This past summer was marked by violent conflict between Georgia and Russia over what might, from a parochial American vantage point, seem obscure and insignificant territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For political scientists this conflict raises a host of issues. Most strikingly, it raises the question of whether and how nations and states map onto one another geograpically. In our lead article, Shererill Stroschein examines the case of Kosovo as a vehicle for proposals about “creative designs” for governance that might be implemented in demographically complex regions. The hope of course would be that such designs might dampen conflict in ways that are both practical and normatively attractive.

In this article, I make a case for a dispersed state control model as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of the Weberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, dispersed state controls are based on a functional principle, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or function. This examination is informed by recent debates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorial autonomy in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflict. I examine the practical application of a dispersed control model in the context of the governance structure proposed for Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. I conclude with an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complex demographic and governing realities in regions such as the Balkans.

Liberal constitutionalism is founded in part on a desire to build a polity on the basis of reason and the public interest. At its most ambitious, the result can verge on a prepolitical or even apolitical view of constitution writing. To be sure, most liberal constitutionalists have backed away from the extreme view by increasingly recognizing that passion and bargaining will inevitably play a role in constitution writing. But few have moved beyond grudging acceptance of passion and bargaining to active incorporation. In addition, the terms themselves are used in increasingly slippery ways. Yet while greater terminological precision is desirable and possible, it cannot overcome a key feature of constitution drafting: reason and interest are easily confused in practice as are passion and rationality. Even if reason and deliberation over the public interest could be distinguished from passion and private bargaining, they are unlikely to be able to deliver what is demanded of them. Constitutional politics differs from normal politics less in the role for rationality and the public interest and more in the means used and the number of actors with veto power. In such an environment, partisan interest and passion are not merely inevitable contaminants but essential elements.

The institutionalization of race-conscious inclusion policies in employment, education, and contracting has largely endured in post-civil rights America despite predictions of their demise. However, scholarship has continued to mislabel many of the specific policies in these organizations and governments as “affirmative action” policies, even though many such policies lack the civil rights roots necessary to warrant this label. In this article, I explain how many organizations have recast, supplemented, or replaced their rights-based affirmative action policies with utilitarian diversity policies. While the conventional, civil rights framework for analyzing affirmative action obscures the rise of such organizational diversity policies, an alternative body of scholarship that employs a diversity framework has shed light on the causes, content, and consequences of this policy and political realignment. The Supreme Court's 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger decision and the political activism surrounding Michigan's Proposal 2 in 2006 both exemplify the trademark signs of this shift from rights-based affirmative action to organizational diversity policies. The article concludes by assessing the promise and dangers of this trend of rooting racial inclusion policies in a utilitarian diversity logic rather than a civil rights logic.

Conceptualizing a political world “beyond black and white” is a familiar scholarly refrain, but theoretical relics of bipolarity remain. The deracialization concept, a much-discussed phenomenon in American elections, is one example. Asian American campaigns provide an interesting case for testing the utility of deracialization in multicultural urban milieus, given the overwhelming tendency for such candidates to be elected from predominantly non-Asian constituencies. Looking in depth at two successful campaigns by Vietnamese Americans in Northern and Southern California, I argue for a broadened approach that can better account for changes in the American political mosaic—namely, increases in immigration occurring in some of the country's fastest growing regions and the availability of alternative media. I call this approach toggling. In this article, I outline the toggling strategy. I conclude by considering the impact of toggling on equality in the American democratic process and suggest some directions for future research.

Amidst rising levels of ethnic diversity in the United States, scholars struggle to understand how group consciousness functions among other non-black minority groups such as Asian Americans and Latinos. Most of the literature in this area focuses on the relationship between identity and immigration incorporation or the debate between national origin and panethnicity. We argue that the Asian American community offers an important case study to understand how social context and one's perceived racial position influence an individual's sense of group attachment. Thus, the Asian American case presents new insight beyond the black politics model into how racial identification influences individual political attitudes and behavior. We present findings from a unique embedded survey experiment conducted in 2004 that reveals a surprising degree of malleability in Asian American racial group attachment. This is a striking contrast to the findings demonstrated by blacks whose racial identification is relatively more stable over various contexts. We seek to explain these findings by advocating for a more explicit consideration of the structural incentives and costs of adopting racial and ethnic identities by highlighting the significance of U.S. immigration policy and its role in creating group-based stereotypes and racial tropes.

