^{page 134 note 1} That this knowledge is not a mere possibility, but that Gentiles have actually obtained it, is rendered Certain by in v. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 1} can mean either (neutrally) religious or (pejoratively) superstitious. Paul exploits the word's ambiguity. An act that was religious to the Athenians would be superstitious to him. Yet even a superstition can become a point de départ for the preacher, and even an agnostic and craven fear can become ‘the beginning of wisdom’.

^{page 135 note 2} The literary and inscriptional evidence for such an altar is judiciously summarized by Williams, C. S. C., The Acts of the Apostles, p. 202.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 3} That refers to Adam, and that Paul is contrasting the past age of idolatry with the present age. (, v. 30) inaugurated by the Gospel, has been shown by Gärtner, B., The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation, pp. 229–33.Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 4} Gärtner (pp. 147–52) argues convincingly against Dibelius (Studies in the Acts of the Apostles, E. T., pp. 29–37) for this historical interpretation of and .Google Scholar

^{page 135 note 5} can indicate either (as in Plato, Philo and Wisd. xiii. 6) an intellectual search for truth, or (as in the LXX) a movement of the will whereby a man turns to God in obedience and adoration. Dibelius opts for the first of these meanings and Gätner for the second. Perhaps both meanings are intended—an intellectual search culminating in a living encounter. In any case the point of the optative mood in the following two verbs is to state that, while Gentiles might have discovered the Creator from his works, in fact they have not done so. must mean ‘feel, or grope after’, since if it had meant ‘touch’ it would have come after .

^{page 135 note 6} This may be, but is unlikely to be, a poetical allusion (to Epimenides). See Williams, C. S. C., op. cit. p. 205.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 1} Christians certainly have their life hid (Col. iii. 3); but this is a strictly supernatural gift made available by Christ's Resurrection.Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 2} St John Chrysostom (cited by Gärtner, p. 178) explains .Google Scholar

^{page 136 note 3} Both Clement of Alexandria and St Chrysostom (cited by Gärtner, p. 194) took to signify man's status as a creature.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 1} Paul's implied logic is well put by Gärtner thus (p. 160): ‘If man is like God, then God is living. If man has a spirit, God must have one also—which cannot be said of the idols’. This could be urged even on pantheistic premises. As Gärtner also notes, each of the preceeding words , and emphasizes that ‘God is the living, the One true God over against the lifeless idols made with human hands’.Google Scholar

^{page 137 note 2} Paul does not attribute to the Athenians any natural desire for God, which would be out of keeping with the motive behind the altar inscription; he does not fulfil (as Dibelius asserts, op. cit. p. 76) ‘their unconscious longings’.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 1} On the absence of the idea of creation among the Greeks see Grant, F. M., Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought, pp. 29–40, 135–52 and E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, pp. 1–17. A. D. Sertillanges aptly characterizes the God of Greek philosophical monotheism thus: ‘Il est le premier dans l'être, mais non point le premier par rapport à tout l'être’ (L'Idée de Création, p. 5). The varying degrees of transcendence or immanence attributed to the philosophical do not affect the radical difference between this and the Christian Creator. For if the lower world emanates from the higher it must possess the properties of the higher, even though in a reduced mode; it can be nothing less than a (Timaeus 92 c). Hence on Platonic principles one could worship either the divine being which is beyond the world or the divine being which is the world.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 2} While the exact phrase ex nihilo does not occur anywhere in the New Testament the idea expressed by the phrase is nowhere contradicted, and more than once implied (e.g. in addition to Heb. xi. 3, I Cor. viii. 6, Col. i. 16 and John i. 3).Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 3} Hence, while Paul says in Rom. ii. 15 that Gentiles ‘have the requirements of the Law written on their hearts’, he does not say that they know the person of the Lawgiver. The Law of which Gentiles possess the is the Jewish Law, the Torah (not the Stoic lex naturae), and only those who stand within the convenant can know Yahweh as the Torah's personal source. Because Gentiles do not have a personal conception of God, they cannot enter into a personal relationship with him. That is why, for example, Paul does not use the words and of man's response to natural revelation.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 4} Hence Paul writes (impersonally) (which has by far the stronger support in the MSS.), not (personally) (which is obviously a scribal alteration).Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 1} So Plutarch, adopting the syncretistic attitude reflected in Aristeas 15, affirms that the various names, by which men call the divine all refer to a single cosmic or (De Is. et Osir. 377–8). Whenever the Greeks wanted to give a rational and moral significance to the gods of anthropomorphic faith, they identified them with such philosophical principles as were available. So, too, Seneca (N.Q. 2. 45) calls Jove ‘rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem cui nomen omne convenit’. Jove may also be called ‘fate’ (for it is he ‘ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum’), or ‘nature’ (for he is ‘quod vides totum, partibus sui inditus, et se sustinens et sua’). The god on whom the world (in general) and men (in particular) depend is, for Seneca, simply the impersonal, immanent ‘first cause’ of Stoic philosophy.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 2} In I Cor. i. 21 Paul has in mind those who claimed that through their own they could obtain a complete and saving knowledge of God. Each element in this claim is denied by implication in Rom, i.Google Scholar

^{page 140 note 3} See Bornkamm's, G. admirable paper ‘Faith and Reason in Paul's Epistles’, N. T.S. IV (1958), 93–100.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 1} In fact, as Hurne showed in his Dialogues, unaided reason cannot conclusively establish the existence of even a Designer.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 2} Just as Paul, in Rom. i., does not specify the through which man knows God, so he does not define the mental process through which such knowledge is acquired; can be variously interpreted according to one's epistemological presuppositions.Google Scholar

^{page 141 note 3} They hinder the truth, that is, by refusing to let it take hold of them and command their allegiance.Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 1} God, in justifying (freely acquitting) the ungodly (), implants in him a new that flows from union with the crucified and risen Christ (Rom. iv. 5, vi. 5–13).Google Scholar

^{page 142 note 2} It should be noted that the divine anima munzdi of the Stoics, while it was known through the reason or intellect, was itself material, or could for certain purposes be materialistically conceived in terms of nature's basic elements, air and fire. And Wisd. xiii. 2 especially includes among idolaters those who divinize or .Google Scholar

^{page 143 note 1} This reference to the philosophers shows that (as Paul's descending scale in Rom. i. 23 suggests) we have to reckon with varying degrees of idolatry, and, therefore, with varying degrees of ‘suppression’.Google Scholar