Hall's statement, widely quoted by writers on State succession, has retained a good deal of its validity. From Grotius to O'Connell, a long series of distinguished publicists have attempted to throw light upon the doctrinal obscurity of the problem. Many of them have displayed remarkable juristic imagination, but have also shown a regrettable lack of precision and discipline. In their justification, however, it must be conceded that the abundant judicial and diplomatic practice on State succession has always been—and still is—contradictory and obscure.

The world today is bipolarised with the two giants, and the camps they lead, confronting each other in the stances of the cold war along the entire length of the international frontier. At various points along this frontier, particularly in Asia, the cold war has ‘hotted up’ into a shooting war; but such outbreaks have been sporadic and after an initial outburst have quietened down. However in Europe, the centre of most major wars during the last century, there has been one continuing fester with Berlin as its core, and the relations of the Great Powers in that city have reflected the temperature of the cold war and the proximity of a shooting war. Every issue between States is conditioned by both political and legal considerations, and it is the purpose of this paper to examine the legal status of Berlin, ignoring in so far as that is possible the political factors governing the problem.

So much has been said and written about the events which led up to the involvement of the International Court of Justice in the financial consequences of the United Nations actions in Egypt (1956) and in the Congo (1960) that I shall try to be as brief as possible here.

As human behaviour is influenced by law, so law is influenced by human behaviour whenever the latter serves to bring about changes in existing legal situations. Law may be substituted for freedom of action; a regime of freedom may be restored where law prevailed; one set of rules may be succeeded by another set of rules. What are the kinds of human behaviour capable of so changing legal situations, and thereby entitled to the name “sources of law”? Here, an obvious distinction presents itself between material behaviour, and acts of communication with regard to future behaviour. A further classification would segregate mere acts of acceptance or rejection from positive behaviour contributing substance to the law. Let us illustrate these distinctions by examples from international relations.

On December 15th, 1960 the Ministerial Decree of September 5th, 1960 relating to limitation of liability of owners of seagoing ships came into force. At the same time the Decree of February 7th, 1952 was withdrawn.

The alteration concerns mainly the increase of the amount per ton for which limitation of liability may be invoked by virtue of Sect. 474, 525 and 541 Neth. Comm. Code.

This Decree is—as we may expect—a harbinger of a more profound adaptation of the Dutch Code to the «International Convention Relating to Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing ships», which was signed by our representatives ad referendum at the Brussels Diplomatic Conference of October 1957.

Le sujet que la présente étude se propose de rechercher ne constitue au point de vue doctrinal qu'un aspect du problème plus vaste de l'immunité des Etats étrangers en général. Vu la connexité étroite entre notre sujet et ce problème, la nécessité de jeter un coup d'œil sur les courants qui se manifestent en cette matière dans la doctrine contemporaine s'impose.

As soon as fault—and hence, liability—is established on both sides, the owner who is faced with a suit, will try to constitute a fund in a country where he may keep alive his counterclaim—smaller than owner A's claim—, in a country with a “cross liabilities” system. The Convention opting for “single liability” will encourage such a desire for different fora and therefore the very aim of the Convention may well be thwarted.

In Soviet legal writings devoted to International Law of civil procedure it is taken for granted that the rules of the internal procedural law, which determine the local (territorial) competence of Soviet courts, function at the same time as rules which delimit international competence in civil law cases. Or as Marakov puts it: “En droit russe- en droit d'avant la révolution ainsi qu'en droit soviétique—la compétence générale coincide avec la compétence spéciale. Autrement dit, on étend les règles du droit interne de compétence spéciale aux rapports internationaux: en déterminant la compétence d'un tribunal de Moscou, on la délimite par rapport à la compétence du tribunaux d'Odessa ainsi que par rapport à la compétence des tribunaux de Berlin, de Paris, de Londres etc.”

La Cour s'est réunie en 1962 pendant 229 jours. Elle a commencé ses travaux le 27 février. La première session a duré jusqu'au 20 juillet. La Cour s'est réunie a nouveau du 27 septembre au 21 décembre.

La Cour a traité deux affaires: L'Affaire du Temple au Préah-Vihéar (fond de l'affaire) entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande, et la Requête pour avis consultatif relative aux obligations financières des Membres des Nations Unies.

La question de l'immunité des navires d'Etat se distingue essentiellement du problème plus vaste de l'immunité des Etats étrangers en général en cela qu'elle fait l'objet d'une série de conventions multilatérales, tandis que les autres aspects de l'immunité des Etats ne sont que sporadiquement réglés par des conventions internationales. Les deux conventions de Bruxelles, signées le 23 septembre 1910, l'une sur l'unification de certaines règles en matière d'abordage, l'autre sur l'unification de certaines règles en matière d'assistance et de sauvetage maritimes contiennent les premières règles qui touchent notre sujet. Ces conventions portent sur les responsabilités et les actions en réparation des dommages du chef d'abordage, respectivement la procédure de fixation d'une rémunération pour l'assistance ou le sauvetage.

The advent of the jet age has considerably increased the need, especially for smaller air carriers, to cooperate. Cooperation is a means to reduce the costs of airline operation and in this case it could facilitate the costly changeover to jet aircraft operations. At the same time cooperation can strengthen the competitive—and sometimes also the air policy—position of the partners. Interchange of aircraft is a modest form of interairline cooperation, which is primarily geared to rationalization of airline operation, i.e. to improve the efficiency of operation by meeting an aircraft shortage experienced by one partner, and by increasing the utilization of the aircraft of the other partner.