At the heart of the constitutional theory of money is the argument that money is central to governance. This article explores the ways in which the core mechanism of the publicly undergirded monetary system, involving the incentivization and disciplining of private investors in the money creation process, creates its ‘fiscal value’ and generates both power struggles and possible instability in the unit of account. This twin dynamic of power and instability is intrinsic to a longue durée analysis of money. It is argued that since the current jural relations allocate money and power in particular ways, the basis is created for potential future political challenges to the status quo ante, thereby creating instability. Further, the article emphasizes the centrality of the indeterminacy criterion which is at the core of the critical legal studies (CLS) framework, and its intimate connection to Keynes's notion of uncertainty. The indeterminacy/uncertainty nexus is used to explore how currency stability is determined or undermined by expectations, power struggles, tax contestations, and broader policy frameworks. Finally, the article relates this monetary theory to the literature on state-led industrialization and shows how such a constitutional money theory of industrialization is an alternative to the New Institutionalist perspective which emphasizes the centrality of ‘clear and well-defined’ property and contracts in order to create an ‘efficient’ economy.

The workload of the International Court of Justice in recent years has increasingly featured cases of disputes classified either as ‘territorial disputes’ or as ‘boundary disputes’, or otherwise involving the Court in considerations of the law relating to acquisition or transmission of territory, or to the creation, location and effect of territorial frontiers. The present survey analyzes the contributions to international law of the Court's decisions in these recent cases. Matters examined include the significance of the terms ‘boundary dispute’ or ‘territorial dispute’; the definition of what constitutes sovereign territory; titles and effectivités as bases for territorial claims; decolonization and the uti possidetis juris; use of natural features or of straight lines as boundaries; and relations across a frontier once established.

Between 1935 and 1937, the International Missionary Council conducted the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment. The objective was to produce silent educational films and screen them to ‘native’ people via mobile cinemas in the British territories in East and Central Africa. Embracing the principle of ‘indirect rule’, and its role in training colonial subjects in economic self-sufficiency and political self-rule, as then advocated by leading colonial figures and the League of Nations, the films strived to capture ‘the native point of view’ through an ‘ethnographic sensitivity’ towards local cultures, concerns and needs. Hoping to educate the natives from ‘within’, they used local actors, familiar locations and pedagogical instructions that were believed to meet the target audience's cognitive capacity. Though in many respects unsuccessful, the experiment cemented the use of cinema in the late colonial project and, more importantly, embodied the clear move at the time towards a more dynamic and disaggregated, yet perhaps never fully post-imperial, international order. I argue in this article that the Bantu Experiment is thus a telling instance through which to examine both the mobility and multiplicity of late imperial locations and the system of modern international administration that emerged during the interwar period. I suggest that this mobility and multiplicity continue to characterize the workings of today's international order, indicating the key role that ‘indirect rule’, as a silent principle of international law, still plays in its functioning today.

The genesis of the jus cogens doctrine in international law has long been associated with a turn to a more value-laden international law after the Second World War promoted by British rapporteurs in the International Law Commission. This article builds on this narrative but adds two seemingly contradictory story lines. In the 1920s and 1930s German-speaking international legal scholars like Alfred Verdross developed the concept as a tool to renounce the disliked Paris Peace Treaties in the context of increasingly aggressive German revision policies. Furthermore, after 1945 Soviet thinkers of the Khrushchev era used jus cogens to criticize Western economic and military integration, while newly independent states regarded the concept as a promising vehicle for distancing themselves from the traditional Western international legal notions in the era of decolonization. Hence, instead of embracing a progress narrative, a dark side account, or a contributionist reading of the history of international law, this article highlights the multifaceted origins of the jus cogens doctrine.

This article argues that the South West Africa Cases were brought to an ignominious end because the cases were about self-determination as much as they were about apartheid. For liberals like Judge Sir Percy Spender, the President of the Court, political systems based on majority rule looked suspiciously like authoritarian regimes modelled on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is submitted that, given the controversy surrounding self-determination in international law, Sir Percy wanted to avoid addressing the merits of the cases. Self-determination was the proverbial ‘elephant in the court room’ that Sir Percy wanted to avoid at all costs. This article builds upon earlier archival research on the South West Africa Cases by taking a closer look at Sir Percy's role in the cases and his views on self-determination. It is argued that what ‘killed’ the cases was Sir Percy's belief that Ethiopia and Liberia were seeking to ‘legalize’ self-determination with a view to further uniting the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations with the Soviet Union against the West.

It is by now uncontroversial that states may owe human rights obligations to individuals outside their territory. The debate about extraterritoriality has, so far, focused on the concept and interpretation of jurisdiction. The role of territory in general, and title in particular, in the conceptual landscape has received less attention in comparison. This article aims to fill this gap by showing that (a) title to territory continues to shape interpretations of jurisdiction, and (b) that this should be avoided. To this end, the article first defines jurisdiction in international human rights law and title to territory. Jurisdiction is best understood as a threshold criterion that triggers human rights obligations of states towards particular individuals. Title to territory, on the other hand, is a set of claims to territory designed to uphold minimal stability. The article then introduces three models – the approximation model, the differentiation model, and the separation model – of the relationship between title to territory and jurisdiction in international human rights law and evaluates them in light of their fit with the relational nature of human rights. The result is that the approximation and differentiation models – that is, those that maintain title's influence on the interpretation of jurisdiction in various degrees – fail the success criterion, while the separation model satisfies it.

