In the current situation of societal modernization and transformation of the political system of Ukraine, one of the most important problems facing the country is the formation of a system of local self-government that can act effectively. If this institution is not developed and strengthened, there can be no discussion of the establishment of democratic, social government, of the development of the rule of law, or of an expansion of the infrastructure of civil society.

In nineteenth-century Russia, the Caucasus was a large region composed of various territories and ethnic and religious groups. This region included Circassia, Mingrelia, Georgia, a part of Armenia, the ancient Media, Daghestan and the territories of Suanctians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, Karakalpaks and other mountaineer nations. During the nineteenth century, Persia, Russia and the Ottoman Empire wanted to establish their influence and power on the Caucasus. Due to this conflict, these powers, especially Russia with Persia and Russia with the Ottoman Empire, fought with each other.

In March 2002 the United States and Uzbekistan signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership. This document marked a qualitative break in the international relations of Uzbekistan and, to some degree, the United States' relations with Central Asia. Uzbekistan had sought closer relations with the United States since its independence in September 1991. But the course of U.S.-Uzbek relations was not smooth. Various obstacles hindered Tashkent's progress in making a positive impression on successive U.S. administrations in the last decade of the twentieth century. Tashkent's abysmal human rights record and the snail's pace of democratic reforms made the notion of closer ties with Uzbekistan unsavoury for U.S. policy makers. At the same time, Washington was more concerned with developments in Russia. Other former Soviet republics, especially the five Central Asian states, were relegated to the periphery of the U.S. strategic outlook. But the dramatic events of September 11 and the subsequent U.S.-led “war on terror” changed the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. The consequent development of ties between Tashkent and Washington was beyond the wildest dreams of Uzbek foreign policy makers. Virtually overnight, Uzbek leaders found themselves in a position to pursue an ambitious foreign policy without being slowed by domestic considerations.

We all know why the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) disintegrated and why the War of Yugoslav Succession (1991–1995) broke out. It was all because of Milošević/Tudjman/“the Slovenes”/communists/organized crime/Western states/the Vatican–Comintern conspiracy, who planned it all by himself/themselves in order to advance his own personal/Serbian/Slovenian/American/Vatican interests—your choice. Or again—it all happened because of local bad traditions/economic problems/structural issues/system illegitimacy/legitimate grievances/illegitimate grievances/the long shadow of the past. Or again—it really started in 1389/1463/1878/1918/1941/1986/1987/1989/1990/1991—your pick. Of course, we all know that both the breakup and the war were completely avoidable/inevitable, don't we? And best of all, we all know that the real villain(s) in this drama can only be Milošević/Tudjman/“the Serbs”/“the Slovenes”/“the Croats”/“the Muslims”/Germany/Balkan peoples generally/the Great Powers, who must be held (exclusively/jointly) responsible for most of the killing, though some of us also know that all parties were equally guilty. Well, maybe we all know what caused the Yugoslav troubles, but it seems that we “know” different things.

A few years ago, the New York Times featured an article on the ancient city of Antioch and its modern-day inhabitants. Having lost its ancient grandeur a long time ago, Antioch (Antakya) is described as today a place that “even most Turks consider … [to be] remote and undistinguished.” The article features interviews with two members of the same family: the 110-year-old Ali Baklaci and his 20-year-old grandson Hasan Negruz. An old-timer who lived through the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, subsequent French mandate and eventual incorporation into Turkey in 1939, Ali Baklaci is unequivocal regarding his identity. In a matter-of-fact manner, he declares, “We cannot forget our origins. We are Arab people.” The grandson, Hasan Negruz, however, has a different view. While Negruz is “one of many local youths who have taken advantage of Syria's offer of free education,” the article informs us, “the experience did not turn him into a pan-Arabist.” Instead, Negruz formulates his identity in a way that is remarkably different from his grandfather's: “I am an Arab who is also a citizen of Turkey, and that's fine. I like being Turkish because this country is more modern than the Arab countries.”

In 2001, the Republic of Macedonia—the former Yugoslavia's southernmost republic—was on the brink of civil war as the ethnic Albanian “National Liberation Army” (UÇK) was fighting Macedonian security forces and establishing rebel control over parts of the country. The armed conflict took more than 200 lives and displaced, at one time or another, more than 100,000 people. Civil war was prevented by an agreement between the four major ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties in the country, signed on August 11, 2001 in the town of Ohrid, thereafter usually referred to as the “Ohrid Agreement.” Far-reaching constitutional and legislative changes would re-construct the Republic of Macedonia as a multi-ethnic democracy. Since then, constitutional amendments and new laws have been passed, increasing the rights and power of minorities, especially the Albanian one. The new constitution combines the concept of civic citizenship with elements of de facto consociationalism, and satisfies the demand of the Albanian minority to help shape the destiny of their country using a collective voice.

