Though presidential personality and preferences heavily influence US Arctic policy, climate change and the perceived threat to US interests posed by rising international engagement in the north among great powers such as Russia and China are increasingly impacting US policy in the region. Recognising that these trends are likely to persist into the future, it is important to understand the US Arctic policymaking apparatus, how geopolitical and environmental factors affect the creation and implementation of such policies through the presidency and how the resulting presidential policies may impact US leadership in the region for years to come. Consequently, this article examines how the distinct styles and preferences of Presidents Obama and Trump interact with growing climate change and defence challenges in the region within the US Arctic policymaking process. We illustrate this interaction through examples at both domestic and international policy levels and then place it in the larger context of the differing presidential approaches to institutionalisation when setting policy. Ultimately, we conclude that not only do presidential priorities regarding climate change, rising international engagement, and institutionalisation critically influence Arctic policymaking, but how a future president views these issues will heavily impact the direction of policies affecting the region.

The Dry Valleys of southern Victoria Land, Antarctica, lying some 75 km west of McMurdo station, form an arid, ice-free area of roughly 2 500 km2. Since the late 1950s, this region has provided a remarkable opportunity for geoscientific studies of the exposed surface rocks, within easy reach of logistic support at McMurdo and Scott bases on Ross Island (Fig 1). As a result of a study of Lake Vanda in the Wright Valley, which began during the 1963–64 summer field season, scientists from the United States, New Zealand and Japan supported the view that further advances in our knowledge of the Dry Valleys would require an examination of the unconsolidated material, and the geothermal regime at lake sites, using direct shallow drilling techniques. As drilling techniques and interestin the geological history of the McMurdo region as a whole (encompassing the Transantarctic Mountains, Ross Island, McMurdo Sound and the Dry Valleys) developed, an international, multidisciplinary project—the Dry Valley Drilling Project (DVDP)—was conceived. By 1969 the US National Science Foundation (NSF) had decided to coordinate proposals from scientists wishing to drill the first intermediate and deep cores into the sediment and rock of Antarctica; the aim, a reconstruction of Antarctic geological history that traditional surface or near-surface studies alone could never achieve. Initially, the approach was to be a sub-surface physical, chemical and biological examination of theDry Valleys, but as the project developed it encompassed studies of the Ross Island volcanic complex and McMurdo Sound sediments.

One of the minor misfortunes of the war has been the suspension of many lines of scientific investigation; while another has been the difficulty of receiving information concerning researches in lands in which, despite the war, it has been possible to pursue important original or collative work. The U.S.A. is a case in point, and it will be of interest to all students of ice and snow that there has appeared from the pen of Mr François E. Matthes, the well-known head of the Section of Glacial Geology of the U.S. Geological Survey, an important monograph entitled “Glaciers”. It is published as Chap. 5 in Hydrology (Physics of the Earth, Vol. 9, edited by Oscar E. Meinzer, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1942). This chapter of seventy pages reviews some of the work done and the advances made in recent years, more particularly in glaciology, as distinct from glacial geology. Incidentally, it is common knowledge that while there is in all a very large body of students of glacial geology, that is to say of the actual effects of ice masses upon the land surface, there are at work remarkably few glaciologists, whose particular study is the physical condition and constitution of those masses, even in countries where glaciers are a normal feature of the landscape.

Each year, more and more of Canada's vast northern territories are being explored in the search for untapped mineral resources. But the area is covered with snow for seven to ten months a year, which hampers most activities connected with mineral exploration. Snow cover also affects changes in albedo and temperature and hydrologic forecasting. The surface hydrology in most areas is only active for two to five months a year. Historically, snow hydrologists have been limited to the use of ground source measurements for estimating the spatial and temporal variability of snow cover. In the Yukon and Northwest Territories hydrometeorological stations are few and tend to be clustered around settlements. Moreover, the ground source data are subject to error and do not necessarily provide a complete picture of current conditions. The synoptic view provided by satellite images presents an economical way to monitor the retreat and advance of the snow-line and of mapping snow cover in remote and sparsely populated areas. The information may eventually be useful for extrapolating conventional ground source data more effectively over the entire Yukon and Northwest Territories.

Inspired by notions of interest of humankind and intergenerational equity, we explored Antarctic perceptions of a subset of future generations—university students. Students at three universities in Canada, the Netherlands, and the USA were surveyed to determine the relationships between nationality, academic major, opinions on values of Antarctica, and support for a range of human activities in Antarctica (n = 618). Logistic regression was used to model the relationship of these variables with support for designation of Antarctica as a wilderness reserve, construction of new research stations, and mining. Compared with business and economics majors, biological sciences and natural resources/conservation majors were more likely to support wilderness designation and less likely to support mineral resource development. Nationality was not significantly associated with support for construction of new research stations and mineral resource development. Opinions on the value of Antarctica and support for activities also exhibited significant influences on dependent variables. Consistent with earlier studies of Antarctic scientists, personnel, tourists, and other members of the general public, university students valued Antarctica as one of the world’s last great wildernesses (66%), an important component of the Earth’s climate system (66%), and a science laboratory for the benefit of mankind (62%).

