The multiplication of legal orders is characteristic of what one could call an age of globalization and counter-hegemonic globalization. In this age, the relationship between international law and other normative orders is increasingly important. The dominant disciplinary frameworks that provide explanations of such a relationship are focused on compliance with and/or the effectiveness of international norms in domestic legal orders and are derived from international relations. In this article, I examine the limits and possibilities of such approaches through a case study of the use of law (at multiple levels) by one of India's most prominent social movements, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada). The article argues that the use of law by a social movement is a concrete instance of counter-hegemonic globalization in which international law is one of many different legal orders, a situation of global legal pluralism, in which it is impossible to tell in advance which normative order will best advance cosmopolitan goals such as human rights.

Among the major crises threatening humanity today, forcing some 20 million people to flee their countries as refugees and displacing some 30 million people within the borders of their countries, are violent internal conflicts, systematic violations of human rights, massive denials of democratic freedoms, and frustration of sustainable, environmentally sensitive development. Although mostly grounded in domestic jurisdictions, these crises often result in human rights tragedies of grave concern to the international community. In this article, the focus lies on the state's sovereignty to underscore its responsibilities and accountability to both domestic and international constituencies.

International law remains in many ways a challenge to legal science. As in domestic law, the available options appear to be exhausted by either internal doctrinal approaches, or external approaches applying more general empirical methods from the social sciences. This article claims that, while these major positions obviously provide interesting insights, none of them manage to make international law intelligible in a broader sense. Instead, it argues for a European New Legal Realist approach to international law accommodating the so-called external and internal dimensions of law in a single more complex analysis which takes legal validity seriously but as a genuinely empirical object of study. This article constructs this position by identifying a distinctively European realist path which takes as its primary inspirations Weberian sociology of law and Alf Ross’ Scandinavian Legal Realism and combines them with insights originating from Bourdieusian sociology of law.

This paper will address an often-neglected agenda of the much-derided League of Nations: its ‘social’ and ‘technical’ works. These targeted human security through regulating different forms of international mobility, including the fight against trafficking in women and children. The League used conventions and conferences to commit nation-states, in a legal model, to standardized anti-trafficking measures. It also, however, worked to educate and inform states, voluntary organizations, and the general public about the nature of trafficking and the ways of combating it. The latter techniques are here interpreted using Foucault's governmentality writings, which encourage us to look beyond the juridical epistemologies of international relations and international law, but not beyond the interlacing of laws and norms, here explored through interwar League governmentalities.

The UN system requires far-reaching changes so as to achieve the objectives of the UN Charter (e.g. with regard to human rights and maintenance of peace) more effectively. European integration law suggests that ‘international constitutionalism’ offers the most effective approach for strengthening the rule of law and peaceful cooperation among democracies. Section 2 outlines basic principles for a constitutional theory of international law. Section 3 discusses the difficulties of ‘constitutionalizing’ the state-centered and power-oriented concepts of the UN Charter. Section 4 explains why the successful Uruguay Round strategy for replacing the old GATT 1947 by the new World Trade Organization (WTO) – notably the ‘package deal negotiations’, the incorporation of other worldwide treaties into WTO law and the mandatory WTO dispute settlement and enforcement systems – offer important lessons for the needed reforms of the UN Charter.

Investment treaty arbitration, unlike commercial arbitration, is not a purely private dispute settlement mechanism that is entirely subject to party autonomy and limited in its effects to the parties to the proceedings. Rather, it fulfils a public function in influencing the behaviour of foreign investors, states, and civil society more generally by crafting and concretizing international standards of investment protection. Investment treaty arbitration thus implements and operates as part of a public system of investment protection. Arbitrators, as a result, incur obligations not only towards the parties to the proceedings, but vis-à-vis the whole system of investment protection. These obligations can be conceptualized as part of the public law implications of investment treaty arbitration and affect, inter alia, the role and status of arbitrators in investment treaty disputes, the procedural maxims that such arbitrations should follow, and the way arbitral awards should be crafted.

