Democracy is unstable as a political system as long as it remains a political system and nothing more, instead of being, as it should be, not only a form of government but a type of society, and a manner of life which is in harmony with that type. To make it a type of society requires an advance along two lines. It involves, in the first place, the resolute elimination of all forms of special privilege which favour some groups and depress others, whether their source be differences of environment, of education, or of pecuniary income. It involves, in the second place, the conversion of economic power, now often an irresponsible tyrant, into a servant of society, working within clearly defined limits and accountable for its actions to a public authority.

R. H. Tawney, Equality, 1931.

Much of the media coverage in relation to populism has focused either on populist moments like the Brexit vote or on populist leaders such as Donald Trump or Boris Johnson. Meanwhile, the academic literature on populism is divided between two broad approaches. First, an emphasis in economics on policy (e.g. Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992) and, second, an accentuation in political science on ideology (e.g. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Both approaches capture important aspects, including the rejection of orthodox monetary and fiscal policy positions and a repudiation not only of established elites but also of pluralism and some of the key institutions on which the rule of law and democracy depend.

The deepening distrust in democracy has grown out of a decade of low growth and cuts to public spending, which in turn has consolidated wage decline while also fuelling a wider sense of economic insecurity. As poverty and inequality intensify, social mobility is in reverse and the social contract is under growing strain. Support for populists has recently receded, but the inability of democratic systems to address deep-seated problems sows the seeds for future populist revolts. Both left- and right-wing governments have responded to increasing anger and alienation with policies that exacerbate existing inequalities of income and wealth, combined with disparities of decision-making power and social status. These are ethical as much as economic questions and they demand a much more robust response than technocratic administration. Otherwise, ethical social democracy and communitarian conservatism will fail to defeat the authoritarianism of both radical-right national populists and the tech-utopianism of far-left populists.

This article argues that it is a waste of time seeking to treat populists as examples of homo economicus when seeking to persuade them that the conspiracy theories to which they subscribe are big lies. But it does not follow that homo economicus is worthless in this context. He has a role in explaining the evolution of the social norms whose violation is the root cause of the rise of populist movements. Such an approach requires a willingness to entertain both proximate and ultimate explanations of human behaviour simultaneously.

Populist responses to matters of social concern are considered in a framework like that of Acemoglu and Robinson’s ‘narrow corridor’ that supports liberty and justice. We discuss the risk that such responses could result in a country being pushed out of this narrow corridor—and, if so, with what long-run consequences. We conclude that a political system of ‘checks and balances’ can play a key role in keeping the society within the narrow corridor; but it is incumbent on the existing political system to confront the issues of populist concern so as to come up with creative solutions.

We present two models that shed light on two issues in the political economy of populism: incumbents who refuse to give up office following a democratic election; and politicians gambling with major policy shifts when their consequences are uncertain. In the democratic transition of power, common knowledge about the veracity of the election process enables citizens to threaten incumbents with protests if they attempt to retain their seats in power. If doubt over electoral integrity prevails, office-seeking incumbents sometimes reject electoral rules. In considering policy gambles, politicians supply policy shifts in response to voters and elites vying for a greater share of economic output. When the mapping from policy to outcomes is uncertain, voters opt for policy gambles, even though these are detrimental to their ex ante welfare, to redress the division of output. These models underscore the importance of institutions that address the source of each coordination failure.

How stable are democracies? Building on Ghosal and Proto (2009, Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1078–1089), the conditions under which democracies are stable are analyzed. How these conditions relate to the threat of the rise of right wing populism poses to democracies is discussed.

Populism is a paradoxical phenomenon that resists easy categorisation because it both rejects and intensifies certain elements of technocracy. Populist politics is at once a backlash against liberal-technocratic ideology and policy and an attempted corrective of some of its worst excesses, such as increasing inequality or pressures on wages. Despite deep differences, both rest on a binary logic that conceals alternatives to the convergence around variants of techno-populism defended by either ‘corporate populists’ or ‘insurgent populists’. One alternative is a public policy programme focused on the building of an economic democracy with more democratic workplaces and a greater emphasis on the dignity of decent jobs, besides policies to reduce regional disparities and foster shared prosperity. But policies alone cannot fully address the deep-seated grievances fuelling the support for populists. Fundamental institutional reform is needed to devolve power and wealth to people and the places where they live and work.