This paper explores the question: How is the NGO observer application process to the Arctic Council influenced by perceptions of legitimacy of the applicant? Using information gleamed from numerous interviews we map out the application process for NGO observer status in the Arctic Council. In addition to the formal criteria, we argue that Arctic states have a set of informal criteria for evaluating NGO observer applications, and that the evaluation of these criteria are coloured by individual Arctic state and the Permanent Participant perceptions of the legitimacy of the NGO applicant. Reaching into the literature on NGO legitimacy, we develop a framework detailing four key components upon which the perceptions of the legitimacy of an NGO are generally formed. This framework is then incorporated into a broader model of the overall application process through which NGOs must submit in order to attempt to gain observer status at the Arctic Council.

In 1921, when Sir Ernest Shackleton was planning his circum-Antarctic expedition on the R.Y.S. Quest, he was eager to appoint a suitably qualified young person as a cabin boy or deck hand. He expressed great admiration for the Boy Scout Movement and its founder, Sir Robert Baden-Powell. Discussions between them led to Shackleton advertising for a Boy Scout to accompany him on the expedition, believing that the experience would greatly benefit the youngster's character, as well as providing much positive publicity for the expedition. He selected two young Scouts but, while much has been written about James Marr, no account has been written about the younger boy, Norman Mooney. This is because he was unable to cope with continuous seasickness and had to return home after only four weeks at sea. This account provides some little-known detail about Mooney and why he was selected, and about Shackleton's sensitive recruiting procedure.

In 1758 the renowned Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus sent his student Anton Rolandson Martin to the Arctic on-board a whaler to collect scientific specimens. He became the first Swedish scientist to sail these northern waters and to set foot on Spitsbergen. But what route did the ship take and where exactly did he land? By using a combination of geographical information in Martin's diary together with latitude and wind directions from his meteorological records the ship's voyage has been reconstructed. The whaler set course directly to the west coast of Spitsbergen and then patrolled waters from there to the eastern flank of the ice fields off Greenland. The ship then returned to Spitsbergen as the whaling season drew to an end. Martin got the chance to set foot on land only once and for just two hours. After recent field work at the presumed locality 258 years after Martin's visit, his descriptions of the islets were checked and a first-hand comparison was made between the rock sample Martin brought home and the local bedrock. The author is now confident that the landing took place on Forlandsøyane islands, situated off the southwestern coast of Prins Karls Forland.

More than 100 years have now passed since Scott’s Terra Nova expedition to the Antarctic, which was quickly followed by the First World War. Out of the events of those times emerges the name of Edward Leicester Atkinson, the Royal Navy Surgeon and Antarctic explorer who was a member of the scientific staff of Scott’s expedition, and who went on to serve in the First World War. In his honour, the Edward Leicester Atkinson Prize will be awarded annually to a Royal Navy Medical Officer who displays the values of leadership and moral courage during the New Entry Medical Officer course, either at Britannia Royal Naval College or the Institute of Naval Medicine.

The emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri) is an iconic Antarctic species. George Robert Gray attributed the first description to Johann Reinhold Forster during James Cook's voyage of 1772–1775, attribution that persists to this day. Gray therefore honoured Forster in the emperor's scientific name—but he was almost certainly mistaken. Thaddeus von Bellingshausen in 1820 was probably the true first observer. Charles Wilkes in 1840 was next. James Clark Ross in 1841 made important observations and brought specimens home to the British Museum. Edward Wilson and others, in 1902–1903 and 1911 on the two expeditions of Robert F. Scott, discovered and investigated the first breeding colony, substantially advancing knowledge about this remarkable creature.

