Fragmentation of international law is a phenomenon that has been discussed ever since the ILC in 2000 decided to add to its programme of work the topic ‘Risks ensuing from the fragmentation of international law’. Koskenniemi, in a paper published in this journal, was one of the first to address fragmentation in legal literature. In 2006, he finalized a voluminous report on ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, providing for means and ways to cope with fragmentation.

The traditional vision that international courts and tribunals do ‘good’ or create a better world through law is increasingly under question. International criminal justice started largely as a ‘faith’-based project, but is increasingly criticized in light of its actual record and impact. This essay examines this journey and, in particular, the role of ‘faith’ and ‘fact’ in the treatment and assessment of international criminal courts, through four core themes (‘effectiveness’, ‘fairness’, ‘fact-finding’, and legacy’) addressed in André Gide's version of the parable of The Return of the Prodigal Son. It argues that, in its ‘homecoming’, international criminal justice would benefit from a greater degree of realism by openly accepting its limitations and embracing its expressivist function. It cautions at the same time against exclusively quantitative understandings of impact, arguing that the power of international courts and tribunals lies not so much in their quantitative record as in their role in setting a moral or legal example or shaping discourse. It concludes that a better match between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ requires greater attention to the interplay between ‘international’, ‘domestic’, and ‘local’ responses to conflict, as well as recognition of their legitimate differences.

In 2012, the Leiden Journal of International Law (LJIL) celebrates its silver jubilee. Such a milestone calls for a brief sketch of LJIL's life and development over the past quarter of a century. This editorial accordingly narrates how LJIL grew from a modest student-run journal to establishing itself as a respected participant in the international academic arena. It is premised on the idea that LJIL's professionalization process and the gradual formation of a distinct identity in the field may be of interest to our entire epistemic community and those interested in the dynamics of the dissemination of scholarly ideas. Eventually, this editorial engages with some of the greatest challenges with which LJIL – as well as other actors in scholarly publishing – will most likely be confronted in the years to come.

Since the demise of philosophical foundationalism and that of the Aristotelian idea of an inner meaning of words, scholarship about international law is no longer perceived as a mining activity geared towards the extraction of pre-existing meaning. Rather, international legal scholarship is in a state of fierce competition for persuasiveness and semantic authority. This does not elevate persuasiveness into the determinant of legality, nor does it lead to a total rejection of the internal point of view. The configuration of that competition for naming is informed by the current structure (and the membership) of the interpretative community of international law. In this competition for naming, words constitute semantic weaponry. Mention is made here of uses of words in international law to create textual economy, generate semantic instability, rough out and hone scholarly ideas, enhance textual aesthetics, yield empiricism, create straw men and preserve the argumentative character of scholarly idea, gratify oneself, boost fame and careers, and intimidate peers. It is also argued that there is nothing to rein in in the use of such semantic tactics in the interpretative community of international law, for paradigmatic revolution is meant to be permanent. It is only if international legal scholars were to lose their social identity that the competition for naming and the interpretative community of international law would vanish altogether.

This symposium concerns the utility of the work of the French philosopher and social theorist, Michel Foucault (1926–84), for international law as an academic discipline. It almost goes without saying that there are several different ways to approach this question of utility. We want to introduce the symposium by sketching just a few of the different avenues by which one could approach the question of Foucault's utility for theorizing international law. One dominant understanding within the extant legal literature on Foucault is essentially to ask after his own legal-theoretical credentials. This approach is based on the seemingly straightforward and widely shared presupposition that if his ‘work offers no plausible account of law, why should legal scholars take him seriously? If we seek to bring Foucault into law, must we not first seek to bring law into Foucault?’1 Here, a precondition to being taken seriously within the discourse of law is precisely the plausibility of one's fidelity to existing conceptions of what law is. Somewhat solipsistically, then, from this perspective, one must first adduce a plausible theory of law in order to be taken seriously within law.

