“Tell a man today to go and build a state,” Samuel Finer once stated, “and he will try to establish a definite and defensible boundary and compel those who live inside it to obey him.” While at best an oversimplification, Finer's insight illuminates an interesting aspect of state-society relations. Who is it that builds the state? How and where do they establish territorial boundaries, and how are those who live within that territory compelled to obey? Generally speaking, these are the questions that will be addressed here. Of more immediate concern is the fate of peoples located in regions where arbitrary land boundaries fall. Are they made loyal to the state through coercion or by their own compulsions? More importantly, how are their identities shaped by the efforts of the state to differentiate them from their compatriots on the other side of the borders? How is the shift from ethnic to national identities undertaken? A parallel elaboration of the national histories of the populations of Karelia and Moldova will shed light on these questions. The histories of each group are marked by a myriad of attempts to differentiate the identity of each ethnic community from their compatriots beyond the state's borders. The results of such overt, state-initiated efforts to differentiate borderland populations by encouraging a national identity at the expense of the ethnic, has ranged from the mundane to the tragic—from uneventful assimilation to persecution and even genocide. As an illustration of the range of possibilities and processes, I maintain that the tragedies of Karelia and Moldova are not exceptional, but rather are a consequence of their geographical straddling of arbitrary borders, and the need for the state to promote a distinctive national identity for these populations to differentiate them socially from their compatriots beyond the frontier.

The 15 October 2003 presidential election went down in the history of Azerbaijan as a turning point for three reasons. First, it provided a legitimacy for the transfer of power from ailing President Heydar Aliev to his son Ilham. Second, it demonstrated the unwillingness of the so-called “international community” to risk jeopardizing geostrategic and economic interests by unequivocally condemning blatant falsification of the ballot. And, third, by failing to condemn falsification of the ballot, the international community has signaled to other entrenched Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders that they have little to lose by following the Azeri example. However, the developments one month later in Georgia evidently worried them that the popular protests that forced President Shevardnadze from power could have adverse repercussions for incumbent leaders across the region.

We Greek political emigres celebrate the thirtieth historical anniversary of the GDR as our own holiday since we are vitally connected to this state from its first steps onwards. We feel better than any other foreigner the great joy and the pride of the people of the GDR since, from the foundation of its socialist state, we are marching side by side and since then we by way of our small contribution feel as co-constructors of this grand act. The thirtieth anniversary of the GDR coincides with the thirtieth anniversary of our political emigration to this hospitable country. Today we all remember the first years after our arrival and our caring reception in the GDR. (Speech of the day at the central celebration of the Greek political emigres in the GDR devoted to the thirtieth anniversary of the GDR and the thirtieth anniversary of the political emigration, Dresden, 29 September 1979).

One of the many controversies that survived the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina concerns the responsibility for several of the most deadly artillery attacks against civilians during the three-year siege of Sarajevo. Although indiscriminate artillery fire accounted for a small fraction of the total civilian deaths during the war, graphic video footage of the mass slaughter exercised a disproportionate effect on world public opinion and, therefore, on Western policymakers who felt constrained to “do something.” On at least three occasions, individual artillery explosions in the Bosnian capital prompted immediate international intervention that substantially determined the course and resolution of the conflict. The persistence of controversy is informed by a combination of factors, including the substantial consequences of the Western response, the inconclusiveness of some of the forensic data, and the conflicting statements of civilian survivors, journalists, spokesmen for the belligerents, and U.N. officials—all of whom have been accused of some degree of bias by one side or another. Nearly a decade later, testimony and forensic evidence presented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has shed new light on these incidents, presenting a more comprehensive and authoritative historical baseline account of the “mortar massacres,” much as it has for a plethora of criminal acts committed by all sides during the wars of Yugoslav succession. The Tribunal recently released documentation detailing some of the mortar attacks that occurred in the city of Sarajevo, including forensic reports compiled by the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which had not been previously made public. The bulk of this information is contained in the Tribunal Judgment and corresponding Dissenting Opinion of the former commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (SRK), Major General Stanislav Galić. Although the reliability of judicial testimony and other evidence is invariably limited by the abilities and resources of both the prosecution and defense, the trial transcript has cleared away at least some of the fog of war, making it somewhat less difficult to apportion responsibility for the disputed attacks. This article integrates the Galić transcript with earlier, wartime U.N. documentation, press releases, and media reports, supplemented by interviews conducted by the authors with military experts familiar with the characteristics of the weaponry employed by the besiegers. It also endeavors to place the most notorious incidents in the broader context presented by the multiplicity of artillery attacks that took place in urban areas across Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.