From time immemorial amnesty has been employed as a means of promoting a political settlement and advancing reconciliation in societies that have emerged from repression. At present there is a trend in support of prosecution of those who have committed international crimes, such as torture and crimes against humanity, which excludes the possibility of amnesty. That amnesty is no longer favored is illustrated by the failure of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to recognize amnesty as a defence to prosecution. While there is no place for unconditional amnesty in the contemporary international legal order an intermediate solution such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with power to grant amnesty after investigation, of the South African kind, may contribute to the achievement of peace and justice in a society in transition more effectively than mandatory prosecution.

The received wisdom of the times is that a wide gulf has opened up between ‘Europe’ and ‘America’ – or at least has finally become visible. A commitment to a certain vision of international law is presented as a European trait that divides Europe from the United States. ‘European’ international law premises perpetual peace on rules that protect state sovereignty and sustain a world divided into territorial states, and it is at odds with the US preparedness to wage ‘total war’ in the name of some purportedly universal ideal, such as ‘human rights’ or ‘democracy’. This conception of ‘European’, territorially based international law versus US (or Anglo-Saxon) universalism is articulated most forcefully by the extreme-right legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt in his 1950 work, Der Nomos der Erde, and related essays; Schmitt, realizing that the state had met its demise with the fall of the Nazi project that he supported, now conceived of a world divided into Grossraume rather than states. Schmitt's conception was challenged by the Marxist-Hegelian philosopher Alexandre Kojève, both in correspondence with Schmitt and in a public lecture that Kojève gave in Düsseldorf at Schmitt's invitation in the 1950s. Kojève articulated an alternative view of global order and Europe's place in it – a view that accepted global Anglo-American military supremacy while advocating a distinctive place for Latin or continental Europe in the building of global justice and prosperity through economic and legal integration and the construction of a just relationship in trade and finance with the developing world. This essay evaluates the debate between Schmitt and Kojève and draws lessons for contemporary discussion of the place of Europe in a one-superpower world.

Modes of liability, such as ordering, instigation, superior responsibility, and joint criminal liability, are arguably the most-discussed topics in modern international criminal justice. In recent years, a wide range of scholars have rebuked some of these modes of liability for compromising basic concepts in liberal notions of blame attribution, thereby reducing international defendants to mere instruments for the promotion of wider sociopolitical objectives. Critics attribute this willingness to depart from orthodox concepts of criminal responsibility to international forces, be they interpretative styles typical of human rights or aspirations associated with transitional justice. Strangely, however, complicity has avoided these criticisms entirely, even though it, too, fails the tests international criminal lawyers use as benchmarks in the deconstruction of other modes. Moreover, the source of complicity's departures from basic principles is not international as previously suggested – it stems from international criminal law's emulation of objectionable domestic criminal doctrine. If, instead of inheriting the dark sides of domestic criminal law, we apply international scholars’ criticisms across all modes of liability, complicity disintegrates (as do all other modes of liability) into a broader notion of perpetration. A unitary theory could also attach to all prosecutions for international crimes, both international and domestic, transcending the long-endured fixation on modes of liability within the discipline.

On 23 September 2014, the United States of America sent a letter to the Security Council justifying the launch of an air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on Syrian territory. In this letter, the US referred to a formula that appeared a few years ago in certain scholarly writings: the ‘unwilling or unable’ test. The aim of this article is to show that this test has not been accepted by the international community of states as a whole in the Syrian case. It is also to stress that such an acceptance would lead to a radical transformation of the jus contra bellum regime, one that a large majority of states is probably not ready to accept.

The article engages in an ideology critique of international criminal-law texts and discourse, drawing on a theoretical framework developed by critical legal studies scholars in order to interrogate, in a different jurisprudential context, the assumptions undergirding contemporary international criminal-law (ICL) scholarship. It argues that the triumphalism surrounding ICL and its adequacy to deal with conflict and violence ignores the factors and forces – including specific international legal interventions in countries’ political economies – that shape or even help establish the environment from which such conflict and violence emanate. In uncritically celebrating ICL and equating it with a pacific international rule of law, ICL scholarship risks shaping passive acquiescence in the status quo and discouraging more throughgoing efforts to address the systemic forces underlying instances of violence, including political–economic forces shaped by international legal institutions.

