• The world economy will grow by 3 per cent this year, and by 3.8 per cent in 2014.

• Growth has picked up slightly in advanced economies, while it has slowed in in key emerging market economies.

• Despite the clear improvements in some major economies, the risks to global growth are mostly on the downside.

• The economy will grow by 1.4 per cent this year, and by 2.0 per cent in 2014.

• Unemployment will fall gradually, to about 7.4 per cent by the middle of next year.

• Consumer price inflation will also fall gradually, to an average of 2.5 per cent per annum next year.

• We expect a slight decline in underlying public sector borrowing this year, to about 7 per cent of GDP, and about 6 per cent in the following year.

Unconventional resources of crude oil and natural gas – shale energy – increased significantly in the US in the early 2000s, triggered by the strong rise in the price of crude oil and technical advances in production. The US is a clear forerunner in the production of shale energy, due to its existing knowledge and infrastructure. The rest of the world is following, although negative environmental effects and other factors have obstructed the diffusion of new extraction methods. In Europe, Polish production is expected to start in the next few years, although environmental concerns are delaying the onset. The rise in the importance of shale energy will increase global oil and gas production markedly. The rising global supplies will improve global energy security in the long run and help to stabilise the large international price differences for natural gas.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, the Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.

We address basic questions about performance-related pay in the US. How widespread is it? What characteristics of employers and jobs are associated with it? What are recent trends in its incidence? What factors are responsible for these trends? Nearly two-fifths of hours worked in the US economy in 2013 were in jobs with performance-related pay, but this share has been declining. We consider several possible causes for this trend and find that they do not have much explanatory power. We do establish, however, that any potential explanation must also account for a long-term shift in the relative incidence of performance-related pay away from low-wage and toward high-wage jobs.

A major objective of the government during the Great Recession has been severely to restrict public sector real wage growth. One potential advantage of performance-related pay schemes is that they naturally offer greater wage responsiveness to fluctuations in the business cycle. Based on evidence from engineering and allied industries during the Great Depression we show that piecework wages exhibited more flexibility than their timework equivalents. We compare and contrast southern/midland engineering districts of Britain with northern districts. The former region was dominated by piece-rated workers and by modern sections of the industry, such as vehicle and aircraft manufacture. Time-rated work predominated in northern districts where older sections – for example, marine and textile engineering – were clustered‥

This paper revisits a literature on the links between unionisation and performance-related pay (PRP), which offers a disparate set of results. Part of the reason for this is the usual inability to distinguish between different types of PRP and the lack of rich panel data containing such measures. Analysis of panel data containing six separate PRP schemes reveals that union members are less likely to receive PRP in general and less likely to receive bonus payments, stock options, or profit sharing than non-members. Furthermore, profit sharing is negatively related to both union membership and coverage. However, union members or those covered by a union contract are more likely to be paid piece rates, providing further evidence that piece-rate pay differs from other forms of PRP.

This note responds to the recent critique by Goodridge, Haskel and Wallis (GHW) of our 2012 study of Britain's productivity puzzle. We show that a correct reworking of the latest official data on changes in labour composition overturns GHW's main criticism. We also question the strength of the empirical evidence offered by GHW in support of their alternative explanations of the productivity puzzle.

This note responds to a critique of our recent paper, “Can Intangible Investment Explain the UK Productivity Puzzle?”. In that critique Martin and Rowthorn (MR) present a re-working of data on labour composition which they feel refutes an element of our argument. In this response we argue that the data are still in support of our original position. Essentially, the puzzle is that measured labour productivity has been falling, but labour quality is rising, so, at least on this measure, changes in labour quality cannot explain falling productivity.