The extraterritoriality or extraterritorial application of international and European human rights treaties refers to the recognition by those treaties' states parties of the international and European human rights of individuals or groups of individuals situated outside their territory and, in a second stage, to the identification of their corresponding duties to those individuals. Examples of extraterritoriality abound in international human rights practice, and in particular in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law. Except for vague and often misleading gestures to the universality of human rights, which allegedly requires their extraterritorial application, however, many of the normative considerations underlying the extraterritorial applicability of human rights have not been broached in the human rights law literature. Nor, conversely, have human rights theorists, even among those who take the supply side of human rights seriously, devoted much attention to the threshold criteria for the abstract recognition of human rights and the trigger of the corresponding duties. To remedy some of those shortcomings, this article endeavours to bring some normative human rights theorizing to bear on the European Court of Human Rights’ recent practice on extraterritoriality. More specifically, the article delves deeper into the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ qua threshold criterion for the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights both within and outside its states parties’ territories; distinguishes it from related notions such as authority, coercion, power, or control; and explains its normative consequences.

The paper analyses the dynamic procedures that work during the formation of international law in international organizations and conventional frameworks. These procedures organize and structure the interactive exercise of the normative function by law-creating bodies and law-applying bodies. The paper conceives of this ‘way’ of making international law as a law-making method that the concept of standardization helps to understand. Grounded in Aristotelian dialectic logic, standardization indeed conceptualizes the dialogic and procedural law-making that works for normative coherence in contexts characterized by co-operation and the heterogeneity of interests. Introducing this concept, the paper insists on the fact that it is the procedural nature of the dialogue that is crucial to reach normative coherence. Drawing on the consequences of standardization, and regarding dynamic procedures, it reappraises the status and the importance of both the different sources of international law and the different participants to international law-making. Also, the paper points out the predominance of normative coherence, as well as that of its ‘guarantor’, namely procedure that its author considers the cornerstone of legal certainty in the co-operative context of the international society.

The goal of this article is to initiate an interdisciplinary and historical reflection on one of the central preoccupations of our time: the relationship of religion to international order. This current project grows out of my long-standing work on the genealogy of modern internationalism. In my past work, I have argued that internationalists constructed their own disciplines in tandem with their construction of nationalism, to such an extent that modern ‘internationalism’ and modern ‘nationalism’ must be understood in relation to each other; in the present essay, I contend that ‘internationalism’ and ‘religion’ have an equally mutually constitutive relationship. This article seeks to retell the story of international law over the past century through the lens of its relationship to religion – a lens that both overlaps with and differs from that of nationalism. Its historical narrative is rooted in the early twentieth century – a period to which so many of our ‘modern’ cultural conceptions may be traced. Its methodology is broadly interdisciplinary, setting changing international legal conceptions of religion in relation to contemporaneous developments in domains such as sociology, religious studies, and historiography. This is the first piece of a series of projected studies on the construction and contestation of ‘religion’, ‘the secular’, and ‘the international’ over the past century. It is also my first publication associated with the interdisciplinary Religion and Internationalism Project, which I co-direct at Brown University.

As a concept, ‘ethnicity’ has been informing the notions of the ‘self’ as well as the ‘other’ since antiquity. While in ancient Greek it referred to the ‘other’ in a derogatory sense, in the Romantic literature of the nineteenth century, ethnicity came to depict the self-image of the nation. Although, in contrast, the liberal self-image refers to ethnicity only in the instrumental sense (as a tool for regulation without attributing any real value to the notion), ethnicity remains salient in both the liberal and conservative versions of nationalism to identify the backward ‘other’ – the minority – within the nation. Against the backdrop of the nineteenth-century discourse on ethnicity, this paper explores how the notion of ethnicity having the image of ‘otherness’ as well as ‘backwardness’ shapes the liberal perception of ‘minority’ and ‘minority protection’ in the post-Cold War context in three different ways. First, I argue that ethnicity informs the perception of the minority as the ethnic ‘other’. Second, the individualist response to minority protection paradoxically endeavours to remove ‘ethnicity’ from the concept of ‘minority’. And finally, in the post-Cold War European scenario, it is again the ethnic ‘otherness’ that rationalizes a differentiated minority protection mechanism for the West and the East within Europe.