The question of international law's role in progressive politics has become increasingly important. This is reflected in an upsurge in scholarship dealing with international law's relationship to imperial power and its progressive potential. There has also been an increase in the number of Marxist accounts of international law, with China Miéville's Between Equal Rights being particularly important. Miéville's book is very pessimistic as to the progressive potential of international law. This article contests Miéville's claims by examining his accounts of legal subjectivity, violence, and indeterminacy, and argues that international law's content is open to progressive appropriations. However, the ‘form’ of international law limits its ability to criticize systemic or structural problems, so that it has very little transformative potential. A progressive politics of international law must therefore take advantage of content without falling foul of form. The article finally enquires whether in some extraordinary situations international law might be transformative.

A recent editorial in this journal stressed the need to rearticulate the methodology – and thereby the distinctiveness – of international law in the context of blurring disciplinary lines between international law and international relations. The aim of this article is to contribute to the methodological aspect of the debate. First, the article outlines a legal empirical approach, which complements legal methodology of international law with empirical tools and techniques such as citation network analysis and corpus linguistics. Second, the article applies the approach on the case law of two European courts: the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It demonstrates how the study of case citations and the language of courts enhance the validity, reliability, and transparency of the established legal method. In particular, scholars of international law gain a stable and complete quantitative basis for a further in-depth study of case law, precedent and interpretation. Additional benefit stems from a set of transparent criteria by which to criticize the jurisprudence of international courts. Firmer ground emerges from which to evaluate the courts’ role in the political process, their societal impact and their legitimacy. At the same time the approach preserves the main features of the distinct legal methodology of international law – especially its attention to legal detail.

The MOX Plant and IJzeren Rijn disputes illustrate the growing problem of concurrent jurisdiction between international courts and tribunals and the ECJ. This article argues that in cases in which Community law is involved in a dispute between two EC member states, international courts and tribunals must accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 292 of the EC Treaty to decide these cases. However, only the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in the MOX Plant case stayed the proceedings and requested that the parties first find out whether the ECJ had jurisdiction, whereas the OSPAR as well as the IJzeren Rijn arbitral tribunals rendered their awards despite the implications of Article 292. Thus it appears that every arbitral tribunal decides the issue of Article 292 as it sees fit. This situation, it is argued, requires the creation of some sort of hierarchy between the growing number of international courts and tribunals in order to co-ordinate and harmonize their decisions so as to avoid a fragmentation of international law.

The New Legal Realist approach to international law builds from a jurisprudential tradition that asks how actors use and apply law in order to understand how law obtains meaning, is practised, and changes over time. The article addresses the jurisprudential roots of the New Legal Realism, its core attributes, and six important components in the current transnational context. In the pragmatist tradition, the New Legal Realism is both empirical and problem-centred, attending to both context and legal normativity. What is new is the rise of transnational activity that gives rise to an enlarged scope of transnational problem-solving through international law in radically new ways across areas of law, and the growth of empirical study of these phenomena. The article concludes by addressing the potential risks of the New Legal Realist approach in terms of scientism and relativism, and it responds to them.

The dominant international legal theories are based on an understanding of international law in terms of a solely state-based system. This article challenges those theories in the context of the practice of the participants in the international legal system. It proposes an inclusive conceptual approach which acknowledges that non-state actors have distinct and independent international rights, responsibilities, and abilities to bring claims, as well as clear roles in the creation, development, and enforcement of international law, which are separate to that of states. While states currently have a primary role in the international legal system, this role is not exclusive.