Considering that phytoplankton assemblages are good bioindicators of environmental conditions, the sensitivity of the Western Antarctic Peninsula (WAP) to climate change, and the importance of some areas of its islands as Antarctic Specially Managed Areas, this work assembles published datasets on phytoplankton biodiversity and ecology in confined coastal areas (embayments) of King George Island, WAP. Over 33 years (1980–2013), 415 species from 122 genera have been identified to species level, being mostly diatoms (371 species), with 10 new species described with local material (6 diatoms, 4 cyanobacteria). The importance of diatoms was indicated by the frequent occurrence of Corethron pennatum, Pseudogomphonema kamtshaticum, and abundant benthic genera in the plankton (e.g. Navicula, Cocconeis). The increased contribution of dinoflagellates after 2010 suggests marked changes in the water column. Early-summer blooms differ between the bays' eastern and western shores, with terrestrial melting and wind-driven upwelling inducing the dominance of benthic species at eastern shores, whereas planktonic diatoms (Thalassiosira, Pseudo-nizschia, and Chaetoceros) are most abundant along western shores and central areas. The importance of an accurate identification of organisms that are becoming key ecological components of the region is discussed, as recent changes in the microflora may affect the entire marine food web.

International Polar Week is an educational activity that has been carried out since the International Polar Year 2007–2008 (known then as International Polar Days). This event, which brings together educators and polar scientists to promote polar science, is generally organised by the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists and Polar Educators International. Here we provide an overview of how International Polar Week started, and describe its implementation in Portugal, a “non-polar” country. We quantify the activities carried out during International Polar Weeks in Portugal between 2012 and 2017, which involved >96,000 students, >200 schools, >1900 educators and 100 polar scientists, with talks and Skype calls by polar scientists being the most frequent activities. Portugal’s International Polar Weeks have involved students, educators and polar scientists from 18 other countries, in particular from the United Kingdom and Brazil. We conclude by providing recommendations to other countries wanting to implement International Polar Weeks.

In 1902, the Norwegian Professor Kristian Birkeland organised an expedition to the Arctic for studies of the aurora borealis, terrestrial magnetism and cirrus clouds. He established four stations at different locations—northern Norway, Iceland, Spitsbergen and Novaya Zemlya—all equipped with a similar set of scientific instruments. Using an extended concept of a scientific instrument, it is shown here that not only the instruments themselves, but also the external equipment, buildings and camp-facilities, as well as the manual work performed by the expedition members all played a role in obtaining the final results. Further, it is shown that Birkeland's efforts in organising and funding the expedition can be seen as an instrument-making operation.

Permafrost occupies 20 million square kilometres of Earth’s high-latitude and high-altitude landscapes. These regions are sensitive to climate change and human activities; hence, permafrost research is of considerable scientific and societal importance. However, the results of this research are generally not known by the general public. Communicating scientific concepts is an increasingly important task in the research world. Different ways to engage learners and incorporate narratives in teaching materials exist, yet they are generally underused. Here we report on an international scientific outreach project called “Frozen-Ground Cartoons”, which aims at making permafrost science accessible and fun for students, teachers, and parents through the creation of comic strips. We present the context in which the project was initiated, as well as recent education and outreach activities. The future phases of the project primarily involve a series of augmented reality materials, such as maps, photos, videos, and 3D drawings. With this project we aim to foster understanding of permafrost research among broader audiences, inspire future permafrost researchers, and raise public and science community awareness of polar science, education, outreach, and engagement.

I am writing in response to Professor Chris Turney's recent research article Why didn't they ask Evans?, published in Polar Record on 28 September 2017. The article took as its focus Scott's second-in-command, Lieutenant E.R.G.R ‘Teddy’ Evans, and alleged that Evans failed to deliver Captain Scott's ‘updated orders’ to base in February 1912. This is an error that needs to be corrected.

