In several recent publications in the philosophy of chemistry we have made use of a repertoire of analytical concepts to guide our investigations. Perhaps studies of other sophisticated knowledge garnering practices could benefit from adopting this analytical scheme if we want to understand their merits and drawbacks. Our suggestions for shaping methodologies for philosophical studies in particular fields of interest includes both the natural sciences, legal systems in action, economies and their management, warfare, preparing the dishes of a cuisine, and so on. Adopting our proposals would encourage philosophers to examine our world seen as fields of material and cultural/social entities affording opportunities for action. At a certain level of analysis, the products of such action, appear to be perfectly identical entities, fungibles. There are no fungibles in nature. They must therefore be thought of as constituents of iconic models. Our scheme for critically examining the practices of investigators is meant to ensure the intelligibility both of the relevant discourse and the trustworthiness of the practices of the discipline in question. The Third Wittgenstein's ‘hinges’ that function as necessities and yet are vulnerable to empirical assessment provide a generic frame for analyses of human practices.

Since 2014, British schools have been required to ‘actively promote’ the value of ‘mutual respect’ to the children in their care. This is relatively unproblematic: liberals are agreed that good citizenship education will involve teaching mutual respect. However, there is disagreement over how ‘respect’ should be understood and what it should imply for norms of respectful classroom discussion. Some political liberals have indicated that when engaging in discussion in the classroom, students should provide only neutral reasons to defend their views. This paper provides a number of arguments against this claim. For example, I argue that this norm relies on a distorted understanding of what it is to respect others and that it stifles the development of civic and epistemic virtue in the next generation of citizens. Even from within the perspective of political liberalism, there are good reasons to favour critical discussion of non-neutral reasons. Education policy should therefore accord greater priority to discussion of students’ actual motivating reasons than to discussion constrained by a norm of neutral discourse.

This paper examines the role of knowledge in education. It proposes that the arguments of Paul Hirst on liberal education can be updated using the idea of a ‘space of reasons’ drawn from the epistemology associated with John McDowell. It further argues that for education to flourish within the space of reasons the idea of ‘epistemic freedom’ needs to be both recognised and developed. Such freedom is particularly exemplified in the ability to form judgements. It is noted that education at all levels has been subjected to processes of ‘rationalisation’, processes identified by Max Weber over one hundred years ago: these processes severely restrict epistemic freedom. However, the paper argues that Alistair McIntyre's concept of a practice can be used to inform our thinking about subject disciplines. The pursuit of knowledge can therefore be seen in terms of practices which operate within the space of reasons. Moreover, we can see the idea of a practice as a counterweight to rationalisation

In what sense does love presuppose appreciation of the other's character? First, I argue that loving appreciation is more often a source of truthful vision than of bias and idealisation. Second, using the example of Elizabeth Bennett, I show that the tendency to forfeit love for those who lose our good opinion can be an expression of undue moralism and pride. Nonjudgmental responses to the other's flaws show how virtuous love can combine both realistic vision of the other's flaws and appreciation of the other that does not stand on balancing flaws with qualities. Such love is in the end connected with a conception of goodness inspired by Kierkegaard and Weil.

Moral questions surrounding suffering tend to focus on obligations to relieve others’ suffering. In this paper, I focus on the overlooked question of what sufferers morally owe to themselves, arguing that they have the duty to self-care. I discuss agents who have been shaped by moral luck to contribute to their own suffering and canvass the ways in which this damages their moral agency. I contend that these agents have a duty to care for themselves by protecting and expanding their agency, which involves precluding further destruction of agency and ensuring the continued ability to self-care.

In this paper I demonstrate how certain contemporary atheists have problematically conflated atheism with agnosticism (knowingly or unknowingly). The first type of conflation is semantic fusion, where the lack of belief in God is combined with the outright denial of God, under the single label of ‘atheism’. The second is morphological fission which involves the separation of atheism into two subcategories where lack of belief in God is labelled as negative atheism and outright denial of God as positive atheism – and while here they are more explicitly demarcated, they are still positioned under the broad notion of atheism. I argue in this paper that atheism should be better used as the propositional denial of God and that uncertainty and unknowability about God should be reserved to characterise agnosticism. Conflating these positions under the single term ‘atheism’ mischaracterises agnostics and inflates the territory of atheists. In clarifying these terms, I review how the nuances in the prefix a- in atheism have potentially contributed towards these misnomers. I also suggest the use of the categories ‘local atheism’ and ‘global atheism’ to clarify on whom the burden of proof lies within the discourse.