The thematic horizon within which this article takes place is the colonial expansion of the Western powers in China between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Focusing on the foundation of the British, French and American concessions in Tianjin, it aims to reconstruct the Western strategies of colonial governance and the role played by law in the process of production of a new social space. Opened as a treaty port in 1860, Tianjin is the only Chinese city where up to nine foreign concessions coexisted, becoming a complex, hybrid space (in)between East and West, defined by social practices, symbolic representations, and legal categories, which does not coincide simply with the area defined by the entity as a state, nation, or city.

This article sketches the contours of a postcolonial genealogy of international organizations law. Contrary to conventional accounts, which remain strongly Eurocentric, the article claims that international organizations law did not emerge until the closing stages of the Second World War, and that its evolution was strongly influenced by the accelerating processes of decolonization that accompanied its birth. More specifically, the article argues that the emergence of international organizations law was spurred by a series of perceived problems regarding the adequacy of the international legal system in the aftermath of the end of formal colonial rule, in which the relations of power constructed through colonialism remained profoundly implicated. The politics of decolonization thus shaped the practice of international organizations, provided the catalyst for many of the foundational cases in international organizations law, and motivated much of its early doctrinal scholarship. Moreover, the article argues that the functionalist logic of international organizations law is deeply embedded in a postcolonial imaginary which, by supporting the division of the world into formally equivalent nation-states, ostensibly cuts against the hegemonic territorialism of colonial governance.

Under contemporary international law, war crimes are conceived as particularly serious violations of the laws of armed conflict. Mere participation of rank-and-file soldiers in an unjust or unlawful war is generally not considered to warrant legal punishment. This position is based on the principle of equality between belligerents. During the last 20 years, this principle has been challenged by the so-called revisionist position in just war theory, as well as by certain scholars in international law. According to them, unjust or unlawful participants in armed conflict perpetrate serious wrongs. This article argues that their conduct is not only morally wrongful, but also that it should be criminalized under certain circumstances. On the basis of empirical research on cognitive biases, and on one of the leading accounts of legitimate authority in political philosophy, it argues that participation in war warrants criminalization only when the war is knowingly or manifestly unlawful. Furthermore, it claims that this position is not only sound at the level of deep moral principles, but that in fact it provides a persuasive reinterpretation of existing international law.

This article considers the ways in which concerns about economic equalities, both among and within countries, were taken up in human rights debates of the 1970s and how concerns about economic inequalities impacted on discussions about the possibilities, objectives and conceptions of rights. It shows how scholars and advocates from the global South, concerned about the production of underdevelopment and unequal accumulation, advocated a more ‘structural approach’ to human rights during this period that argued that a just international order was necessary for the realization of rights. The article first considers Third World demands for a New International Economic Order to address inequalities among countries, as well as the potentially conflicting focus on inequalities within countries by the World Bank and its subsequent promotion of a ‘basic needs’ approach to development. Thereafter, it considers how these different approaches to economic inequality were taken up in and influenced human rights debates and frameworks of this period.

Before 1492, European feudal practices racialized subjects in order to dispossess, enslave and colonize them. Enslavement of different peoples was a centuries old custom authorized by the law of nations and fundamental to the economies of empire. Manumission, though exceptional, helped to sustain slavery because it created an expectation of freedom, despite the fact that the freed received punitive consequences. In the sixteenth century, as European empires searched for cheaper and more abundant sources of labour with which to exploit their colonies, the Atlantic slave trade grew exponentially as slaves became equated with racialized subjects.

This article presents the case of Haiti as an example of continued imperial practices sustained by racial capitalism and the law of nations. In 1789, half a million slaves overthrew their French masters from the colony of Saint Domingue. After decades of defeating recolonization efforts and the loss of almost half their population and resources, Haitian leaders believed their declared independence of 1804 was insufficient, so in 1825 they reluctantly accepted recognition by France while being forced to pay an onerous indemnity debt. Though Haiti was manumitted through the promise of a debt payment, at the same time the new state was re-enslaved as France's commercial colony. The indemnity debt had consequences for Haiti well into the current century, as today Haiti is one of the poorest and most dependent nations in the world.

This article argues that understanding the role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) to be that of a guardian of discourse would respect legitimate disagreement among pluralist democracies, while enabling the Court to safeguard human rights in a meaningful and effective way.

From the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) and the Court's jurisprudence, three basic standards of review can be distilled: First, wherever the Convention's requirements are sufficiently concrete, the Court holds contracting states to well-established standards. Second, when applying broad, abstract and relative Convention rights, the Court safeguards the practical rationality of a democratic decision-making discourse under the rule of law – a substantive review standard that is influenced by procedural factors. Third, the Court also needs to check the facts underlying the case, in order to render its control effective.