Religion plays a central role at the global political level despite being often portrayed as dead, marginal, or irrelevant. The way in which it plays that role, however, is not always immediately apparent or transparent. Professor Berman's essay attempts to illustrate the various ways – direct and indirect – in which religion is still central in today's debates about international law and politics. He does that by bringing us back to the interwar period, which saw an abundant flurry of arguments about international law, nationalism, and religion. He focuses in particular on the avant-garde movement led by Georges Bataille, who called for the shaking of civil society by appealing to the destabilizing forces of the (left) sacred in opposition to the conservative forces of the (right) sacred. Bataille's key insight is that religion has a contagious energy that is far more sweeping and powerful than the mere force of Western rationality. From this viewpoint, (international) law is incapable of taming the crisis of the West and of keeping at bay the perils of religion and nationalism.

In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared: ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.’ Michel Foucault in turn repeatedly referred to his method of study as description, arguing that the role of philosophy is not to reveal what is hidden, but rather to make us see what is seen. This essay suggests why the turn to description as a mode of legal writing might be a productive move at this time.

Engaging with a mundane topic like the softness of international law may certainly look surprising to the readership of a journal known for its avowed and constant quest for an intellectually and conceptually rigorous ‘off-Broadway’ scholarship. Why would a journal that tries to establish itself as a leading alternative voice in the field replay a comedy so often staged in mainstream scholarship? It is with the full awareness of such an anticipated feeling of déjà vu that the editors of the Leiden Journal of International Law have decided to open the ensuing pages to an oft-debated topic with the ambition of evaluating the possibility of transcending the traditional pitched battle between opponents and advocates of soft law. It is well known that, after the juvenile success of the concept1 and its embrace by a great number of international scholars, soft law became the object of severe criticisms, resulting in a chasm in the international legal scholarship. Indeed, the debate about soft law came to literally split authors into two camps, firmly pitted against one another. On the one hand, there are the advocates of the notion for whom the binary nature of law is incapable of explaining the complexity of the international exercise of public authority in a pluralized world2 or who see soft law as an instrument of (programming of the) development of hard law.3 These apostles of the notion of soft law are opposed by those who see the notion as redundant because it turns into either hard law or not law at all,4 it is self-serving for the profession,5 it is dangerously deformalizing our instruments of law ascertainment,6 or it is weakening the general authority of law.7 The fierce character of that confrontation originates in soft law's being intrinsically intertwined with one's core and inner understanding of (international) law, thereby making these discrepancies seem irreconcilable.

Nathaniel Berman's paper offers us a rich study of the interwar reflections about the intertwining between religion and nationalism, seen as ‘forces’ both dangerous and necessary, which should be ‘freed’ or ‘tamed’ in order to create a new political order. This theme is approached through its theorization by the French Collège de Sociologie and its non-academic philosophy of the sacred (mainly Bataille's transformation of the Durkheimian idea of a ‘left sacred’ and a ‘right sacred’), but also through the discourses and the practices of international law, by prominent lawyers, or through the way European nations dealt with the status of ‘minorities’ or with colonized people living under status of Protectorate. I much appreciate Berman's evocation of these various reflections and the way they ‘complicate’ (both as analysis and as symptoms) the problem of secularization as well as the question of legal internationalism. Let me develop these two points, before coming to some aspects of Berman's reflection that seem to me less convincing or more questionable.

Even if Foucault was generally disposed to avoid the category of sovereignty in his genealogy of governmentality, his lectures on the subject nevertheless have much to offer for our understanding of the historical tradition of international legal thought. The purpose of this article is to try to situate Christian Wolff's account of the jus gentium within Foucault's work, focusing in particular upon the way in which Wolff might be seen to exemplify elements of the transition identified by Foucault from government according to raison d'état to a new art of government informed by the emergence of political economy. This, it is argued, not only makes legible certain elements of Wolff's work that have otherwise remained obscure, but points also to the place of international law in the fine-grained materiality of everyday life.

