The year of the Risorgimento, 1860, is associated with the ‘Garibaldi moment’, a time when the image of the radical revolutionary appeared to be ‘depoliticised’ in Britain. While recognising such a phenomenon, this article considers whether regional pockets escaped such a trend, analysing the case-study of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, where strong links between Garibaldi and local radicals coloured public perceptions of the Italian hero. By scrutinising the unfolding of the ‘Garibaldi moment’ in this context a complex picture emerges, showing that, far from being a unifying ‘depoliticised’ figure, Garibaldi was a source of divisions within Newcastle society. Crucial in this division was George Crawshay's challenge to the recruitment of a British Legion to follow Garibaldi. By looking at the provincial press and examining the local reception of a variety of entertainments, it is argued that, while political engagement drove the enthusiasm of radical audiences, fashionable shows–devoid of political content–could not rely on Newcastle ‘Garibaldimania’.

Gramsci's work continues to enjoy popularity amongst academics and activists. There is nonetheless a real question about the relevance of his central political ideas for the twenty-first century. This paper defends the thesis that Gramsci's humanism is part of a long tradition of political thought which dates back to Machiavelli, and that although this national-popular humanism is now outdated for reasons which are suggested in the writings and films of Pier Paolo Pasolini, there is also a sociological component to Gramsci's theorising that retains resonance today.

Soon after the Second World War and the signing of the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy was faced with the traumatic loss of its African colonial Empire, an Empire whose establishment had been one of the main objectives of the Fascist regime's foreign policy. This article analyses Anglo-Italian relations in the Somalian context, highlighting the contributions made by Fascism and by the anti-Italian policies of British troops to the tensions that were to lead to the tragic events of January 1948. Attention is focused on the diplomatic mission carried out by Umberto Zanotti Bianco, President of the Italian Red Cross, an important figure in Italian Liberalism. Zanotti Bianco was conscious of the need for Italy to rejoin the ‘club’ of democratic powers and, in accordance with the diplomatic strategy of Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza, he sought to reopen dialogue between Britain and Italy. The dispute between Italy and Britain brought about by the Mogadishu events and, more generally, by the Italian presence in Africa was soon brought to a close, due both to Zanotti Bianco's shrewd strategy and to the clear need for the Western Allies to strengthen De Gasperi's government on the eve of the decisive April 1948 elections.

The Italian national elections of 18 April 1948 handed power to the Christian Democratic Party. The Italian Communist Party had, however, gained significant municipal control in the local elections of 1946. For the Communists, the local level became the testing ground where administrative practices, political initiatives, social alliances and economic projects were developed. The leaders and the intellectuals worked to outline the cultural framework of a political project which could challenge national politics from town councils. Meanwhile, with a view to making gains in the local elections of 1951–1952, propaganda was used in an attempt to diffuse and proselytise municipal political programmes among different social classes in a divided socioeconomic environment.

This article analyses, adopting the well-known approach of Katz and Mair, the issue of organizational change within Italian political parties since 1990. In addition to an account of trends in membership, local units, finances, staff, and of changes in party statutes, the article aims at testing the widespread view in the literature that organizational resources–hence power–are becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of party and/or parliamentary leaders, and correspondingly that the territorial presence of parties is declining. The analysis of the change over time of Katz and Mair's party organisational ‘faces’ leads to the confirmation, to a large extent, of the overall hypothesis of a decline of the party at ground level, and a concentration of party resources in the central office, and above all in the party in public office.

Italian security policy literature reveals, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, two distinct strains of analysis. One set of explanations, rooted in realist theory, views Italian foreign policy behaviour by reference to its power position. A second set of arguments, rooted in liberalism, assumes that policy-makers are ultimately influenced by domestic institutional factors in deciding foreign policy issues. The purpose of this article is to offer a theoretical contribution to the ongoing debate on continuity and change in Italian foreign policy. While neorealist and liberal theories have been widely used to explain the development of Italian international behaviour, neither approach has yet provided a full explanation of Italian security policy since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to these theories, it is argued that Italy has built its foreign policy on the basis of cultural considerations involving conflicting strategies of action.