The drastic changes in the Balkans in the 1990s and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in particular have resulted in a large number of publications attempting to explain the break-up of this country and the political developments in the Balkans. Some of these publications deal partly with the local Muslims who were engaged in the Balkan conflicts but, with some exceptions, they are focused mainly on recent developments, with less attention paid to the historical contexts in which the Muslim nationalist movements were shaped.

The argument to be presented here is that the Yugoslav meltdown involved three factors or sets of factors: first, the various underlying problems such as economic deterioration, political illegitimacy, and structural factors which drove the system toward crisis; second, the presence and persistence of inter-ethnic resentments deriving from irreconcilable national historical narratives in which Yugoslavia's constituent peoples cast each other as “the Enemy” (usually across the Serb–non-Serb cleavage) and specifically stoked by certain ambitious political figures; and third, the emergence, in Serbia, of a national “revitalization movement” led by Slobodan Milošević, nurturing grandiose territorial fantasies. I shall also argue that understanding the Serb national awakening of the late 1980s as a “revitalization movement” helps to understand the nature of what happened in Serbia, in particular how Serb nationalists could construe their initiatives as responses to some perceived threat coming from outside the community of Serbs, the phases in the development of that movement, and its role in impelling socialist Yugoslavia toward breakup and meltdown.

Intra-state regional differences are a central topic in the study of European and Eurasian politics. In Ukraine, regional differences have proven to be powerful predictors of mass attitudes and political behavior. But what does the “regional factor” in Ukrainian politics represent? Is it simply the result of compositional effects, or are the regional differences more than just a sum of other demographic factors correlated with geographic divisions? When analyzing regional divisions as an explanatory variable, what are the implications of employing different regional frameworks? In this article, we demonstrate how geographic divisions in the country hold up even when others factors—such as ethnicity and language use—are controlled for. As part of this inquiry, we compare the results of three competing regional frameworks for Ukraine: one with two regions, one with four regions and one with eight regions. While the eight-region framework is uncommon in studies of Ukraine, the decision to examine eight regions is supported by historical, economic and demographic arguments, as well as by the results of the statistical analyses presented in this article. Scholars who have focused on fewer regions in Ukraine may have underestimated the effects of regional differences and missed interesting stories about intra-state variation in Ukrainian attitudes and voting behavior. The results of this study carry important implications not only for the study of Ukraine but also for those interested in intra-state regional divisions across Europe and Eurasia.

This article is about national identity, political interest and the creation of international human rights regimes. Geographically, it is focused on Western Europe and the very recent process of establishing the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Both national identity and political interest are seen as important determinants of this process, defining its discourse and outcome. The relationship between the two is complex and recursive. They influence each other to an extent that warrants seeing them as mutually constitutive. On one hand, the social, political and economic projects elites engage in have to resonate positively with dearly held elements of national identity but have also the power to modify them. Being a psychological phenomenon, on the other hand, national identity is a dynamic concept that employs common historically defined memories, traditions and customs but is also subject to the influence of the political context within which it operates.

The post-1989 rise of ethnic conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc have led to the renewed salience of minority rights and their prominence in international relations. The 1990s witnessed a proliferation of legal instruments and offices dedicated to minority rights at the intergovernmental level (mainly within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe, but also the United Nations). After decades of arguing that rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic or religious minorities can be sufficiently ensured within the framework of universal human rights, attributed to individuals regardless of group membership, liberal political theorists (most notably Will Kymlicka) have started to advocate the need to supplement these traditional human rights with minority rights (meaning certain group-differentiated rights or “special status” for minority cultures) in order to ensure justice in multicultural states.

The mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, barely noticeable from the capital initially but highly visible at the centre political stage between 1986 and 1988, played an important part in the political struggles of the late socialist Yugoslavia. The prevailing view in the literature is that Kosovo Serbs were little more then passive recipients of the attitudes and actions of high officials and dissident intellectuals. The elite thesis says that Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals initiated and guided the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, aiming to undermine the party's approach to Yugoslavia's national question and to initiate reassessment of the official policy on Kosovo and Serb–Albanian relations. According to the thesis, Milošević then took over and orchestrated the action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs in order to make the case for the removal of Kosovo's autonomy. The intellectuals and Milošević have generally supported this interpretation, claiming their role in the events leading to the constitutional change to the disadvantage of Kosovo Albanians in 1989–1990.

Ethnic issues have a paramount impact on the security of Southeastern Europe. The most recent proof of that has been NATO's involvement in the conflict between the Serbian government and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Only NATO's involvement could reverse the highly destabilizing effect of the expulsion of over a million of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb army and paramilitary forces beyond Kosovo's borders.