By setting ‘soft’ precedent in the form of factors that guide future decision-making without entirely prejudging it, and by taking into account second-order reasons concerning its legitimacy to intervene, the Court is acting as a second player in states’ decision-making discourse. Its task is not to replace the institutions originally responsible for taking the decision, but to ensure that they conform to their own role.

Hitherto, the ‘African part’ of the history of international law has often been limited to the (critical engagement with) ‘the acquisition of Africa’ since the 1880s and questions of ‘state succession’ and international borders following independence starting in the 1950s. In this historical narrative, the dominance of colonialism is evident. It seems that ‘Africa’ as a narrative concept in international legal history remains tied to abstract contrasts such as ‘foreign domination’ versus ‘independence’, or ‘exploitation’ versus ‘development’. However, if twenty-first century writings about ‘international law in Africa’ and its histories remain shaped by this perspective, historians may lose sight of issues, questions, or ideas formed in historical Africa that do not fit into this preconceived dichotomous matrix. After discussing methodological challenges, this article asks for other ‘contacts’, other arenas of ‘internationality’ and international law in Africa’s pre-colonial past. These contacts reach back very far in history. Three arenas are mentioned: the Red Sea area and Ethiopian-Arab relations; the Indian Ocean rim; and finally, the case of nineteenth-century Ethiopia.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the question of state responsibility for injuries done by rebels to foreign nationals, or ‘aliens’, in its territory became an important one for international law. Initially, it was common for disputes regarding such responsibility to be resolved through diplomacy, backed up, not infrequently, by the threat and even the use of force. Later it became a matter which also led increasingly to arbitration; beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century a growing number of arbitral tribunals dealt with claims against states for injuries done to aliens by rebels. From the first, established in 1839, there followed a series of 40 mixed claims commissions which touched on state responsibility for rebels. Nearly three-quarters of these arbitrations involved a Western state against one of the new Latin American republics. In this article, I explore how intervention in Latin America, and particularly its turn to arbitration, produced the highly-contested doctrine of state responsibility for rebels. Reading this history in the context of decolonization, capitalist expansion and economic imperialism in Latin America, I argue that the doctrine of state responsibility for rebels was produced out of and used to manage the transition from old colonialism to new imperialism in the region so as to guarantee foreign trade and investment. Understanding this history, I argue, helps us to put back together the pieces of alien protection which fragmented after 1945 and illuminates how international law continues to protect foreign investment against rebels in the decolonized world.

The dynamic of the secondary market for sovereign debt has been affected by the presence of a peculiar category of holders: vulture funds. These funds, specializing in purchasing the debt of sovereign states in distress at a discounted market price, stay aloof from restructuring processes and then enforce their claims in courts to secure the face value. For low revenue debtor countries, paying the claims may involve reducing the resources available for basic services to the population. For very poor countries this also involves a significant regression in terms of development. Against this background, the purpose of this work is to inquire whether and to what extent there exists a rule permitting the suspending and rescheduling of payments so as to pay dues without impairing services. In order to find such a rule, inquiry is to be made into general norms: necessity and public policy. It is under the umbrella of the truly international public policy that the duty of a state to provide certain basic services to its population can be subsumed and the corollary of the suspension and rescheduling of these payments consistently with this duty can be applied.

This article examines the state sovereign immunity rule in the context of a rising number of sovereign wealth funds and their ever-increasing value of cross-border commercial activities in the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis. The concept of sovereignty and the rule of sovereignty remain in a state of flux while new actors such as sovereign wealth funds are participating in global commercial activities in a nontransparent and politically motivated manner. Accordingly, states may pursue strategic foreign policy objectives through these newer investment arms in an unconventional way, thereby being deeply involved in the political-economic arena and distorting the existing concepts of international law. This article posits that there is an international law black hole in which sovereign wealth funds have come to engage in commercial activities as well as exercise the public functions traditionally associated with states (acts jure imperii). The doctrine of restrictive immunity has come into question and the bulk of local court decisions have offered little clear guidance. Against this backdrop three interconnected perspectives are then discussed with reference to emerging economies like China: the immunity rule, the principle of sovereignty, and the balance of power in globalization.

This article considers the approach to the res judicata principle taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) and, specifically, its application in its 2016 judgment on preliminary objections in the latest dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. The judgment joins the small number of ICJ decisions in which the Court was evenly split, an altogether rare situation, which, at the time of the decision, had not occurred since the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Intriguingly, such a fracture seems to have been prompted by differences over the operation of a procedural principle the understanding of which is comparatively uncontroversial. Upon closer analysis, however, the disagreement reveals that more significant questions were at stake, with members of the minority issuing a vocal joint dissent and several individual declarations. This study will move in three parts: first, it will provide an overview of the nature and purpose of the principle of res judicata, its application in international adjudication, and its use by the ICJ; second, it will analyze the Court's reading of the principle in the case at issue; third, it will expose the broader implications of one such approach for the role and authority of the World Court and the international judiciary.

In 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.