This paper examines how Antarctica has been depicted in recruitment material, and compares the expectations set up in the advertising imagery with the reality of expeditioners’ experiences. Textual analyses of advertisements and job descriptions are used to reveal dominant themes, including the trope of extremity, while interviews with those who have spent time on the ice provide reflections on the actual challenges encountered when working in Antarctica, such as boredom. Much of the popular discourse around Antarctica continues to centre on the Heroic Era (1895–1922), a time of exploration typified by men pitting themselves against nature and striding out into unchartered expanses of ice. Although modern day life on Antarctic stations differs markedly from the extreme conditions experienced by early explorers, the continent continues to be associated with notions of toughness and extremity. We argue that in some cases, advertisements may actually target the wrong audience. This has important implications for how an Antarctic station as a workplace is conceptualised, and then experienced by those who head south, with potential detrimental effects.

In ’Why didn't they ask Evans?’ (Turney, 2017), I draw together previously unpublished sources and new analyses of published material to cast further light on the circumstances that led to the fatal events surrounding the return of Captain Robert Falcon Scott's Polar Party on the British Antarctic Expedition (BAE, 1911–1913). Of particular importance are the notes on the meeting between the Royal Geographical Society's President Lord Curzon and the widows Kathleen Scott and Oriana Wilson in April 1913, which explicitly identify Lieutenant Edward ‘Teddy’ Evans as having removed food that exceeded his allocation as a member of the Last Supporting Party (Curzon, 1913), the establishment and almost immediate closure of a ‘Committee of Enquiry’ chaired by Lord Curzon (Beaumont, 1913a, b, c; Cherry-Garrard, 1913a; Darwin, 1913; Goldie, 1913), the recognition of missing food at key depots by the returning Polar Party on the 7, 24 and 27 February 1912 (Scott, 1913a; Wilson, 1912), Evans’ anger at not being selected as a member of the Polar Party and his early departure home (Evans, 1912), the revised timeline of when Evans fell down with scurvy on the Ross Ice Shelf to apparently align with when and where the food was removed (The Advertiser, 3 April 1912, Adelaide: 10) (Cherry-Garrard, 1922; Ellis, 1969; Evans, 1912, 1913a, 1943; Lashly, 1912; Scott, 1913a, 1913b), Evans’ failure to ensure Scott's orders regarding the return of the dog sledging teams had been acted on (Cherry-Garrard, 1922; Gran, 1961; Hattersley-Smith & McGhie, 1984) and the misunderstanding amongst senior Royal Geographical Society members during Evans’ recuperation in the UK that Apsley Cherry-Garrard ‘was to meet the South Pole party, with two teams of dogs, at the foot of the [Beardmore] glacier’ (Markham, 1913). I would like to thank May (2018) for her comment and acknowledge that Edward Wilson's sketchbooks of the expedition's logistics, scientific priorities, sketches and notes on the BAE comprise entries from 1911–1912 and not solely from 1912, which Turney (2017) used to denote the year of the last entry.

Captain Robert Falcon Scott's plan for the attempt to reach the South Pole during the Terra Nova Expedition was to use horses, motorised sledges and dog teams to lay depots on the Ross Ice Shelf to advance the effective starting point for the three man-hauling groups to the foot of the Beardmore Glacier. His idea was that two of the groups would turn back after two and four weeks, after depositing supplies for the final polar party to rely on during the return journey. In this paper, the logic of the mathematical ‘jeep problem’ is applied to derive the theoretically optimal points at which the support parties should have turned back in order to optimise the relationship between distance and consumption of supplies. The results show that, according to this model, Scott took both his support parties along too far, especially the last support party under Lieutenant E.R.G.R. ‘Teddy’ Evans.

The article Could Captain Scott have been saved? Cecil Meares and the second journey that failed, by Karen May and Sarah Airriess, first published in Polar Record in 2014 (May & Airriess, 2015), builds a case against Cecil Meares for a failure to restock One Ton Depot in accordance with Scott's instructions. The authors claim that Meares was guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty and ‘obfuscation’. However, their case is diminished – in my view – by three significant mistakes that undermine their charges against Meares. In the three sections below, I identify those mistakes and consider whether the strong claims May and Airriess make about Meares are justified.