On 21 January 2011, the pre-trial judge of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (hereinafter ‘STL’) posed several questions to the Appeals Chamber (‘Chamber’)1 pursuant to Rule 68(G) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.2 Three of these questions dealt with the crime of terrorism.3 (i) Should the Tribunal take into account international notions on terrorism even though Article 2 of the Statute only refers to the Lebanese Criminal Code (‘LCC’)? (ii) If so, is there an international definition of ‘terrorism’ and how should it be applied? (iii) If not, how is the Lebanese definition of ‘terrorism’ to be interpreted by the Chamber? Both the prosecution and defence submitted extensive briefs dealing, inter alia, with these questions.4 Additionally, two amicus curiae briefs were submitted.5 On 16 February 2011, the Chamber issued its (interlocutory) decision pursuant to Rule 176 bis (A).6 The Chamber argues, in a nutshell, that terrorism has become a crime under international law and that the respective international definition influences the (applicable) Lebanese law. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that the Chamber's considerations, albeit innovative and creative, are essentially obiter, since the applicable terrorism definition can be found, without further ado, in the Lebanese law. There is no need to internationalize or reinterpret this law; it should be applied before the STL as understood in Lebanese practice. As to the Chamber's affirmation that there is a crime of terrorism under international law, I will argue, in the second part of the paper, that the available sources indicate, at best, that terrorism is a particularly serious transnational, treaty-based crime that comes close to a ‘true’ international crime but has not yet reached this status. Notwithstanding, the general elements of this crime can be inferred from the relevant sources of international law.

Responding to an urgent request by the authorities of Mali, France launched Operation Serval against several terrorist armed groups in January 2013. The French troops were assisted by a Chadian contingent and by forces progressively deployed by other African countries within a UNSC authorized African force (Resolution 2085). While the French and African military operations in Mali were clearly legal, they raise important questions of jus ad bellum in relation to the two legal arguments put forward to justify them: intervention by invitation, and UNSC authorization. In this paper we first discuss the general rules of international law applying to intervention by invitation. We explain that such an intervention could sometimes be contrary to the principle of self-determination and we propose a purpose-based approach. We then apply these rules to the situation in Mali and conclude that the French and Chadian interventions were legal because, on the one hand, the request was validly formulated by the internationally recognized government of Mali and, on the other hand, their legitimate purpose was to fight terrorism. The UNSC approved this legal basis and ‘helped’ France and Chad appeal validly to it by listing the enemy as ‘terrorist groups’. It gave its ‘blessing’ to these interventions, without authorizing them, and observed the events with relief. The adoption of Resolution 2100 on 25 April 2013 raises new legal questions. The Council creates a UN peace enforcement mission in Mali, MINUSMA, which has a robust use-of-force mandate. Created just a few weeks after the DRC Intervention Brigade, this force seems to indicate an ongoing evolution (revolution?) in UN peacekeeping, notwithstanding the assurances by some UNSC member states that MINUSMA will avoid ‘offensive counter-terrorism operations’. At the same time Resolution 2100 gives a restricted use-of-force mandate to France (to protect MINUSMA), without challenging the legal validity of intervention by invitation for all other tasks. The conflict in Mali might thus remain for some time yet between the latitude of UNSC authorization and the longitude of unilateral intervention by invitation.

The UN Security Council has recently referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court. This has been hailed as a breakthrough in international criminal justice. However, aspects of the referral resolution can be criticized from the point of view of their consistency with both the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. The limitations of the referral with respect to whom the Court may investigate also raise issues with respect to the rule of law. In addition, Sudan has accused the Security Council of acting in a neo-colonial fashion by referring the situation in Darfur to the Court. This article investigates these criticisms against the background of the international system in which international criminal law operates, and concludes that although the referral cannot be considered neo-colonial in nature, the referral can be criticized as selective and as an incomplete reaction to the crisis in Darfur. The referral remains, however, a positive step.

In 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon purported to identify a customary international crime of transnational terrorism and applied it in interpreting domestic terrorism offences under Lebanese law. This article argues that the Tribunal's decision was incorrect because all the sources of custom relied upon by the Appeals Chamber – national legislation, judicial decisions, regional and international treaties, and UN resolutions – were misinterpreted, exaggerated, or erroneously applied. The Tribunal's laissez-faire attitude towards custom formation jeopardizes the freedom from retrospective criminal punishment, subjugating the human rights of potential defendants to the Tribunal's own moralizing conception of what the law ought to be. The decision is not good for international law or public confidence in its institutions and processes.