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Making Things Up By Karen Bennett. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2017), pp xi + 260, £45 ISBN: 9780199682683

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 October 2017

Abstract

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Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2017 

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References

1 Supervenience sneaks back as an example of building on page 62, presumably in error.

2 We could also call this most fundamental relation ‘Building’ (perhaps with subscripts to distinguish them) but for the purposes of this review I will ignore the distinction between the two.

3 Schaffer, Jonathan, ‘Monism: The Priority of the Whole’, Philosophical Review 119 (2010): 3176CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Kim, Jaegwon, ‘Making sense of emergence’, Philosophical Studies 95 (1999): 336CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Wilson, Jessica M., ‘No work for a theory of grounding’, Inquiry 57 (2014): 535579CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Obviously, such a view is often not counterintuitive to its proponents, and (counterintuitive or not) it may be that their view is correct.

7 See also Jonathan Schaffer, op. cit., 40.

8 This restriction on modal recombination is one reason why Schaffer rejects a conception of properties which have their causal roles essentially. See, for example, Schaffer, Jonathan, ‘Quiddistic Knowledge’, Philosophical Studies 123 (2004): 132CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Dasgupta, Shamik, ‘The possibility of physicalism’, The Journal of Philosophy 111 (2014): 557–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Fine, Kit, ‘Guide to ground’, in Correia, F. and Schneider, B. (eds), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 3780CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Bennett, Karen, ‘By our bootstraps’, Philosophical Perspectives 25 (2011): 28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Heil, John, From an Ontological Point of View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Bennett, Karen, ‘Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It’, Noûs 37: 471–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.