The past decade has brought an unprecedented boom in the study of courts as political actors in Latin America. We examine the extraordinary diversity of academic research on judicial politics in the region, identifying the key questions, findings, and theoretical debates in the literature, highlighting important conceptual disjunctions, and critiquing the research methods scholars of judicial politics in Latin America have employed in their work. We close by suggesting new avenues of inquiry to help advance the collective effort to understand the roles courts play in Latin American politics.

More political scientists should engage in the debates surrounding regulation of communications networks, the infrastructure on which telecom, media, and Internet services ride. In 1990 there were 14 communications regulators worldwide, by 2007 there were 148. To fulfill World Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications commitments, many countries aim to create regulatory agencies that are “independent.” What characterizes independence? Regulators are embedded in a political context that includes three main constituencies : other government institutions, industry, and consumers. Independent regulators are able to take action autonomously from other government institutions and industry while serving as advocates for consumers. In a survey of 18 countries, several traits emerge; a leader who cannot be dismissed arbitrarily, regulatory authority clearly distinct from policymaking, independent funding, minimal staff exchange between regulator and regulated firm, and dedicated support for consumers. It is usually easier for a regulator to be independent if operators are privatized. In a study of 4 countries, independent regulators follow decision-making procedures that give the public notice about proposed rule changes, opportunities to provide comments, and final decisions with explanation. Also, independent regulators have gift, conflict of interest, and post-employment rules, which set ethical standards and expectations for staff.

Using the “classical twin method,” political scientists John Alford, Carolyn Funk, and John Hibbing conclude that political ideologies are significantly influenced by genetics, an assertion that has garnered considerable media attention. Researchers have long used human twins in attempts to assess the degree of genetic influence on various behavioral traits. Today, this methodology has been largely replaced in favor of contemporary molecular genetic techniques, and thus heritability studies have seen a diminishing role in behavioral genetic research of the twenty-first century. One important reason the twin method has been superseded is that it depends upon several questionable assumptions, the most significant of which is known as the equal environments assumption. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing argue that this crucial assumption, and thus their conclusion, holds up under empirical scrutiny. They point to several studies in support of this assumption. Here, we review the evidence presented and conclude that these attempts to test the equal environments assumption are weak, suffering significant methodological and inherent design flaws. Furthermore, much of the empirical evidence provided by these studies actually argues that, contrary to the interpretation, trait-relevant equal environments assumptions have been violated. We conclude that the equal environments assumption remains untenable, and as such, twin studies are an insufficient method for drawing meaningful conclusions regarding complex human behavior.

Beckwith and Morris raise concerns about the value of twin studies for understanding the role of genetics in complex human behavior, but virtually all of their concerns have been raised and rebutted before. When it comes to the equal environments assumption (EEA), the best approach is to test for and control possible violations of the EEA on heritability estimates rather than merely rejecting all empirical evidence because of the possibility of EEA violations. In many respects, since the study of the genetic basis of complex human behaviors now includes many methods in addition to twin studies, Beckwith and Morris's critique applies more to the behavioral genetics of a quarter century ago than to today's multifaceted behavioral genetics. Twin studies establish that there is a sizeable genetic component to political orientations, thereby giving cause to look further at the nature of that role by using other methodologies, including molecular genetics. We conclude by pointing out that the normative implications of the relevance of genes to human behavior are not nearly as worrisome as Beckwith and Morris seem to believe.

As I write this Introduction the 2008 Republican National Convention is drawing to a close. John McCain's selection of little-known Alaska Governor Sarah Palin has taken the pundits by surprise, injecting new dynamics into the Presidential contest, and furnishing proof that political life is riddled with contingency. At the same time, the selection further accentuates, and perhaps even reduces to absurdity, a theme that has been at the heart of this campaign season largely due to the Democratic party primaries and their down-to-the-wire contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton—the politics of difference. If the Democratic contest demonstrated that the politics of race and gender are central not simply to the Democrats but to the U.S. as a whole, the Republican convention has made it all but inevitable that for the first time in the history of the U.S. an African-American has broken the color line in Presidential politics, a woman has broken the gender line in Republican Presidential politics, and come January 2009 there will be either an African-American man or an (Alaskan American) woman in the White House as either President or Vice-President. This is extraordinary. At the same time, before this contest plays out to its conclusion—long after this introduction goes to print, and before it reaches you—there will no doubt be much tortuous discussion—and also posturing and denunciation—of the politics of race and gender and of the ways that these identities intersect with broader claims of citizenship.

