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Inter-Action of the Sources of International Law1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

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As human behaviour is influenced by law, so law is influenced by human behaviour whenever the latter serves to bring about changes in existing legal situations. Law may be substituted for freedom of action; a regime of freedom may be restored where law prevailed; one set of rules may be succeeded by another set of rules. What are the kinds of human behaviour capable of so changing legal situations, and thereby entitled to the name “sources of law”? Here, an obvious distinction presents itself between material behaviour, and acts of communication with regard to future behaviour. A further classification would segregate mere acts of acceptance or rejection from positive behaviour contributing substance to the law. Let us illustrate these distinctions by examples from international relations.

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Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1963

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References

2. See the decisions to which reference is made in n. 22 below.

3. Minquiers and Ecrehos case, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 71Google Scholar; Case concerning Sovereignty over certain Frontier Land, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 227Google Scholar; Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 28.Google Scholar

4. The same decisions respectively at p. 71 (1953), p. 229 (1959) and p. 24 (1962).

5. Blockade” of Portendic Case (1843)Google ScholarGreat Britain v. France (La Pradelle-Politis, Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, I, pp. 512531).Google Scholar

6. Case of the Free Zones (1932) P.C.I.J., Series A/B No. 46 pp. 147148.Google Scholar

7. Case of the Isle of Clipperton (1931)Google ScholarMexico v. France, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, II, p. 1107 ff.Google Scholar

8. Judgment, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947, p. 83.Google Scholar

9. Lauterpacht, H., “The Covenant” as the “Higher Law”, British Yearbook of International Law, 17 (1936), pp. 5465.Google Scholar

10. McNair, , Law of Treaties, 1961, p. 218.Google Scholar

11. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea; Off. Rec. Vol. IV, pp. 41 ff.Google Scholar

12. Published in Revue générale de droit international public 3e série, XXIX (1958), pp. 78119.Google Scholar

13. Annuaire suisse de droit international, XIV (1957), pp. 158 ff.Google Scholar

14. Reports 1949, p. 22.

15. p. 29.

16. With regard to public policy (ordre public) as an exception to the applicibility of private international law conventions reference can be made to the Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), Judgment of 11 28th, 1958Google Scholar, I.C.J. Reports 1958, pp. 55 ffGoogle Scholar. and particularly to the observation of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his separate opinion, p. 99: “recourse to ordre public, especially if not expressly authorized by the Convention, is in the nature of an exception. It is a permissible exception. But it is an exception which must be justified with some particularity. If a State takes action which, on the face of it, departs from the language of the Convention, then it cannot confine itself to proving generally that the Law under which it acted falls within the permissible exception; it must show that that exception was applied reasonably and in good faith”.

17. In the German High Command Trial the Tribunal said: “defendants were in many instances in retreat under arduous conditions wherein their commands were in serious danger of being cut off. Under such circumstances, a commander must necessarily make quick decisions to meet the particular situation of his command. A great deal of latitude must be accorded to him under such circumstances. What constitutes devastation beyond military necessity in these situations requires detailed proof of an operational and tactical nature”. (In re von Leeb and Others, War Crimes Reports, 12 (1949) pp. 9394Google Scholar; B.Y.I.L. 1952, p. 451.Google Scholar

18. “Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law”, Recueil des Cours, 94 (1958), pp. 335 ff.Google Scholar

19. Perry, R. B., Realms of Value, 1954, p. 117.Google Scholar

20. Die Gerechtigkeit, 1950, p. 83Google Scholar: La Justice–La Vérité, 1955, p. 61Google Scholar with a reference to Fichte. And see Blackshield, A., “Empiricist and Rationalist Theories of Justice”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, XLVIII (1962), p. 55.Google Scholar

21. Such as “ne concedit venire contra factum proprium”, “a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold” (England, Court of the Exchequer: Cave v. Mills (1862); “im ersten sind wir frei, im zweiten sind wir Knechte”. (Goethe).

22. To mention only the Fisheries Case, Reports 1951, p. 139Google Scholar; the Belgium-Netherlands Frontier Land Case, Reports, 1959, p. 227Google Scholar; the Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits), Reports 1960, p. 3940Google Scholar; Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Reports 1962, p. 30.Google Scholar

23. Resolution adopted 26 April 1958.

24. “que, dans le droit des gens, c'est un principe bien établi, qu'il faut s'abstenir autant que possible de modifier l'état des choses existant de fait et depuis longtemps” Grisbaderna Case, Norway/Sweden, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 10 1909, Scott's Hague Court Reports, 1916, p. 493.Google Scholar

25. For a further discussion of the four aspects of reasonable conduct reference can be made to the present author's address to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences and Letters at the occasion of its 155th anniversary, 1963; Yearbook of the Academy 19621963.Google Scholar