The development of the UK economy over the past four years has been marked by a very favourable and unexpected combination of steady growth and low inflation with prices growing on average at about the same rate as real income. In addition, claimant unemployment has fallen by over 800,000 since its peak at the beginning of 1993 and the current account deficit of the balance of payments has remained small and, somewhat erratically, declined.

One of the more troubling aspects of economic performance in the UK since the recession has been the persistence of high levels of public sector borrowing. Borrowing reached a peak of 7.1 per cent of GDP in 1993–94 and has since fallen to 4.5 per cent in 1995–96, with a further fall to 3½ per cent in prospect for this year. Continued borrowing at high levels has raised public sector indebtedness. On the Maastricht treaty definition, general government debt has risen from 41.9 per cent of GDP in 1992 to an estimated 54.2 per cent of GDP in 1995 so that much of the leeway below the 60 per cent reference level has been used up. The overall net worth of the public sector has declined from 28 per cent of GDP to 14 per cent over the same period.

There was a pause in growth in a number of European economies around the end of 1995, with weak domestic demand leading to moves to return stocks to more normal levels. This was exacerbated by bad weather in the first quarter of 1996. Rather pessimistic conclusions were widely drawn from these few months, but recent developments, especially in Germany have made us, and others, more optimistic about the short-term prospects. In the EU as a whole output rose by 0.49 per cent in the first quarter. Whilst output in France and Italy appears to have declined in the second quarter, in part due to statistical factors arising from the extra working day in the first quarter, growth remained at or above trend levels in the UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark, and recovered significantly in Germany. Industrial output in Germany rose continually in the six months to August, with manufacturing output at its highest level since 1992. This has begun to be reflected elsewhere in the EU, with industrial confidence rising for the first time in 19 months.

The transition to monetary union in Europe, which began formally when Stage 2 started in January 1993, is now well over half way to completion, according to the deadlines set in the Maastricht Treaty. The first decisions on Stage 3 are approaching fast, yet the prospects for its commencement are still very unclear, and many important practical and policy issues are still in doubt. This article provides an overview of the EMU debate, covering the latest developments on convergence (Section 1), the main institutional matters still to be resolved before Stage 3 begins (Section 2), the key problems awaiting policy-makers in Stage 3 (Section 3), and finally the controversy about the economic rationale of EMU (Section 4). It concludes that the UK Government was wise to defer a decision on whether to participate in Stage 3 until the implications became clearer, but that it would be unwise to abandon the option, which it presently risks doing, by design or default.

This article considers the role of fiscal policy within a European Monetary Union. There are two quite different issues. The first is the medium-term problem of deficits and debt. The Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria are usually seen as an imperfect response to the need to contain potentially ‘irresponsible’ fiscal authorities. It is argued here that they should be seen as reflecting a coordinated response to the generalised objective of fiscal consolidation and restraint in Europe: similar rules are likely to be a feature of Stage 3. There is a danger that governments are underestimating the difficulties of fiscal consolidation in a large area such as Europe. In practice, success would require a sustained rise in private sector investment and growth (or reduced private savings). The monetary coordination to go with generalised fiscal restraint appears to be lacking and we suggest a preemptive cut in interest rates. A more complete view of the causes of rising debt stocks in Europe is needed, and we suggest that a reframing of the problem of deficits and debt in terms of the needed (counterpart) private sector responses would be helpful in highlighting the coordination problems and avoiding adverse dynamic reactions. The medium-term problems interract unfavourably with the second set of issues-the need for fiscal policy to be used more actively for short-term stabilisation in a future common currency area. Fiscal offsets are an appropriate response to domestic demand shocks, but not to others, such as those requiring a change in the real exchange rate. Contrary to the ‘fiscal federalist’ position, such stabilisation need not involve centralisation. But there are serious difficulties. Without care, needed stabilisation will be prevented by the Maastricht criteria or the rules likely to follow them. And without coordination, independent stabilisation of common shocks will tend towards too little fiscal activism rather than too much.

The external shocks emphasised by the standard Optimum Currency Area approach (i.e. shocks to exports) have surprisingly little influence on employment and unemployment in most member countries of the European Union (EU) whether or not exchange rates are fixed. Short-run exchange-rate variability (but not the level of the exchange rate) seems to have a negative impact on employment.

It is often claimed that a high degree of international labour mobility is a condition for a monetary union. However, what matters for the Optimum Currency Area approach is the difference between inter-regional and inter-national labour mobil ity and not the level of the latter. Recent data show that international labour mobility in Europe is of the same order of magnitude as inter-regional labour mobility within member countries and that, the latter seems to be influenced by the housing market. EMU is thus unlikely to significantly worsen the problems that arise through the low mobility of labour in Europe.