This paper studies cycles of nationalization and privatization in resource-rich economies. It starts with a synthesis of available evidence on the drivers and consequences of privatization and nationalization. Then it develops a dynamic model of the choice between private and national regimes for the ownership of natural resources. The choice is driven by a basic equality-efficiency trade-off: national ownership results in more redistribution of income and more equality but undermines incentives for effort. We discuss how the resolution of the trade-off depends on external variables—such as the commodity price—and domestic ones—such as the tax system. The model thus identifies the determinants of the observed cycles of privatization and nationalization and is consistent with key stylized facts.

This paper investigates whether temporary agency employment complements or substitutes for regular employment. We use unique administrative data that provide information on the overall size of the German market for temporary agency workers for the period 1991–2010. To take into account the interaction between the two employment forms, we identify a SVAR model with correlated innovations by volatility regimes. We find that a positive shock to temporary agency employment increases overall employment, but also leads to substitution for regular jobs.

This paper deals with macroeconomic aspects of widespread substance abuse with a reference to illicit drugs as an example. Substance abuse impedes the productivity of the labor force and reduces economic growth. Workers are either nonusers and therefore fully productive, a number of whom are employed by the government in drug-control activities, or users who are only partially productive. Efficient management of the nation's portfolio of workers involves eradicating drug use when initial user numbers are lower than a critical level, but allows user numbers to rise to, and be accommodated at, a stationary level when initial user numbers exceed a critical level.

In this paper we explore how income inequality affects growth in a dynastic family model with bequests (physical capital) and investment in human capital for children. For tractability, we abstract from factor markets and focus on household production, which is prevalent in developing countries. We explore a joint distribution of bequests and human capital and track the evolution of income distribution across generations. We show that initial inequality has a positive indirect effect on average output growth by lowering the ratio of physical to human capital, besides its standard negative direct effect. If education is mainly privately (publicly) provided, then income inequality retards (promotes) growth outside the balanced growth path. On the balanced growth path, inequality always hinders growth.

Is there an economic justification for why technical change is by assumption labor-augmenting in dynamic macroeconomics? The literature on the endogenous choice of capital- and labor-augmenting technical change finds that technical change is purely labor-augmenting in steady state. The present paper shows that this finding is mainly an artifact of the underlying mathematical models. To make this point, Uzawa's steady-state growth theorem is generalized to a neoclassical economy that, besides consumption and capital accumulation, uses current output to create technical progress or to manufacture intermediates. The generalized steady-state growth theorem is shown to encompass four models of endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change and the typical model of the induced innovations literature of the 1960s.

Based on a behavioral stock-flow housing market model in which the expectation formation behavior of boundedly rational and heterogeneous investors may generate endogenous boom-bust cycles, we explore whether central banks can stabilize housing markets via the interest rate. Using a mix of analytical and numerical tools, we find that the ability of central banks to tame housing markets by increasing the base (target) interest rate, thereby softening the demand pressure on house prices, is rather limited. However, central banks can greatly improve the stability of housing markets by dynamically adjusting the interest rate with respect to mispricing in the housing market.

This paper studies an economy with ex post heterogeneity and nominal bonds in a model à la Lagos and Wright (2005). It is shown that a strictly positive interest rate is a sufficient condition for the allocation with nominal bonds to be welfare-improving. This result comes from protection against the inflation tax.

This paper studies the growth and fiscal policy implications of the assumption that public policy generates an externality in the individual rate of time preference through the aggregate public capital stock. We examine the competitive equilibrium properties and we solve for endogenous growth–maximizing fiscal policy. We investigate the behavior of the government size and the growth rate to the sensitivity of time preference to public capital and the magnitude of public capital externality on production. We find that the Barro taxation rule [Barro, Robert J., Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), 103–125], which states that the elasticity of public capital in the production function should equal the government size, is suboptimal. We show that the government does not necessarily have to increase income taxation following a rise in public capital intensity because of the externality of public capital on time preference and, in turn, on growth and the tax base of the economy.

