic representativeness of political institutions. The underrepresentation of specific groups (and of women in particular) in political institutions is a democratic problem (Phillips 1995). To counter the lack of representativeness of political institutions, measures have been adopted to increase the influx of female politicians in parliaments and governments. Among others, quota regulations have been implemented in several countries in recent years (Dahlerup 2007; Krook 2007).

The “personal vote” refers to “that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 9). The presence of a personal vote in an electoral system means that the person up for election matters, not just the candidate's party. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina go so far as to refer to it as “relationships between the represented and representatives,” claiming that these relationships are more “personal, particularistic, and idiosyncratic than in other kinds of systems” (8, emphasis mine).

What is feminist about feminist evolutionary theory, and how valid is the feminist evolutionary analytic approach for understanding violence against women globally? What has evolutionary analysis got to do with legal enclaves, pluralism, and inequitable family law, and how do they cause violence? And, moreover, is legal change, specifically adopting and diffusing similar liberal family status laws worldwide, the best strategy for ending pervasive and egregious violence against women? Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen's article, “What Is the Relationship between Inequity in Family Law and Violence against Women? Approaching the Issue of Legal Enclaves” (Politics & Gender. 2011. 7 (4): 453–92) raises theoretical, empirical, and praxeological questions for feminist scholars of politics and international relations that this Critical Perspectives section takes up with essays from six contributors selected from an open call for papers.

Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen (2011) seek to use evolutionary biology as a form of metafeminism, or as an ultimate cause to understand the roots of patriarchy. Patriarchy as a system that ontologically creates women's discrimination and legitimates violence is widely accepted within a range of feminisms and has been the foundational argument of feminist scholarship. The concern that is raised here in regard to Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen's article is not the validity of their concern with investigating the relationship between inequity in family law and violence against women, but the basis of their argument in evolutionary biology. In this essay, I bring posthumanism and especially new (vital) materialism as a way to build bridges with the feminist evolutionary analytical approach (FEAA) and constructivist or linguistic-oriented approaches in International Relations (IR). Posthumanism is an approach to social theorizing that addresses the impossibility of the nature/culture distinction in novel ways.

While we applaud Hudson, Bowen, and Nielson (2011) for demonstrating the correlation between two modes of contemporary sexist oppression (inequality in family law and violence against women), we are concerned about how they embed a contested narrative of human evolution into otherwise straightforward findings. We argue that claims about human evolution are unnecessary to their argument, and, more importantly, that the version of feminist evolutionary analysis they describe is less feminist than it could be.

Globally, women's movements share the twin concerns of equality within the family and freedom from domestic violence. The following questions conjoin and animate these debates: Given that violence against women is a global phenomenon, why are some states more effective at controlling domestic violence than others? What is the correlation between inequality encoded in family laws and the rate of violence against women in society? Are legally plural states more likely to demonstrate a higher degree of institutionalized inequality and gender-based violence within the family? The analytical peg for Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen (2012) is the feminist evolutionary analytic approach (FEAA) that explains the almost universal prevalence of male dominance among humans during the course of formation of societies. It suggests that violence against women is greater in legal systems that design family law to maximize men's rights.

One of the important perspectives that feminist analysis has brought to the study of politics is the value of the individual and the importance of capturing individual experience in our understanding of large social and political forces. Simple aggregation of individual experience can lose the richness of that reality. Yet the normative adherence to the critical appreciation of each person's life and experience need not prevent us from drawing inferences from patterns of behavior in order to help us intervene to improve the lot of those who suffer in the wake of systematic prejudice or discrimination.

In their article, Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen (2011) argue that inequities in family law codify an evolutionary legacy of male control over female reproduction that correlates with increased rates of violence against women. Their general argument is comprised of three fundamental premises. First, the authors provide empirical evidence indicating a relationship between inequities in family law, defined as “state regulation of marriage, parenthood, dissolution of marriage, custody of children, and transmission of goods across generations” (454), and levels of physical violence against women in particular societies. Second, the authors anchor their general argument in a feminist evolutionary analytic approach (FEAA). They contend that evolutionary forces are an ultimate cause of patriarchy and violence against women, even as they acknowledge the importance of more proximate causes of specific forms of violence against women. According to the authors, an FEAA approach can help explain “persistent patterns of patriarchy throughout human history” (464) and “…tells us that there is a strong evolutionary component to violence, and that its origin is male-female conflict over reproduction, and that these influences will be mirrored in human systems of family law” (468). Finally, the authors draw upon the two previous premises to build the third and most critical premise of their argument. Because the authors believe that evidence showing a correlation between inequities in family law and levels of physical violence are ultimately rooted in evolutionary dynamics, they conclude that “[s]ocieties that persist in safeguarding inequitable family law are societies built upon evolutionary male reproductive strategies of structural control and higher levels of coercion of women by men” (470).

I seek to engage the authors in a deeper interrogation of their claims, particularly that societies can mitigate the evolutionary legacy of patriarchy by limiting the influence of religious/cultural enclaves and instead promoting universalism, as exemplified in CEDAW and international law. I challenge and politicize this alleged “choice” between universalism and cultural/religious enclaves/relativism, as it ultimately rests on a series of too-easy dichotomies (secular/religious, western/nonwestern) that may inadvertently stymie collaborative attempts between “western” and “non-western” feminists to challenge inequitable family law and gender violence. Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen (2011) do offer critiques of western states. They are careful to point out nuances, subtleties, and complexities with their concept of religious/cultural enclaves. They also convincingly broaden the concept of gender equality beyond formal political rights to the kind of social, legal, and economic justice encapsulated in equitable family law and freedom from violence. And, they provoke an examination of why and how gender equality and gender violence are linked. But I suggest that their empirical research might have better traction by taking seriously two problematic implications of championing the “universal” as necessarily progressive: the failure to recognize patriarchy as part of universalism; and the inattention to why and how religious/cultural enclaves are patriarchal.