The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was opened to all States for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984. Part I of the Convention defines and prohibits torture, establishes a system of universal jurisdiction against it, and specifies the responsibilities of States under the Convention for preventing and prosecuting torture in their territories. Part II establishes an international implementation system based on a Committee against Torture with the authority to review mandatory periodic reports by States parties on their implementation of the Convention. Optional provisions also permit parties to authorize the Committee to receive and investigate communications (complaints) from States or from individuals alleging violations of the Convention, as well as any reliable information it should receive indicating the systematic practice of torture in the territory of any State party.

The international economic order of the late fifties and early sixties was still fascinated by the so-called salt-water colonialism. This appears from international legal attempts at that time to offer more protection to foreign investors than was available to their host countries. The mid-sixties inaugurated a new era by reversing this trend. Legal aspects of the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States, such as stabilization clauses and the choice of both forum and applicable law, thus in the seventies became subordinate to the discretionary powers of host States, whether or not a party to a contract. A possible consensus regarding the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) was even abandoned because of this prevailing view. The real challenge in this period formed the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) moulded in a predominantly political blue-print for the development of States as the sole or main actors in international economic relations.

The great attraction of comparative law — whatever this term actually means — undoubtedly to some extent for legal scholars consists in the boundless freedom it offers. As shown in the many publications which have appeared since the 1900 Paris Congress, the most grandiose ideas have been developed, even when there is actually very little chance that they will ever be materialized and really only have a place in books of tall stories. Unattainable wishes have been expressed which are intimidating and discouraging. Views have been put forward with no other purpose than to create rather doubtful problem areas for future contemplation. Perfect methods of comparison have been recommended without any attempt at providing any illustrations of their application, while from the other side, views can even be heard which openly question whether comparative law even exists.

International fluvial law is one branch of international law that presents thestudent of international law with a seemingly irreconcilable paradox. On the one hand, judging from the scanty treatment often given to the issue in the standard treatises (and its almost complete absence from college syllabi), one could easily conclude that international fluvial law is only to be located on the periphery of international law; that it is a fringe subject, just as air law and space law were regarded only half a century ago. But, on the other hand, a more patient enquiry into the history and development of international law soon reveals that, in fact, international law has been concerned with the regulation of international watercourses (lakes, rivers, etc.,) for a long time, with individual pronouncements by publicists dating back to the writings of the acclaimed ‘fathers’ of international law: Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel. Viewed from this angle, then, international fluvial law, or the law of international watercourses, lies at the very core, rather than on the fringes, of the historical development of international law. Indeed, it is apt to observe that the history of the modern international organization, and thus the advent of the law of international institutions, dates back to the establishment of the various international commissions by European States in respect of some of the major international rivers in Europe between 1815 and 1866: the Rhine Commission (1815), the European Commission for the Danube (1856) and those dealing with the Elbe (1821), the Douro (1835), the Po (1849) and the Pruth (1866).

The Conference, held in Vienna at the invitation of the Austrian Government from 18 February to 21 March 1986, was to consider the draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or between international organizations, initially prepared by the International Law Commission and finalized by them in 1982. The ILC unanimously adopted the text of these articles, with the exception of Article 66 (settlement of disputes).

The new 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the LOS Convention) that lays down a comprehensive framework for contemporary uses of the sea, all of them playing an increasingly important role in international relations and the world's economy, may certainly be considered a major achievement in the history of international law. The Convention accomodates a great variety of political, economic and strategic interests of States in their various uses of the sea and provides a firm basis for avoiding conflicts between these uses. Quoting Arvid Pardo, it is ‘truly a “package deal” containing innumerable bilateral and multilateral political compromises’.

The Board of Editors of this review has asked us to write an essay on the recent developments in the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary in the Netherlands. We have gladly accepted this invitation because an analysis of these developments enables us to outline one of the most fundamental trends in the Dutch legal system during the last few years. We believe that this outline may be of interest to Dutch and foreign readers alike.

The attainment of independence by many colonial peoples and territories all over the world through the process of decolonisation is perhaps one of the significant events in contemporary international law and relations. In the process of decolonisation, many distinct groups and territories under different autonomous administrations were subjected to forced unity under a single colonial administration. The grievances and expectations of these identified groups were not taken into consideration during the decolonisation process. As a result, decolonisation has created in its wake numerous multiracial States. These States are now confronted with the problem of national unity. Some of them have been able to preserve their national solidarity by defusing the separatist sentiment of dissident groups: some, however, have attempted this in vain.

The Protocol concerning the Interpretation by the EC Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968, on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in civil and commercial matters (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Interpretation) came into force on 1 September 1975 between the six original Member States of the EEC (i.e., Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany). On the basis of this Protocol the European Court of Justice can give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the above-mentioned Convention, of the Protocol Annex to this Convention and also of the Protocol on Interpretation itself.

It is sometimes argued that States who do not want to see the legal regime concerning nuclear weapons altered, will have, for precisely that reason, serious difficulties in ratifying the 1977 Protocol additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, especially Protocol I relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.

Two reports were before those present at the meeting, one by Professor Bos entitled Ongeschreven Volkenrecht in de Nederlandse Rechtspraak (Unwritten International Law in Dutch Judicial Decisions), the other by Professor Meijers entitled Rond het Internationaal Gewoonterecht in Nederland (About Customary International Law in the Netherlands). Both reports were produced as part of the Branch's series of Mededelingen (Information), No. 91 (April 1985), pp. 1–53 and pp. 55–158, respectively.