In this progress report, we first indicate the origins and early development of the Marshallian Macroeconomic Model and briefly review some of our past empirical forecasting experiments with the model. Then we present recently developed one-sector, two-sector and n-sector models of an economy that can be employed to explain past experience, predict future outcomes, and analyze policy problems. The results of simulation experiments with various versions of the model are provided to illustrate some of its dynamic properties that include “chaotic” features. Last, we present comments on planned future work with the model.

This paper investigates the impact of institutions on the dollarization of the domestic banking system using a unique policy experiment: the process of accession of countries to the European Union (EU). Using a dynamic factor model, we decompose fluctuations in financial dollarization for 24 transition economies into a common factor, an EU factor, a non-EU factor, and country-specific factors. The EU factor, which proxies for improvements in institutions under the set criteria for eventual membership, reveals the importance of institutions for the extent of financial dollarization over time. The results also indicate the asymmetric impact of improved institutions on the domestic bank's balance sheets by inducing higher loan dollarization and lower deposit dollarization. The relative importance of the EU factor to the financial dollarization of a country is associated to the degree of comovement of its business cycle with that of the EU.

This paper evaluates the optimality of a temporary worker permit policy from the point of view of the host country by using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, calibrated with data from the United States and Mexico. In the model, the decision to migrate and the corresponding decision to return are endogenous and take place within families that are heterogeneous in terms of human capital. After finding a migrant's optimal migration duration and the resulting shrinkage in the wage gap and change in interest rates, the paper derives the restriction on migrants' stay that maximizes natives' utility. It also derives the migrant length of stay that would pass a majority vote. When migration duration is restricted, the fraction of the native population made better off is maximized with a permit length of four years.

This paper finds strong evidence of a positive relationship between currency risk premia and real exchange rate swings, significant at the 1% if not 0.1% level, for three US$ exchange rate samples. The risk premia are measured using survey data on traders' exchange rate forecasts. This circumvents the need for an auxiliary hypothesis of rationality and enables more direct focus on risk behavior. The analysis is conducted using the I(2) cointegrated VAR, which allows for time-varying trends in the variables. Evidence of persistent changes is found for interest rates, prices, and nominal and real exchange rates. Interest rate shocks appear to drive the system, whereas expectations are correcting only in the longer run.

This paper is helpful for understanding interactive-agent economies. It presents a user-friendly framework for exploring the implications of economic interaction, and demonstrates its wide applicability. Agents repeatedly face binary choices and receive i.i.d. shocks; payoffs depend upon one's own action and shocks, as well as upon the actions of a subset of other agents. Simulations explore how properties change as the number of agents, the number of neighbors, and the degree of interaction change. Key results in this framework include the following: The law of large numbers can readily be postponed or defeated, stationarity and ergodicity are trivial to deduce, any equilibrium distribution may be attained in “globally interactive” economies, continuous- and discrete-time analogues generally behave very similarly, dynamics can be sensitive to details of the interaction structure (implying that popular mean-field approximations are not always appropriate), and substantial persistence is typical.

This paper aims at characterizing the debt-consolidation processes put forward by some European countries in order to assess welfare and, in particular, the inequality effects involved. For this purpose, we built a general equilibrium heterogeneous-agent model capable of exploring the relationship between fiscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution of income and wealth. Using a utilitarian welfare criterion, results show that different strategies yield different outcomes. Despite the positive welfare gains observed, transition costs affect all episodes and are determinant in sorting among the welfare-enhancing strategies. Our results confirm the superiority of adjustments partially based on the reduction of unproductive expenditures over those based on tax raises or on the reduction of social transfer. Welfare is further enhanced when consolidation strategies involve an equilibrated mix between expenditure and transfer cuts and tax increases, because debt consolidation processes mostly or exclusively based on social transfers cuts have a strong negative effect on welfare inequality. Moreover, shock volatility and persistency (also shaping inequality) help explain different results across countries: under high income inequality, consolidation processes are expected to yield smaller inequality effects on welfare, whereas a worse consumption–leisure trade-off may arise.

We generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy, static or dynamic, can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other players' policies are ineffective with respect to the dynamic target variables shared with that player. Or no Nash Feedback Equilibrium can exist, unless they all share target values for those variables. We extend those results to the case in which there are also nondynamic targets, to show that policy effectiveness (a Nash equilibrium) can continue to exist if some players satisfy the Golden Rule but target values differ between players in their nondynamic targets. We demonstrate the practical importance of these results by showing how policy effectiveness (a policy equilibrium) can appear or disappear with small variations in the expectations process or policy rule in a widely used model of monetary policy with the possibility of target independence.

Under certain interpretations of its coefficients, a specified econometric model is an exact representation of the “true” model, defining the “objective” probability distribution. This note enumerates these interpretations. In the absence of the conditions implied by these interpretations, the econometric model is misspecified. The note shows that model misspecifications prevent the satisfaction of a necessary and sufficient condition for individual expectations to be rational in Muth's sense. Whereas restrictive forms of econometric models can give very inaccurate predictions, this note describes the conditions under which the predictions generated from time-varying coefficient models coincide with the predictions generated from the relevant economic theory.

Fixed search costs, that is, costs that do not vary with search duration, can amplify the cyclical volatility of the labor market. To assess the size of fixed costs, we analyze the relation between search costs and search duration using German establishment data. An instrumental variable estimation shows no relation between search duration and search costs. We conclude that search costs are mainly fixed costs. Furthermore, we show that a search and matching model, calibrated for Germany with fixed costs close to 75%, can generate labor market volatility that is consistent with the data.

This paper builds a small-open-economy nonscale-growth model with negative population growth and investigates the relationship between trade patterns and per capita consumption growth. Under free trade, if the population growth rate is negative and its absolute value is small, the home country becomes an agricultural country. Then the long-run growth rate of per capita consumption is positive and depends on the world population growth rate. On the other hand, if the population growth rate is negative and its absolute value is large, the home country becomes a manufacturing country. Then the long-run growth rate of per capita consumption is positive and depends on both the home country and the world population growth rates. Moreover, the home country is better off under free trade than under autarky in terms of per capita consumption growth irrespective of whether the population growth is positive or negative.

The paper presents an agent-based model reproducing a stylized credit network that evolves endogenously through the individual choices of firms and banks. We introduce in this framework a financial stability authority in order to test the effects of different prudential policy measures designed to improve the resilience of the economic system. Simulations show that a combination of micro- and macroprudential policies reduces systemic risk but at the cost of increasing banks’ capital volatility. Moreover, the agent-based methodology allows us to implement an alternative meso regulatory framework that takes into consideration the connections between firms and banks. This policy targets only the more connected banks, increasing their capital requirement in order to reduce the diffusion of local shocks. Our results support the idea that the mesoprudential policy is able to reduce systemic risk without affecting the stability of banks’ capital structure.

This paper studies stock price comovements in two key regions [the United States and Europe, which is represented by three major European developed countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom)]. Our paper uses recent high-frequency data (HFD) and investigates price comovements in the context of “normal times” and crisis periods. To this end, we applied a non-Gaussian Asymmetrical Dynamic Conditional Correlation (ADCC)-GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model and the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) approach. This choice has three advantages: (i) With the development of high-frequency trading (HFT), it is more appropriate to use HFD to test price linkages for overlapping and nonoverlapping data. (ii) The ADCC-GARCH model captures further asymmetry in price comovements. (iii) The use of the MES enables to measure systemic risk contributions around the distribution tails. Accordingly, we offer two interesting findings. First, while the hypothesis of asymmetrical and time-varying stock return linkages is not rejected, the MES approach indicates that both European and US indices make a considerable contribution to each other's systemic risk, with significant input from Frankfurt to the French and US markets, especially following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Second, we show that the propagation of systemic risk is higher during the crisis period and overlapping trading hours than during nonoverlapping hours. Thus, the MES test is recommended as an indicator to help monitor market exposure to systemic risk and to gauge expected losses for other markets.