This article argues that the concept of diligence provides a useful role in clarifying (and perhaps narrowing) the discretionary powers of the State with respect to the development of natural resources. The claim has two branches. First, the concept of due diligence plays an important role in bridging the normative gap between the harms caused by private actors and the international law of State responsibility. It is the vehicle by which States can be made to assume responsibility for private developments within their jurisdiction and control that cause harm to other States. Second, the concept of due diligence plays an important role (a “generative role”) in teasing out the detailed logical implications of more abstract primary norms such as the duty of prevention. These derivative duties include the duties to make a preliminary assessment of whether the proposed activity may cause a risk of significant transboundary harm: to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) if there is a risk of significant harm and, if the EIA confirms that risk, to notify and consult with respect to possible measures to prevent or mitigate that risk. The article demonstrates both of these claims through an examination of the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and arbitral awards. Finally, the article applies these claims in the context of possible resource developments in Alaska, British Columbia and Yukon that may have transboundary implications.

As a collaborative production, the exhibition New Arctic aspired to explore postcolonial versions of the Arctic. For this purpose, the exhibition included, among others, an installation called a map machine, seeking to display the Arctic as a site of ongoing ontological politics. To our audiences, the map machine visualised how an inhabited Arctic continues to become a periphery, open to new resource exploitation, a Dreamland “out of space and time.” In this text, I mimic the work of this map machine by describing a series of outside interventions on the Varanger Peninsula, in the Sámi core areas of Norway. The case that initiates the set of actions described in this text is a proposed expansion of a quartzite mine in the small village of Austertana. I illustrate how maps and bureaucratic processes as working political technologies introduce new cartographic visions of this land–water interface, counteracting other existing versions of the same landscape. The case illustrates how exactly such new visions impose urgently meaningful single-action landscapes, or how the Tanafjord was literally reworked from a landscape of endangered species to a landscape defined by an issue of maritime security.

Over the last three centuries, geographers, oceanographers, geophysicists, glaciologists, climatologists, and geoengineers have shown great interest in Arctic Ocean sea ice extent. Many of these experts envisaged an ice-free Arctic Ocean. This article studies three stages of that narrative: the belief in an ice-free Arctic Ocean, the potential for one, and the threat of one. Eighteenth and nineteenth century interest in accessing navigable polar sea routes energised the belief in an iceless polar sea; an early twentieth century North Hemispheric warm spell combined with mid-century cold war geostrategy to open the potential for drastic sea ice loss; and, most recently, climate models have illuminated the threat of a seasonally ice-free future, igniting widespread concerns about the impact this might have on Earth's natural and physical systems. This long narrative of an ice-free Arctic Ocean can help to explain modern-day scepticism of human-induced environmental change in the far north.

Frederick George Jackson, the leader of the Jackson-Harmsworth Expedition of 1894–1897, accomplished a great deal during his exploration of Franz Josef Land [Zemlya Frantsa-Iosifa] although his achievements have never been fully acknowledged. Jackson's expedition itself has often been eclipsed by his famous meeting in 1896 with Fridtjof Nansen, absent for 3 years in the Arctic and it has been unfairly coloured by the view that Jackson was no more than an adventurer and sportsman. The research reported in this article evaluates Jackson's plan and management activities. The study developed a set of factors to evaluate his performance arising from a variety of expeditions contemporary with Jackson's. His strong personality and limited personnel managerial experience limited the full extent of what he might have achieved. Yet, Jackson developed a strong exploration model that was based on comprehensive planning, a significant concern for the health and welfare of his companions, the willingness to innovate in a number of activities including sledging, and a commitment to scientific discovery. Although the expedition did not find a route to the North Pole, Jackson confirmed that Franz Josef Land was an archipelago and he gave credence to the consumption of fresh meat as a means of preventing scurvy. One of Jackson's legacies to subsequent explorers was the use of ponies for haulage. He was unable to appreciate the weaknesses in their use and his influence on subsequent Antarctic expeditions often led to undesirable results. But, overall, Jackson was an innovator in a conservative exploration community.

In December 1913 Sir Ernest Shackleton released a prospectus and announced The Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition. His goal was to undertake the first crossing of Antarctica from the Weddell Sea via the polar plateau to McMurdo Sound on the Ross Sea. The journey had already been attempted by Wilhelm Filchner whose ship Deutschland, had become beset in the Weddell Sea ice for nine months in 1912. Shackleton aimed ‘to make all possible scientific observations on [the Trans-Antarctic] journey; to carry on similar work by parties operating from the two bases on the Weddell and Ross Seas [and] to carry on scientific work, and travel unknown portions of the coastline, by the two ships of the expedition’(Shackleton 1913: 3). With Endurance a continental crossing party of six led by Shackleton would begin from the Weddell Sea and a supporting depot laying party led by Nimrod veteran Lieutenant Aeneas L.A. Mackintosh RNR, with the auxiliary barquentine Aurora based in McMurdo Sound. Unbeknown to each party, both experienced problems beyond their control. Endurance was holed and sank in the Weddell Sea and Aurora locked in ice, although damaged, reached New Zealand. Here the ship was repaired and then undertook a relief expedition with Shackleton as a passenger, to McMurdo Sound. In spite of these major setbacks each party conducted valuable scientific observations.