The Russian conquest of Siberia was not only a remarkable event in world history like the conquest of the New World by the Western European nations, but also a decisive step in Russia's empire-building. Through territorial enlargement the empire became multiethnic. This process resembled the expansion of the white settlers in North America. Like North America, Siberia represented an “open frontier.” Harsh nature and the encounter between the white settlers and the “savages” formed the identity of the frontier. From the perspective of modern cultural anthropology the frontier also shaped reflections on the self and the other. There existed, however, a decisive difference to the American frontier: Siberia became a meeting ground for Russian and Asian cultures. Whereas the American frontier—except in the encounter with Mexico—remained isolated, Russians early came in contact with Asian nations. From the early emergence of a modern state in Russia during the era of Enlightenment, Russia came into manifold contacts with “civilized” Asians (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans) and with “uncivilized” Asians, i.e. the tribes of Siberia. At the junction between Europe and Asia, Russia as a Eurasian empire was the sole country in Europe which was so near to Asia. It was therefore logical that Russia felt a kind of mission toward Asia and required the role of a mediator between Europe and Asia.

Thousands of books have been written on Yugoslavia's dissolution and the wars that followed in the 1990s. Most of them, however, deal with relations among the main ethno-nations of Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks (Muslims), Montenegrins, Macedonians and Albanians, and the effects on them of the dissolution and wars. Hungarians and Italians of Yugoslavia also suffered, and the wars affected their destiny; but these peoples have rarely been mentioned in the context of this history. It is the aim of this article to fill the gap.

Let us now have a closer look at the Kharkiv-Belgorod (potential) cross-border region as a case study of Ukrainian-Russian cross-border cooperation. Not only is the case of Kharkiv-Belgorod special because of the historical and cultural specificity of the region, which provides additional symbolic resources for its “reinvention” as a borderland (this will be discussed in the last section of the paper); it also represents an interesting combination of (remaining) cultural closeness and (growing) social and economic differences between the two bordering territories; significantly, these two administrative units became the initiators of the cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Russia and see themselves as pioneers whose experience can be used for the other parts of the border.

The trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague is a vehicle both for achieving justice and for pursuing historical truth. At this first-ever trial of a former head of state before an international tribunal, the same evidence serves two purposes: the quests for “truth” by those involved in the judicial process, on one side, and those engaged in academic historical interpretation, on the other. In each sphere, there are expectations to be satisfied. Those of the peoples of Serbia and the other former Yugoslav lands, international governmental and non-governmental actors, and observers are all different from each other; and they are all distinct from the viewpoint of future students of history. The two frameworks for truth are neither necessarily competitive nor complementary, and the tests of their validity may differ. But the raw material they use may be identical and the outcome of each may be parallel and consistent. And the two varieties of truth may reinforce one another in the quest to restore peace and security, to establish justice, and to compile a broadly accepted account of contentious, awful events.

The consensus among specialists on the politics of socialist Yugoslavia and supporters of Slobodan Milošević is that he rose personally as the leader due to a broad appeal of his political programme. According to one version of the political programme thesis, Milošević overwhelmed his initially more powerful opponents in the leadership of Serbia in 1987 by obtaining majority support in higher ranks of the party for his nationalist programme, namely the reduction of autonomy of Kosovo. The other version of the thesis says that he extended nationalist appeals to the population at large and established control over party and state organs in the largest republic of federal Yugoslavia largely by bringing pressure from society on the political elite. In any case, Milošević emerged from the leadership struggle as a very powerful leader and was thus able to purge his rivals from the regional leadership and embark upon the implementation of a nationalist programme. The supporters of Milošević have largely agreed with the specialists. Borisav Jović, his right-hand man, claimed, “the removal of bureaucratic leadership of Serbia, which had subserviently accepted the division of Serbia in three parts,” to be one of their main achievements.

As nations emerge from repressive regimes and societies begin to rebuild following violent intranational conflict, the notion of “facing the past” has become an increasingly important and pressing issue. How should new regimes address the crimes of their predecessors? How should societies deal with individuals who committed grave crimes against humanity? Who should be held responsible for what happened during the dark periods of violence and war?

It is well known that the idea and practice of cross-border cooperation have been developed in postwar Europe with the intention of overcoming the economic and social isolation of border regions and reconciling the hostilities between former enemies. But as a precondition for this process the new map of European borders had to be perceived as “final” and “just,” and as such it was legitimized on international and national levels. Moreover, it was the universal acceptance of the principle of the invariability of borders which made it possible for national governments to grant border regions more freedom in their contacts with the neighbours. The same applies in principle to the former socialist countries, where cross-border cooperation is supposed to help overcome the post-Cold-War division of Europe.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars developed an interest in Central Asia unmatched since the days of the “Great Game.” Scholarship initially focused on contemporary issues rather than historical analyses, since Central Asia was composed of obscure, newly independent, and strategically important states. With the opening of archives in the 1990s, however, historians began to pursue research on the identity and ideology of modern Central Asia, the legacy of the Soviet Union and Muslim modernism, and the challenges to nationalism and Islam. Drawing from postcolonial studies, these works have filled important voids and expanded our ability to analyze the multitude of factors that function in the conceptualization of the nation and the adoption of national ideas by the Central Asians themselves.