Freedom from the Soviet empire created an opportunity for elites of each former Soviet Socialist Republic to “nationalize” their newly independent state. Most observers of contemporary Kazakh politics would agree that Kazakhstan has taken advantage of this historic opportunity, and can thus be classified as a nationalizing state. For Rogers Brubaker, a nationalizing state is perceived by its elites as a nation-state of and for a particular nation, but simultaneously as an “incomplete” or “unrealized” nation-state. To resolve this problem of incompleteness and to counteract perceived discrimination, Brubaker argues, “nationalizing elites urge and undertake action to promote the language, culture, demographic preponderance, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the core ethnocultural nation.” While the foundation of any Soviet successor state's nationalization program is a cluster of implemented formal policies that privilege the titular nation, these policies are often reinforced by informal practices, primarily discriminatory personnel practices, with the same function. Much has been written about Kazakhstan's nationalization strategy, and not surprisingly scholars rely on what they know about formal policies and informal practices to characterize that strategy. Little has been written, however, about the “Pugachev Rebellion” in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, and nothing has been written about the relationship between the official Kazakh reaction to what I call the “Pugachev incident,” and Kazakhstan's nationalization strategy in general. This article sorts out confusing events surrounding the Pugachev incident, and offers an interpretation of the official Kazakh reaction, which is best understood when situated in the broader context of Kazakh nationalization, to the incident.

Nursultan Nazarbayev has been President of Kazakhstan since that country became independent in 1991. Observers expect him to remain in his current position until 2013, and there are clear indications that he has started to prepare for his daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, to take over power after 2013. Analyses of Kazakhstan's foreign policy therefore both has had and will continue to have a close focus on the person of Nursultan Nazarbayev. In addition, this is all the more true because foreign policy in Kazakhstan to an extreme degree is a one-man affair. The present article discusses the interplay between personal and national interests as motivating factors in the foreign policy of Nazarbayev. More specifically, it investigates how these different types of motivation have influenced Nazarbayev's attempts to seek partnership with or distance from the USA and Russia.

The Eurasianist ideology is coming back on the Russian political and intellectual scene but also among the Turkic and Muslim elites in the Russian Federation and in Kazakhstan. The political, economic, social and identity difficulties of the transition invite Russians and other post-Soviet citizens to think about their relations with Europe and about the relevance of taking the West as a model. In this context of destabilization, Eurasianism proposes a geopolitical solution for the post-Soviet space. It presupposes the existence of a third continent between East and West, called “Eurasia,” and supports the idea of an organic unity of cultures born in this zone of symbiosis between Russian, Turkic, Muslim and even Chinese worlds. Neo-Eurasianism is the main ideology born among the different Russian conservative movements in the 1990s. Its theories are very little known, but the idea of an entity called Eurasia, regrouping the center of the old continent in which Russia would be “at home,” is more and more rife. It attracted many intellectuals and politicians in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Eurasianism was a way to explain the “disaster.”

This article examines the origins of the nonviolent resistance movement in Kosovo in the early 1990s, with the purpose of explaining the dynamics that led to the emergence of the so-called “parallel state” of Kosovo Albanians.

For nearly a century, the contrast between a cultural and a political form of nationalism has been upheld. In the early twentieth century, Fredrich Meinecke made a distinction between the political nation, or Staatsnation, based on a common political history and a shared constitution, and the cultural nation, Kulturnation, based on a shared cultural heritage. The most important distinction between the two is that while membership in the former is voluntary, membership in the cultural nation is a matter not of choice, but of common objective identity. Meinecke maintained that political nationalism derived from the spirit of 1789, i.e. from the idea of the self-determination and sovereignty of the nation. Cultural nationalism, in contrast, was a striving for national individuality, characteristic of anti-Enlightenment German thought.

The five Central Asian Muslim republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) count many Christian—Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian and Protestant—minorities. Unlike the religious communities in the Near and Middle East, most Christians in Central Asia consist of Slavic/European minorities (Russians, Germans, Poles, Armenians, Greeks, etc.), which came in the area during the Russian colonization in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. The main traditionally Christian nationalities living in Central Asia are Slavs and Germans. Today, Russians are mainly present in Kazakhstan (4.5 million), in Kyrgyzstan (600,000) and in Uzbekistan (at least half a million). There are only several tens of thousand Russians in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Like Russians, the number of the other Slavic nationalities has considerably decreased in Central Asia since the last three decades. There are 50,000 Ukrainians in Kyrgyzstan, 500,000 in Kazakhstan and about 100,000 in Uzbekistan. Byelorussians number 111,000 in Kazakhstan, and about 20,000 in Uzbekistan. According to the 1999 census, there are only 47,000 Poles in Kazakhstan. Today there are 353,000 Germans in Kazakhstan, 21,000 in Kyrgyzstan, and less than 8,000 in Uzbekistan, and their community is nearly nonexistent in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Other nationalities are also present in the Christian communities, though more modestly: among them, Koreans (about 160,000 in Uzbekistan, close to 100,000 in Kazakhstan in 1999), Greeks (10,000 in Uzbekistan), Tatars (248,000 in Kazakhstan) as well as Armenians (there remained 40,000 Armenians in Turkmenistan in 1995, with 42,000 in Uzbekistan today). Armenians have only one cult building in Samarkand. Moreover, after the fall of the USSR, more and more natives have been converted to Christianity: many—especially Protestant—missions, are now acting among Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, etc.