Pursued over the last two years of the Pacific war, the Free French effort
to organize and direct an effective resistance to the Japanese occupation of
Indo-China ended in military failure. Characterized by administrative
complexity, inadequate supplies and attenuated communications, Gaullist
insurgency was marred by Free France's de facto reliance upon Admiral
Louis Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC). While the
re-conquest of Malaya and Burma remained incomplete, British backing for
a resistance network in Indo-China was bound to be limited. And as British
interest in the final re-conquest of their own territories climaxed in the
spring and summer of 1945, so material provision for the French in
Indo-China inevitably declined. Although Mountbatten consistently supported
his Free French protégés, Churchill, in particular, was
reluctant to take issue with his American allies. Neither the US government
nor American commanders in China and the Pacific supported Free French
methods and objectives. By 1945, the American Office of Strategic Services
(OSS), dedicated to supporting guerrilla warfare and resistance
organization, and the Office of War Information (OWI), which disseminated
US propaganda, were developing independent contacts inside northern
Indo-China. As a result, the OSS increasingly endorsed the one truly
effective resistance movement: Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh coalition.