Soft law is often seen as a way to overcome certain problems of legitimacy in international law, notably the weaknesses of a voluntaristic conception of international law's validity. Other perceived benefits of soft law include flexibility, speed of adoption and modification, and even effectiveness. Yet, soft law is seen by others as a threat to law, because it effaces the border between law and politics. This paper explores different approaches to the boundary between law and not-law that seek both to maintain this boundary and to reconceptualize it in a way that better anchors the validity of international legal rules.

Stability versus change is one of the fundamental debates of the law of treaties. The limits of pacta sunt servanda – under which conditions a state may derogate from treaty obligations when circumstances change – appears as a constant throughout the history of international law. This article examines the limits of pacta sunt servanda in times of fragmentation. It first discusses the mechanisms of general international law – supervening impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances (Articles 61 and 62 VCLT) in the law of treaties and force majeure and the state of necessity (Articles 23 and 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility) in the law of state responsibility. It is argued that they provide only insufficient means to accommodate change. Against that background, derogation is examined in specific treaty regimes, including international human rights law, the law of the sea, and international investment law. Treaty-based termination/withdrawal clauses and emergency exceptions are analysed accordingly. Especially the latter are formulated in a regime-specific way, adapting derogation from treaty obligations to the requirements of the respective treaty regimes. On the basis of an empirical analysis of relevant state practice it is argued that this regime-specificity – a sign of fragmentation – is especially important since there is an increased need for temporary derogation in contemporary international law.

This article surveys contemporary approaches to international soft law, such as various types of legal positivism, legal realism, critical legal studies, and global administrative law. It scrutinizes to what extent the concept of law endorsed by each of these approaches is able to tackle two challenges caused by the spread of soft law as a means of governance: (1) the fact that international soft law is today often the functional equivalent of international treaties and (2) the contestations of the legitimacy of soft law. It concludes that discursive approaches that stress the public character of international law appear very promising, because they link broad concepts of law with considerations of legitimacy. However, since international institutions today exercise public authority not only through soft law or hard law, but also through non-legal instruments like information, the article argues that one ultimately needs to conceptually dissociate the concept of international law from the concept of public authority.

This paper will address an often-neglected agenda of the much-derided League of Nations: its ‘social’ and ‘technical’ works. These targeted human security through regulating different forms of international mobility, including the fight against trafficking in women and children. The League used conventions and conferences to commit nation-states, in a legal model, to standardized anti-trafficking measures. It also, however, worked to educate and inform states, voluntary organizations, and the general public about the nature of trafficking and the ways of combating it. The latter techniques are here interpreted using Foucault's governmentality writings, which encourage us to look beyond the juridical epistemologies of international relations and international law, but not beyond the interlacing of laws and norms, here explored through interwar League governmentalities.

I thank the Leiden Journal of International Law for this opportunity to address the provocative responses by Jean-Claude Monod and Lorenzo Zucca to ‘The Sacred Conspiracy’. In this short reply, I seek to clarify some misapprehensions, as well as to sharpen the differences between us.

A survey of the case law of the ICTY and ICTR reveals inconsistencies and conceptual discrepancies in the approach to genocide cases, in particular with respect to the cornerstones of such cases – the identification of the protected group and its members – resulting in different levels of protection against genocide. A review model might help to address these issues, which are, arguably, preconditions of the legitimacy of these courts and of the effective enforcement of the prohibition of genocide. Given the close relationship between genocide and discrimination, this review model might be built on the ‘building blocks’ of discrimination law. The purpose of this contribution is twofold: (1) by unfolding the relationship between direct discrimination and genocide to devise a model of review, and (2) to analyse the consequences of the consistent application of this model for the identification of the protected groups and their members.