The dichotomy of reason and passion is so deeply embedded in the construction of what is ‘legal‘ that it seems difficult even to imagine an international law that would not be entrenched in it. The very identity of international law seems based on its capacity to set itself on the side of reason, in opposition to the passionate, the irrational. Is not reason practically synonymous with order, and passion with chaos? And what is law for if not to bring about order, and to allow exit from our slavery under passion? Is not reason what is universal and objective, while passion is particular and subjective? And is it not then the case that a law pretending to universality must perforce align itself with the forces of reason?

On 11 July 1996, the International Court of Justice, in its third Substantive decision and first Judgment in respect of the dispute brought before it by Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia or BH) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia or FRY) under Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dismissed all the preliminary objections that had been raised by Yugoslavia, as well as several additional bases of jurisdiction invoked by Bosnia. The Court also found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and that the application filed by Bosnia on 20 March 1993 was admissible. It thus positioned itself, over three years after the application had been filed, to resume the proceedings to consider the case on its merits, though still on an somewhat lcisurely schedule.

Tadić (indictment of 13 February 1995)

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is specifically charged in its Statute with the protection of victims and witnesses. This mandatory consideration is also reflected in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘the Rules’). As a newly created international judicial organization, the 18 months since the very first decision granting protective measures for victims and witnesses was issued have been highly influential in identifying and laying down the basic principles upon which such protection may be granted within the context of the unique legal framework of the ICTY. The completion of the first trial has enabled the ICTY to put those principles into practice and evaluate them over a six-month period. This article will focus mainly on the experiences gained from the Tadić trial, with reference to other cases for completeness.