When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands. By Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 176p. $25.95.

In her timely and provocative book, Kathleen Arnold examines the super-exploitation and disenfranchisement of the “new working class”—low-income immigrants, African Americans, and women workers—and utilizes these phenomena as a catalyst for sharpening our critical understanding of American governance in our globalizing conditions. She contends that the neoliberal state is deploying deregulation and massive policing interventions simultaneously. The latter range from the exposure of welfare mothers to the rigors of workfare to the war on drugs, post-9/11 domestic security operations, mean-spirited attacks on the homeless, and the crackdown on illegal immigration. Arnold proposes a sobering diagnosis that is loosely based upon Giorgio Agamben's theory of bare life: As the state operates outside the law on a frequent and even systematic basis to reduce these target groups to a subhuman status, we are witnessing the triumph of prerogative power in American society today.

Anna Marie Smith and I have similar concerns about the poor, racism and sexism. Yet we view political theory in different ways. Smith has focused on one set of programs and gives the reader a richly detailed view of recent welfare laws. In contrast, I have tried to do something very different. First, I use Giorgio Agamben's ideas as a foil, drawing upon Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault to supplement this reading, and I investigate the ideas of John Locke (rather than Thomas Hobbes) to understand sovereignty today. By looking at Locke, we can understand how representative government based on the rule of law and equality can coexist with prerogative power used systematically and domestically. Instead of a top-down view of power, I argue that modern power is characterized by the dispersal of sovereignty and, importantly, prerogative power (the legal suspension of the law). Thus, even as national borders have become more open (both with economic globalization and post-Clausewitzean forms of war), state sovereignty has not necessarily declined. In fact, the use of prerogative power increasingly characterizes late-modern power even as neoliberal rhetoric gives the opposite impression.

In her book, Anna Marie Smith meticulously analyzes the racial and gendered dimensions of the U.S. welfare state and the ways in which it punishes the unmarried and imposes hetero-normative standards on all types of poor families. Smith's aim is to “expand the disciplinary limits of feminist political theory” (p. 6) by drawing on case law, public policy, and social theory. She exposes highly undemocratic practices directed at poor women and men, as well as what amounts to a eugenic project seeking to limit poor people's reproduction. Significantly, individuals of color are targeted by the state for eugenic control and moral policing. In particular, Smith points out how welfare reform and the implementation of “paternafare”—a program that forces poor women to identify biological fathers so that the state can pursue these “deadbeat dads”—do not help the one group who even conservatives agree are “innocent”—children. Very rarely are any party's circumstances elevated by this system, and most often “payers” are forced into deeper poverty. Furthermore, the state's hetero-normative stance marginalizes lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals (LGBTs) in a legal system in which their rights are already deeply compromised.

Let me begin by thanking Kathleen R. Arnold for her comments and Jeffrey Isaac for the invitation to participate in this exchange. Clearly, Kathleen and I are both indebted to the Marxist and Foucauldian traditions. For my part, however, I find the Gramscian insistence on the historically specific, complex, and contradictory character of every historical bloc and hegemonic institution more compelling than the social theories that envision the social structure as a closed totality (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri) or construct state power in an ahistorical and one-dimensional manner (Giorgio Agamben). Contemporary welfare reform, for example, resembles the racially exclusionary “substitute father” rule of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. But welfare reform, with its workfare requirement, child support enforcement, family cap, fatherhood programming, abstinence education, and marriage promotion dimensions, is also somewhat unique. The Gramscian paradigm encourages us to be skeptical when it appears as if the state in a late-modern developed society is becoming either a simple instrument of capital that is obediently shrinking into irrelevance, or an omnipotent machine whose seamless coherence and unbroken continuity leaves democratic forces absolutely no strategic opportunity for constructing a counterhegemonic bloc and fighting back.