When Shackleton published his book South (Shackleton 1919) on the expedition, compiled with New Zealand journalist and friend Edward Saunders, with exception of accounts on the Ross Sea party sledging and drift of the ship Aurora, no recognition was given to work undertaken by the four Ross Sea party scientists and an assistant. Later publications have focused on the depot-laying, while books on Antarctic science have largely overlooked the science undertaken.

The purpose of this paper is to make this better known, and to give credit to the four scientists involved. The science conducted although primarily concerned with meteorological observations, also covers limited glaciological observations including the ablation of lake ice, solution of glacier ice in salt water, tidal recordings, collection of zoological and other specimens, along with the use of improvised equipment to undertake observations. The science achieved was secondary to the field work. The Ross Sea party science was done however, under conditions not normally conducive for such field work with health issues a major contributing factor. A lack of funding, equipment, personality problems, concern for Aurora and crew, uncertainty of Shackleton's Antarctic crossing and their own relief, led to depression, sleeplessness and insomnia.

The article discusses how organisational structure and culture affected the preparations for sledging in three Antarctic expeditions between 1901 and 1904. The central focus is how expedition leaders sought tacit knowledge, ‘the knowledge of how we do things.’ Two organisational types were derived from a study of 36 major polar expeditions. These – the industrial organisation and the innovative organisation – were used to analyse how sledging practices evolved in the British National Antarctic Expedition, German South Polar Expedition, and Scottish National Antarctic Expedition. Robert Falcon Scott, in great part as a result of his naval heritage, did not fully understand the need for and the methods required to gain the operational knowledge required for sledging in Antarctica. He applied the traditional command-and-control system based on naval tradition. Erich von Drygalski and William Speirs Bruce applied Fridtjof Nansen's scientific approach, in which the scientific staffs were integrated into sledging operations. In this approach, every variable that could possibly affect the outcome of the research was incorporated into preparations, much as is the case in classical experimental design. While no attempt is made to judge sledging success in the study, the results clearly indicate the importance of knowing how to use the tacit dimension in sledging. The implications go far beyond sledging and suggest the need for managers to have an intimate understanding of how things work.

Pollen- and non-pollen-palynomorphs (NPP) analytical studies of the northwestern part of Spitsbergen were conducted between 1988 and 1991. As well as pollen from local native flora and more dispersed species, some well preserved remains of tardigrada exuvia, buccal tubes and eggs were found. This study reviewed the remains of at least six tardigrade taxa reported: Dactylobiotus ambiguous, Paramacrobiotus richtersi group, Richtersius coronifer, Macrobiotus hufelandi group, Macrobiotus peterseni and Minibiotus cf. intermedius, which are reassessed and determined more accurately. These findings provide some new insights into the past environmental conditions and changes for Spitsbergen. Based on the present research it can be concluded that tardigrade remains are frequent NPP elements of pollen analyses from lake, peat bogs and detritus sub-fossil sediment cores, at least in polar regions. It can also be stated that tardigrades can be considered indicators in further palaeontological studies helping to reconstruct past environmental conditions (for example humidity) for some regions. However, the knowledge of tardigrades in these types of analyses is still rather poor.

India's interest in Antarctica dates from 1956, when the Indian government first raised the question of the peaceful use of Antarctica in the UN. Although India began as a strong critic of the Antarctic Treaty System, and, indeed, conducted scientific activities on the continent for two years without being a member of it, India recognised that her interests would be better served by joining the Treaty as a full member.

Radiocarbon age determinations of 32 walrus (Odobenus rosmarus) remains show that the species has been a member of the Greenland fauna since at least the middle Holocene. The oldest date is 7280–7160 calendar years BP. However, most dated remains come from archaeological sites and are of late Holocene age

In the century since Roald Amundsen and Robert F. Scott led the first and second expeditions to reach the South Pole, commentators have frequently passed judgement on the different means of transport that the two explorers employed. In hindsight, and since he ‘won,’ they have consistently praised Amundsen for using dogs exclusively and criticised Scott for not doing the same. Surprisingly, however, almost no attention has been given to the experience of Amundsen's dogs, whose extreme suffering seems to have vanished into a collective blind spot. Here, with the aim of restoring balance to one part of the vexed historiography of the two explorers, that record is set straight. Amundsen's troubled and contradictory attitude towards his animals is also explored and common misconceptions about Scott's views on the use of dogs for transport are confuted.